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Facilitating the Dreams of Politicians

Facilitating the Dreams of Politicians

I’m a life actuary, not a pension actuary, so take my musings here as the rant of a relatively well-informed amateur.? I have reviewed the book Pension Dumping, and will review Roger Lowenstein’s book, While America Aged, in the near term.

First, a few personal remembrances.?? I remember taking the old exam 7 for actuaries — yes, I’ve been in the profession that long, studying pension funding and laws to the degree that all actuaries had to at that time.? I marveled at the degree of flexibility that pension actuaries had in setting investment assumptions (and future earnings assumptions), and the degree to which funding was back-end loaded to many plan sponsors.?? I felt that there was far less of a provision for adverse deviation in pensions than in life insurance reserving.

I have also met my share (a few, not many) of pension actuaries who seemed to feel their greatest obligation was to reduce the amount the plan sponsor paid each year.

I also remember being in the terminal funding business at AIG, when Congress made it almost impossible for plan sponsors to terminate a plan and take out the excess assets.? Though laudable for trying to protect overfunding, it told plan sponsors that pension plans are roach motels for corporate cash — money can go in, but it can’t come out, so minimize the amount you put in.

The IRS was no help here either, creating rules against companies that overfunded plans (by more than a low threshold), because too much income was getting sheltered from taxation.

Beyond that, I remember one firm I worked for that had a plan that was very overfunded, but that went away when they merged into another firm which was less well funded.

I also remember talking with actuaries working inside the Social Security system, and boy, were they pessimists — almost as bad as the actuaries from the PBGC.

But enough of my musings.? There was an article in the New York Times on the troubles faced by some pension actuaries who serve municipalities.? For some additional color, review my article on how well funded most state pension and retiree healthcare plans are.

Pretend that you are a financial planner for families.? You can make a certain number of people happy in the short run if you tell them they can earn a lot of money on their assets with safety — say, 10%/year on average.? Now within 5 years or so, promises like that will blow up your practice, unless you are in the midst of a bull market.

Now think about the poor pension actuary for a municipal plan.? Here are the givens:

  • The municipality does not want to raise taxes.
  • They do want to minimize current labor costs.
  • They want happy workers once labor negotiations are complete.? Increasing pension promises little short term cash outflow, and can allow for a lower current wage increase.
  • A significant number of people on the board overseeing municipal pensions really don’t get what is going on.? It is all a black box to them, and they don’t get what you do.
  • You don’t get paid unless you deliver an opinion that current assets plus likely future funding is enough to fund future obligations.
  • The benefit utilization, investment earnings, and liability discount rates can always be tweaked a little more to achieve costs within budget in the short run, at a cost of greater contributions in the long run, particularly if the markets are foul.
  • There are some players connected to the pension funding process that will pressure you for a certain short-term result.

Even though I think pension plan funding methods for corporate plans are weak, at least they have ERISA for some protection.? With the municipal plans, that’s not there.? As such, more actuaries and firms are getting sued for aggressive assumptions, setting investment rates too high, and benefit utilization rates too low.

The article cites many examples — New Jersey stands out to me because of the pension bonds issued in 1997 to try to erase the deficit they had built up.? They took the money and invested it to try to earn more than the yield on the bonds — the excess earnings would bail out the underfunded plan.? Well, over the last eleven years, returns have been decidedly poor.? The pension bonds were a badly timed strategy at best.

Now, like auditors. who are paid by the companies that they audit, so it is for the pension actuaries — and there lies the conflict of interest.? One of my rules says that the party with the concentrated interest pays for third-party services, so it is no surprise that the plan sponsor pays the actuary.? I’m not sure it can be done any other way, unless the government sets up its own valuation bureau, and tells municipalities what they must pay.? (Now, who will remind them about Medicare? 😉 )

The suits against the pension actuaries and their firms could have the same effect as what happened to Arthur Andersen.? These are not thickly capitalized firms, and many could be put out of business easily.? For others, their liability coverage premiums will rise, perhaps making their services uneconomic.

Finally, the flat markets over the last ten years have exacerbated the problems.? Partially out of a mistaken belief that the equity premium is large (how much do stocks earn on average versus cash), actuaries set earnings rates too high.? The actuarial profession offers some guidance on what rate to set, but the reason they can’t be specific is that there is no good answer.? With all of the talk about the “lost decade,” well, we have had lost decades before, in the 30s and 70s.? Even if the statistics are correct for how big the equity premium is, equity performance comes in lumps, and in the 80s and 90s, when we should have taken the returns of the fat years and squirreled them away for the eventual “lost decade,” instead, politicians increased benefits as if there was no tomorrow.

