Month: January 2009

A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part III

A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part III

“Take your seats, Gentlemen.” Brad Baldwin intoned.? John headed for his seat, and realized that one of the heads of the subsidiaries was not yet there.? Where was the head of credit-related insurance, Jan Kimmelman?

As John sat down, Brad said, “You may note that Mr. Kimmelman is not here.? We fired him this morning, and his subsidiary is going into liquidation, depending on what we believe our best options are in the current economic environment.”

That news sent a chill through the room.? No subsidiary of Mega Insurance had ever been eliminated in its 40-plus-year history.? What else could happen?

Peter Farell, the Chief Investment Officer walked in, saying to Brad Baldwin, “Your special reports are ready.”? Then, looking at Stan Bullard, he said, “And yours are ready too.”

This floored John.? He had asked Peter for reports to bolster his case, but what would these other reports show?? The CEO never had extra reports on investments, and Bullard was always silent… what would he have to say?

Before his thoughts were complete, Brad said, “We will follow our ordinary procedures.? Each one of you will present the report for your subsidiary.? We will do a presentation of our own.? After that we will ask you questions.? Any questions?”

Total silence, partly out of shock.

“Fine then. Mr. Goldsmith, your report.”

Henry rose and referred to papers he had previously distributed.? There were shuffling noises for a moment, and he began his report.? Pricing trends were neutral-to-good.? They had pared back in competitive lines, and were expanding in lines where pricing was showing some strength.? Profits were adequate, and reserves were at the high end of reasonable.

John thought that Henry was the best.? He understood the economics of his business, and played the pricing waves like a pro at the top of his game.

At the end, Henry said, “Though conditions appear good now, and we will aim to do better next year, our profits could be affected by major disasters in the next year.? This is a cyclical business.”

At that, Baldwin said, “Mr Blitztein?”

Marc stepped forward, and began to discourse on competitive dynamics in the P&C business, particularly the short tail areas where they focused, and where the Law of Large Numbers could apply.? They were getting good results in auto and home insurance, and some of their specialty coverages were gaining traction.? Growth was slow, but they thought that the future could be better.

John thought, “Well good for you.? At least you don’t have asset problems to worry about… can your Zebra character come work for me?”? John shook his head.? Henry and Marc were in no danger, and Jan was gone.? Brent was obviously successful, which left him as the scapegoat.? His subsidiary could easily be merged into Whata Life, and most of Wonderful LIfe’s employees dismissed.? Great.? John had been a second father to many of his employees.? They weren’t just numbers to him — he wanted his employees to benefit from the success of the company.? As it was, he did not see how that would happen, given this meeting.? Bowing his head, he prayed quietly to Jesus.

With Marc’s presentation complete, Brad said, “Mr. Davidson, it is your turn.”

John looked at Peter, who acknowleged the glance, and then rose to speak to the meeting.? HIs stomach was quivering, but he knew he must give it his best.

Aggbank

Aggbank

I’ve been thinking about ways to set up an “aggregator bank,” [Aggbank] much as I would rather see RTC 2 come into existence.? If we are going to allow banks that are live try to shed their dud assets to the Aggbank, then, maybe this is a way that it should be done:

Aggbank needs real advice on assets.? Not just fakery from large asset managers, who might be doing favors for friends, but independent skeptical advice that realizes that many of the assets will not be “money good.”? Here is my advice:

Aggbank should solicit offers of assets, with prices.? It should then publish that it will buy so much of assets that have been offered, so if anyone is willing to sell it cheaper, submit their offers.

The winning offers hand over the assets and receive cash in return.? They also hand over two securities: a senior loan agreement and common equity 50/50, in exchange for an equity stake in Aggbank, equal to the price that the asset was sold for.? The equity stake is reducible/increasible if the eventual value of the asset sold proves less or more than the price it was sold for.

This provides reasonable incentives for fair sale prices, and protection to taxpayers, while allowing banks to lighten their inventories of illiquid assets.

A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part II

A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part II

John looked at the deep brown wood.? When he first came to the boardroom ten years ago he was impressed at its seeming splendor, and thrilled to be a new CEO of Wonderful Life.? Today, the thrill was gone and the wood just seemed dark.

?Hiya, Johnny! Howya doin???

With a jolt, John Davidson turned to face Brent Fowler, CEO of Whata Life.? He answered, ?Just fine, Brent, and you??

?Oh, Johnny.? There are always opportunities to be pursued in our business, and we are doing well in exploiting all of them.?

?Indeed, sir.? Congratulations on another good year.?? John choked up a bit as he said this, because he did not get how Whata Life could be so profitable and grow so fast at the same time.

?Thaaank you , Johnny.? If you are in the right place at the right time, the profits just flow, and that is where we aim to be!?

John didn?t have much to say to that, so he bid Brent adieu for the moment, and bumped into Henry Goldsmith, who was the head of Mega?s Bermuda P&C reinsurance company.? He had always found Henry to be a straight shooter, so he smiled as he asked, ?Hi Henry, how goes it on the rock??