The states and smaller government entities have dug a hole, and they will have to fill it somehow.? Lacking the ability to print money, they will raise taxes as they can, and borrow where they may.? We are seeing the first pains from this today, but the real crisis is 5-10 years out, as the Baby Boomers start to retire.? You ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

More on AIG

More on AIG

Aside from Abnormal Returns (one of my favorites, good to see him back), my comments on AIG were also cited by Felix Salmon at Market Movers.? I tried to post this comment there, but the software would not let me, and I have no idea why:

Thanks, Felix.? With the Wells Notice served to Hank Greenberg, this chapter of the AIG story is not over yet.

Sometime in the future, I’ll find and post a copy of the memo where Hank Greenberg discovered the massive under-reserving at ALICO Japan, giving his response to the problem… but given the billion dollar hole, it was amazing that AIG did not miss earnings that quarter, because it was much larger than their quarterly earnings.

And some of my insurance analyst friends wonder why I don’t find AIG to be cheap…

But, regarding the recent AIG news flow, my timing is not something that I attribute to skill.? I don’t believe in luck, but that Greenberg would get the Wells Notice so soon, that AIG would indicate willingness to sell off non-core units, or that they would raise significantly more capital than they previously indicated was not something I would have expected would happen the next day.

As I mentioned at RealMoney back when Greenberg left AIG, my experience in my three years inside AIG was that we (the small actuarial unit that I was in in Wilmington, Delaware) found five reserve errors worth more than $100 million, but none of them ever upset AIG’s quarterly earnings.? That is why I remain a skeptic on AIG.

Post 700

Post 700

It’s that time again. As WordPress counts, this is post 700 on my blog, though the actual number is more like 80% of that. I take this time to write a post about the blog itself, rather than the things I ordinarily write about.

My blog is a tough one in some ways. I admire many narrowly focused blogs, because they do such a good job at their narrow tasks. Many of them are in my blogroll. I read my blogroll daily; that’s what is in my RSS reader.

But I care about a wide range of topics in economics, finance and investments. Anytime I focus on one narrow area for a time, I get negative e-mail saying that I’m not writing about what he wants to read. Well, I’m sorry. My interests are broad, and you will get a melange when you read me. I felt the same way at RealMoney, because I was one of the few writers that you could not predict what area I would write about next.

The markets have calmed down, and my equity portfolio has done well, but I do not think we are past the troubles yet:

  • We still have an oversupply of houses.
  • Investment banks are still overlevered in their swap books.
  • Commercial property prices are beginning to fall, and that will have negative effects on the equityholders, and those who finance them.

As for my business life, I am busy preparing to pitch my equity management methods to institutional investors. I have been on the other side of the table in my life. Hopefully that will help me meet their needs.

In closing, I want to thank Abnormal Returns, The Big Picture (thanks, Barry), Alea (thanks, jck), FT Alphaville, The Kirk Report, Seeking Alpha, and Newsflashr for their support. I also want to thank the many small blogs that like me and have me on their blogroll. That means something to me; I thank you for your support. I also thank the TSCM/RealMoney fraternity for their support. TSCM has done the world a service by training young financial journalists, and bringing talented investors into writing for the public.

I have a list of thing to write about next, and it is long. If you have opinions about what you want me to cover e-mail me here. I am horrendously behind on my mail, but I read everything that gets written to me.

Again, many thanks for reading me. I appreciate all who take their valuable time to read my blog.

Concluding the Current Portfolio Management Series

Concluding the Current Portfolio Management Series

To start, let me gather together my conclusions from the prior articles, and add one more:

  • Get the right industry.
  • Get a bright management team.
  • Don?t panic over small setbacks. Buy more.
  • Rebalance your portfolio regularly to fixed weights.
  • Dividends matter.
  • Buy cheap.
  • Trade away for better opportunities when you find them.
  • Don?t play with companies that have moderate credit quality during times of economic stress.
  • Measure credit quality not only by the balance sheet, but by the ability to generate free cash.
  • Spend more time trying to see whether management teams are competent or not.
  • Cut losses when your estimate of future profitability drops to levels that no longer justify holding the asset.
  • Diversify, diversify, diversify!

Okay, take another look at the graph above, and see that my gains are bigger and more frequent then my losses. Nonetheless, I took some significant losses. How could I bear those losses? Diversification. No position has ever been more than 7% of my portfolio, and the normal position is 2.9% in my 35 stock portfolio. I can take some whacks on individual positions if my overall investing is working.

My key question in deciding whether to sell a stock is whether I think its future returns are likely to be less than alternative investments. That is the only good reason to sell a stock, but few investors follow that rule. I may get my estimates of future value wrong, but if I do it consistently, my results should be good.

You can review my eight rules here. From my prior articles, you can see how my rebalancing trades have added value overall, even though on my losing trades, they added to the losses. Value works, Momentum works, and industry rotation works if it is done right.

My focus on accounting integrity, similar to to the work done by Piotorski, helps value investing work by avoiding value traps. I don’t miss every trap, but if I miss enough of them, I end up doing well.

Finally, our minds are not geared to make decisions where the dimensions of the decision are large. My methods compress the dimensions of the decision, and turn the decision into a swap transaction, where you trade something worse for something better.

That’s what I do in investing, and perhaps in the near term, I will gain my first sizable external clients. In closing, here is a list of all of my trades over the past 7.7 years:

Full disclosure: long the portfolio listed at Stockpickr.com.

Why Do I Blog?

Why Do I Blog?

I thought Felix Salmon did an excellent job on this post regarding economics blogging. His correspondent proposes standards for and a reward to be handed out to the best bloggers. Felix declines. I decline as well, which I will detail later. There are already ways for financial bloggers to be distinguished against one another:

  • What’s the Alexa, Technorati, and Quantcast rankings of your site?
  • Do journalists call you to talk about financial issues? (Happens to me a lot.) Do you get mentioned in the paper? (Uh, not so much… the copy editors leave me on the cutting room floor…)
  • If someone Googles a given term, where do you show up?
  • How many hits do you get per day? How many subscribe to your RSS feed? E-mail feed? Seeking Alpha? Other?
  • Do you get mentioned by Abnormal Returns? The Kirk Report? Other linkfests?

The thing is, the web is a very competitive environment, with a lot of bright people. Switching on the web is easier newspapers or magazines.

But why do I blog? Let me answer that with a different question, “Why did/do I write for RealMoney?” Well, it’s not for the money, though I would earn more if I submitted my articles to RealMoney rather than placing them at my blog. I like explaining concepts to people and seeing the light go on. I like hearing that someone made a better investment decision because of my educational writings. I also enjoy the challenge of trying to tease out conclusions from dirty data, using an approach that is eclectic.

Oh, and the money? Sorry, not much there. Though my blog costs me $200/year, it makes roughly $1000/year. The $800/year of profit is not enough to compensate me for my time; given the time required, I’m not sure what would be enough. I don’t do it for the money; I do it for the audience. (I would make more if I submitted it all to RealMoney, but then the audience would not be as wide, and I would not be building my brand.)

Now some bloggers are anonymous. I will mention Equity Private and Accrued Interest. Both know their stuff, and they aren’t pulling anyone’s chains. If someone writes anonymously, and does not know their stuff, their readership will not grow, because it will become known through the comments at the blog — it will not appeal to the intelligent commenters that help build an audience.

Blogging is in many ways tougher than being a young journalist. A blogger starts with no audience, whereas a young journalist has an audience from the publication. The young journalist will be guided in what to write about by his superiors, and will automatically get edited. The blogger has to figure out what he can adequately say, and whether anyone really wants to read him. The young journalist will have discipline imposed on him, whereas most successful bloggers have to develop their own discipline — one consistent with their posting style and frequency. Blog audiences decay rapidly with lack of attention, and there is a lot of competition to be heard. Journalists succeed or fail as a group, and the individual journalist does not have a lot of effect on that.

That last point should be changed to when journalistic organizations succeed or fail, the journalists inside tag along. Their competition does not primarily come from bloggers, but from Craigslist (classified ads), Google (targeted advertising), Ebay (targeted consumer to consumer sales), and Monster (Job ads and applicants), which dries up the real revenue streams. Plus, the younger demographic does not as easily pay for print subscriptions.

One other note — many popular bloggers realize that they could become a lot more popular if they head off in a sensationalistic direction, and a few do, with some cost to the truth. They do their readers little service. What I have stared down is that I could write only about stock investing ideas, and my site would be more popular. But those are far less certain than what I write about. I feel comfortable talking about my portfolio, which is over at Stockpickr.com, but individual ideas, particularly the controversial ones, have a lower probability of being correct.

Blogging is easier than being a journalist if you don’t care about being read. Anyone can go to Blogger or Typepad (among others), and start a blog in minutes. It is those bloggers who have something significant to say who will end up with an audience. I thank my audience that reads me regularly; I only hope that I can continue to be worthy of your time.

PS — I recently submitted my blog to Blogged.com, and the editor did not think that much of my blog. If you have a strong opinion about me, positive or negative, perhaps you could write a review. Again, thanks.

Book Review: The Fundamental Index

Book Review: The Fundamental Index

The Fundamental IndexThe books keep rolling in; I keep reviewing. Given that I am a generalist, perhaps this is a good task for me. Before I start for the evening, though, because I know the material relatively well, I skimmed the book, and read the parts that I thought were the most critical.

The Religious War Over Indexing

Passive investors are often passionate investors when it comes to what they think is right and wrong. For market cap or float-weighted indexers:

  • The market is efficient!
  • Keep expenses low!
  • Don’t trade fund positions!
  • Fundholders buy and hold!
  • Tax efficiency!
  • Weight by market cap or float!

For fundamental indexers:

  • The market is inefficient (in specific gameable ways).
  • Keep expenses relatively low.
  • Adjust internal fund positions as valuations change!
  • Fundholders buy and hold!
  • Relative tax efficiency!
  • Weight by fundamental value!

Some of the arguments in Journals like the Financial Analysts Jounrnal have been heated. The two sides believe in their positions passionately.

For purposes of this review, I’m going to call the first group classical indexers, and the second group fundamental indexers. The first group asks the following question: “How can I get the average return out of a class of publicly buyable assets?” The answer is easy. Buy the same fraction of shares of every member of the class of assets. The neat part about this answer, is everyone can do it. The entirety of shares could be owned in such a manner. Aside from buyouts and replacements for companies bought out, the turnover is non-existent. Net new cash replicates existing positions.

The fundamental indexer asks a different question, namely: “What common accounting (or other) variables, relatively standard across companies, are indicators of the likely future value of the firm? Let’s set up a portfolio that weights the positions by the estimated future values.” Estimates of future value get updated periodically and the weights change as well, so there is more trading.

Now, not all fundamental indexers are the same. They have different proxies for value — dividend yield, earnings yield, sales, book value, cash flow, free cash flow, etc. They will come to different answers. Even with the different answers, not everyone could fundamentally index, because at some point the member of the asset class with the highest ratio of fundamental weight as a ratio of float weight will be bought up in entire. No one else would be able to replicate the fundamental weightings.

So, why all of the fuss? Well, in tests going back to 1962, the particular method of fundamental indexing that the authors use would beat the S&P 500 by 2%/year. That’s worth the fuss. Now, I have kind of a middle position on this. I think that fundamental indexing is superior to classic indexing, so long as it is not overdone as a strategy. Fundamental indexing is just another form of enhanced indexing, tilting the portfolio to value, and smaller cap, both of which tend to lead to outperformance. It also allows for sector and company-level rebalancing changes from valuation changes, which also aids outperformance. In one sense fundamental weighting reminds me of Tobin’s Q — it is an attempt to back into replacement cost. Buy more of the assets with low market to replacement cost ratios.

But to me, it is a form of enhanced indexing rather than indexing, because everyone can’t do it. Fundamental Indexing will change valuations in the marketplace as it becomes a bigger strategy, wiping out some of its advantages. The same is not true of classic indexing, which just buys a fixed fraction of a total asset class.

Though the book is about fundamental indexing, and the intellectual and market battle versus classic indexing, there are many other topics touched on in the book, including:

  • Asset Allocation — best done with forward looking estimates of earnings yields (another case of if everyone did this, it wouldn’t work.. but everyone doesn’t do it. Ask Jeremy Grantham…)
  • The difference to investors between dollar vs time weighted returns by equity style and sector. (Value and Large lose less to bad trading on the part of fund investors… in general, the more volatile, the more fund investors lose from bad market timing.)
  • A small section on assumptions behind the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and how none of them are true. (Trying to show that a cap-weighted portfolio would not be optimal…)
  • And a section on how future returns from stocks are likely to be lower than what we have experienced over the last half century.

One more note: I finally got how fundamental weighting might work with bonds, though it is not explained well in the book. Weight the bond holdings toward what your own models think they should be worth one year from now. That’s not the way the book explains it, but it is how I think it could be reasonably implemented.

The Verdict

I recommend the book. The authors are Bob Arnott, Jason Hsu, and John West. At 260 pages of main text, and a lot of graphs, it is a reasonable read. The tone is occasionally strident toward classic indexing, which to me is still a good strategy, just not as good as fundamental indexing. (It sounds like Bob wrote most of the book from a tone standpoint… but I could be wrong.)

Who should buy this book? Academics interested in the debate, and buyers of indexed equity products should buy the book. It is well-written, and ably sets forth the case for fundamental indexing.

Full disclosure: If you buy anything from Amazon after entering Amazon through any link on my leftbar, I get a small commission. It is my version of the tip jar, and it does not increase your costs at all.

Financial Literacy for Children

Financial Literacy for Children

As we were driving down the highway Monday evening, back from our oldest daughter’s symphony concert at U-MD, my wife and I began talking about teaching children about money.? We homeschool, so we have to consider a lot in training our children for the real world.

Some of my children have an interest in the market, some don’t. Personalities differ, but you want to give them some core knowledge that everyone can use. There have been people in our home school get-togethers who when they find out I am an investor, they ask “Do you know of any good books on the stock market for kids?” Lamely, I suggest the out-of-print book by Ken Fisher’s son, Clayton, which is pretty good, but I didn’t think it was definitive.? One has complained to me about the Stock Market Game, which seems to teach speculation, not investment.

That’s true of most stock market contests — the only exception I can think of was the Value Line contest back in 1984 . I managed to place in the top 1%, but not high enough to win. That contest forced you to pick 10 stocks from ten different groups for six months. The stocks were sorted by price volatility deciles, so you had to pick some volatile stocks and tame stocks. The stocks were equal weighted, and there was no trading. Great contest — I would love to run something like that. I have suggested it to The Street.com, but no dice. Hey, maybe Seeking Alpha would like to try it! Nominal prize money, but there would be bragging rights!? (Abnormal Returns, this could work for you as well…)

My wife tells me to think about it. Well, today, as I’m going through my personal e-mail, I run across a note from the Home School Legal Defense Association promoting the National Financial Literacy Challenge. Timely, I think. They are having a competition based off of the national standards published in 2007 by the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Finance.

So I look at the standards, and I think, “These are pretty detailed… how can you turn this into a usable curriculum?”? I print them out and read a little bit of them to my wife Ruth, who says, “Typical for those that set standards, and aren’t teachers; you can’t work with that stuff.”? My wife was a high school teacher, and despite that hindrance, she still homeschools well.? But she knows the troubles that come to public school teachers as mandates come down from on high.

She asked me, “What would you recommend, then?”? I thought about it and said that the personal finance book that I reviewed recently, Easy Money, would be a good book for high school seniors to read.? It’s not a complex book at all.? Afterward I would discuss it with them.? She asked me why I hadn’t done that for our older two children and I said, “It was published after they went to college.? I’ll ask them to read it this summer.”

For investing, I still think that Buffett’s Annual Reports are understandable to most teens.? Marty Whitman is easy to read as well.? But I always liked Ben Graham, and I think The Intelligent Investor is accessible to the average teenager.? Good investing is not complex… but often we make it so.

Full disclosure: if you enter Amazon from my links and buy anything, I get a small commission.? It is my substitute for the tip jar, and it doesn’t increase your costs at all.

The Sea Change in Bonds

The Sea Change in Bonds

The bond market has had quite a shift since the last Fed meeting. What are the common themes?

  • Outperformance of credit, especially high yield.
  • Return of the carry trade.
  • Tax-free Munis have run.
  • Underperformance of Treasuries (longer= worse), and foreign bonds, particularly carry trade currencies like the Yen and Swiss Franc.

The willingness to take risks in fixed income has returned, particularly in the last two weeks. I don’t want to tell you that this is a trend that won’t reverse… it might reverse. Remember that bear market rallies tend to be short and sharp, and that the credit bear market in 2000-2002 had several legs. Leg one may be over for this credit bear market, but that doesn’t mean the credit bear market is over; there are still too many unresolved credit issues in housing, builders and investment banks.

Now, to flesh out the changes, I looked at the total returns on 15 major ETFs in different sectors of the bond market. Here are the returns since 3/19:

  • HYG — High yield Corporates + 4.47%
  • DBV — Carry trade fund +2.83%
  • MUB — National Municipals +1.10%
  • LQD — Investment Grade Corporates +0.99%
  • FXE — Euro currency Trust +0.29%
  • BIL — Treasury Bills -.06% (Negative on T-bills?!)
  • AGG — Lehman Aggregate -1.03%
  • SHY — Short Treasuries -1.18%
  • TIP — TIPS ETF -2.85%
  • IEI — 3-7 yr Treasuries -3.41%
  • FXF — Swiss Franc Currency Trust -3.44%
  • BWX — Intl. Gov’t Bond Fund -3.49%
  • IEF — 7-10 yr Treasuries -3.74%
  • TLT — 20+ Treasuries – 4.87%
  • FXY — Yen Currency Trust -5.30%

What a whipping for safe assets. Perhaps the Fed will be happy that they helped engineer the whacking. Then again, the TED spread is still high, and the change might just be a normal shift in sentiment after the panic leading up to the last FOMC meeting. Interesting to see both the return of the carry trade and credit spreads outperforming the move in Treasuries.

For those that follow my sector recommendations, I would be lightening, but not exiting credit positions in the near term. I’m in the midst of considering my other sector recommendations, and will report on this soon. For more on this topic, refer to:

Before I close, one large negative area where there is excess supply: preferred stock of financial companies.? There is a lot floating around from balance sheet repair efforts where they didn’t want to dilute the common.? (That’s the next act.)? I would stay away for now, but keep my eyes on selected floating rate trust preferreds, to leg into on the next leg down.

Book Review: Beating the Market, 3 Months at a Time

Book Review: Beating the Market, 3 Months at a Time

A word before I start: I’m averaging two book review requests a month at present. I tell the PR people that I don’t guarantee a review (though I have reviewed them all so far), or even a favorable review. They send the books anyway.

Included in every book is a 2-6 page summary of what a reviewer would want to know, so he can easily write a review. Catchy bits, crunchy quotes, outlines…

I don’t read those. I read or skim the book. If I skim the book, I note that in my review. Typically, I only skim a book when it is a topic that I know cold. Otherwise I read, and give you my unvarnished opinion. I’m not in the book selling business… I’m here to help investors. If you buy a few books (or anything else) through my Amazon links, that’s nice. Thanks for the tip. I hope you gain insight from me worth far more.

If I can keep you from buying a bad book, then I’ve done something useful for you. I have more than enough good books for readers to buy. Plus, I review older books that no one will push. I hope eventually to get all of my favorites written up for readers.

Enough about my review process; on with the review:

When the PR guy sent me the title of the book, I thought, “Oh, no. Another investing formula book. I probably won’t like it.” Well, I liked it, but with some reservations.

The authors are a father and son — Gerard Appel and Marvin Appel, Ph. D. They manage over $300 million of assets together. The father has written a bunch of books on technical analysis, and the son has written a book on ETFs.

Well, it is an investing formula book… it has a simple method for raising returns and reducing risks that has worked in the past. The ideas are simple enough that an investor could apply them in one hour or so every three months. I won’t give you the whole formula, because it wouldn’t be fair to the authors. The ideas, if spun down to their core, would fill up one long blog post of mine. But you would lose a lot of the explanations and graphs which are helpful to less experienced readers. The book is well-written, and I found it a breezy read at ~200 pages.

I will summarize the approach, though. They use a positive momentum strategy on three asset classes — domestic equities, international equities, and high yield bonds, and a buy-and-hold strategy on investment grade bonds. They apply these strategies to open- and closed-end mutual funds and ETFs. They then give you a weighting for the four asset classes to create a balanced portfolio that is close to what I would consider a reasonable allocation for a middle aged person.

Their backtests show that their balanced portfolio earned more than the S&P 500 from 1979-2007, with less risk, measured by maximum drawdown. Okay, so the formula works in reverse. What do we have to commend/discredit the formula from what I know tend to happen when formulas get applied to real markets?

Commend

  • Momentum effects do tend to persist across equity styles.
  • Momentum effects do tend to persist across international regional equity returns.
  • Momentum effects do tend to persist on high yield returns in the short run.
  • The investment grade buy-and-hold bond strategy is a reasonable one, if a bit quirky.
  • Keeps investment expenses low.
  • Gives you some more advanced strategies as well as simple ones.
  • The last two chapters are there to motivate you to save, because they suggest the US Government won’t have the money they promised to pay you when you are old. (At least not in terms of current purchasing power…)

Discredit

  • The time period of the backtest was unique 3/31/1979-3/31/2007. There are unique factors to that era: The beginning of that period had high interest rates, and low equity valuations. Interest rates fell over the period, and equity valuations rose. International investing was particularly profitable over the same period… no telling whether that will persist into the future.
  • I could not tie back the numbers from their domestic equity and international equity strategies in the asset allocation portfolio to their individual component strategies.
  • I suspect that might be because though the indexes existed over their test period, tradeable index funds may not have existed, so in the individual strategy components they might be done over shorter time horizons, and then used indexes for the backtest. This is just a hypothesis of mine, and it doesn’t destroy their overall thesis — just the degree that it outperforms in the past.
  • They occasionally recommend fund managers, most of whom I think are good, but funds change over time, so I would be careful about being married to a fund just because it did well in the past.
  • If style factors or international regional return factors get choppy, this would underperform. I don’t think that is likely, investors chase past performance, so momentum works in the short run.
  • Though you only act four times a year, that’s enough to generate a lot of taxable events if you are not doing this in a tax-sheltered account.
  • It looks like they reorganized the book at the end, because the one footnote for Chapter 9 references Chapter 10, when it really means chapter 8.

The Verdict

I think their strategy works, given what I know about momentum strategies. I don’t think it will work as relatively well in the future as in the past for 3 reasons:

  • There is more momentum money in the market now than in the past… momentum strategies should still work but not to the same degree.
  • International investing is more common than in the past… the payoff from it should be less. There aren’t that many more areas of the world to go capitalist remaining, and who knows? We could hit a new era of socialism abroad, or even in the US.
  • Interest rates are low today, and equity valuations are not low.

Who might this book be good for? Someone who only invests in mutual funds, and wants to try to get a little more juice out of them. The rules on managing the portfolio are simple enough that they could be done in an hour or two once every three months. Just do it in a tax-sheltered account, and be aware that if too many people adopt momentum strategies (not likely), this could underperform.

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Nerds and Barbarians

Nerds and Barbarians

There have been a lot of bits and bytes spilled recently over whether hedge funds like volatility or not. Here’s a sampling:

Here’s the truth, the answer isn’t a simple yes or no.? Hedge funds are limited partnerships that do a wide variety of things in the markets.? Some aim for easily modeled consistent gains through arbitrage.? Others aim for maximum advantage, no matter what.? I call the first group the “nerds” and the second group the “barbarians.”? Neither of these terms are meant to be insulting — I consider myself to be a nerdy barbarian.

Nerds are yield-seekers.? They are attempting to achieve high smooth yields well in excess of the nominal risk-free rate on a constant basis.? They tend to get funded by fund-of-funds who attempt to diversify nerds, and maybe a barbarian or two, who have clients looking for smooth yields in excess of their hurdle rates.

When volatility rises, nerds get hurt.? In the same way that junk bond investors get hurt in volatile times, so do hedge fund nerds.? Almost all simple arbitrages rely on calm markets, where there is enough liquidity to finance every project imaginable, and a few that aren’t imaginable.? Volatility alerts investors to the concept that maybe there will not be enough cash flow to complete the transaction at a positive net present value.

Barbarians are another matter.? They swing for the fences, and are looking for maximum advantage.? They look to earn the returns from big bets that could be right or wrong.? They like increased volatility, because it enables them to take positions when they are despised or enraptured.? They play for the mean reversion, something that the nerds can’t do.

To make matters more complex, some hedge fund groups blend the two attitudes.? Good idea, if you can maintain your competitive advantages.

To close this, there is no simple answer to whether hedge funds like volatility or not.? Some benefit,? some get hurt. In my opinion, because of hedge fund-of-funds, which like nerds, volatility tends to hurt hedge funds in aggregate, but not by much.

With credit spreads wide, and disarray among the nerds, it is probably time to favor high yield investing and nerds in hedge funds.??? Don’t jump in with both feet though, I would only allocate 50% of a full position at present.? There is a lot more volatility to be worked out of the system.

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