Henry smiled and said, ?Not so bad.? No major disasters, so we make a lot.? We just have to leave some of it to the side for future disasters.? And you??

?Could be better, Henry.? The credit crunch is eating at our assets, and growth has been marginal, despite our best efforts.?

?How much money have you lost??

?We?re making money, Henry, but less than last year.? We can?t dividend as much back to Mega.?

Henry?s eyes widened, and he said, ?Oooh.?? My sympathies.? Look, it?s a tough environment; every life company is having a rough time of it.? Just look at AFLAC.? If they can?t make it, no one can.?

?Very true.? Thanks, Henry.?

?Don?t mention it, John.? Hey remember, if things go bad, I?m here for you.?

?Thanks again, Henry.?? John knew that Henry kept his word, so he considered it an offer to help him in his next job search.? Good guy, bad day.? At that moment the head of domestic P&C, Marc Blitztein, walked into the room.? ?Hey, John, old man, how?re you doing??

Marc was the youngest of the subsidiary managers, but he had turned around the flagging domestic P&C division by focusing on new quantitative underwriting tools before most of the smaller competition caught on.

?Good to see you, Marc. How?s business??

?Could be better.? Competition is rough, but we keep finding new ways for people to know us.?

?Indeed you do.? That Zebra mascot of yours is ubiquitous.?

?Ziggy?? What a concept!? It?s amazing what one good idea will do.?? John wished that he had Ziggy.? Maybe that Zebra could sell life policies as well.? Alas, he had no fancy logos or cartoon pitchmen.

John said, ?Well, more power to you.? Worried about this meeting??

?A little.? We aren?t growing the way we used to; we?re only around 10% growth, and loss costs are catching up with us, somewhat.? How about you??

John shook his head.? ?I don?t know.? Things weren?t great prior to the credit crunch, but given the effect on asset values, we are pinched here.? We won?t be able to dividend as much next year.?

Marc looked at him sympathetically, and said, ?I?ve heard what that can mean.? My heart goes with you.?

?Thanks,? said John, distracted as his cell phone bleeped.? It was his wife.

?Hi honey, you won?t believe what John, Jr., did today??

?Uh, dear?? Can I call you back this evening?? The big meeting is about to happen.?

?I?m sorry, dear.? Call me back.? I?m praying for you.? Love you.?

?I love you too dear.? Bye.?

As he turned his cell phone off, he saw that the CEO of Mega Insurance, Brad Baldwin, had entered the room, together with Stan Bullard, scion of the family that owned Mega.? Behind them was the CFO, the corporate actuary, and a person he had never seen before.? John wondered what might be going on, and thought that this would be one bad day.

Spot the Three Currency Regimes

Spot the Three Currency Regimes

I’ve had an interest in the Yuan since the revaluation in 2005. To start this off, two RealMoney CC posts:


David Merkel
Yuan Musings
8/10/2005 10:46 AM EDT

Today, the People’s Bank of China, in a speech given by central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan, announced the currencies that are in the basket against which it sets the value of the yuan. They are the currencies from the following nations, excerpted from the speech:

China’s major trading partners are the United States, the Euro land, Japan, Korea, etc., and naturally, U.S. dollar, euro, Japanese yen and Korean won become major currencies of the basket. In addition, China also trades significantly with Singapore, U.K., Malaysia, Russia, Australia, Thailand, and Canada, currencies of these countries are also important in determining China’s RMB exchange rate.

Nice. But the weights and whether the weights are fixed were not given either. I’ve run a constrained regression model using data from the last 15 trading days (which only gives me 4+ degrees of freedom), constraining the lesser currencies to a 10% weight at most. What I end up with is that the U.S. dollar is in the high-80% range in terms of weight in the basket. If true, it means that the change in the yuan peg accomplished little, as I suggested at the time.

This is a very tentative conclusion, because I need more data. Two weeks from now, I will be able to shed more light on this.

As an aside, I have a model for the Singapore dollar, where the basket weights aren’t given, and it’s very predictable and normal-looking. They clearly have fixed weights. Within two months, I should be able to determine whether the same is true of the Chinese yuan.

None


David Merkel
China’s Rigged Currency
9/30/2005 4:10 PM EDT

Please pardon a brief Friday rant on China’s currency. I have a model that attempts to figure out the weights on their non-disclosed currency basket. Given the multicollinearity problems of my model, here is what I think I know:

  • The hypothetical basket is composed 75% of US dollars. Probably some of that weight belongs to currencies highly correlated with the US dollar, but the model picks the US dollar.
  • The yuan has been artificially appreciated versus the basket Over the past month and a half by 0.5%. If all of the currencies in the basket were revalued equally, the dollar would be 8.133 yuan, as compared to 8.092 today. (Wouldn’t Washington squawk if the exchange rate actually fell below the initial devalued level?)
  • This may explain the recent move by China to change the currency bands for all currencies except the US dollar. It was getting too hard to do a controlled appreciation of the yuan versus the dollar while staying within their currency bands for the other currencies; it’s impossible to have more than one set of cross rates globally.

    My guess here is that China is trying to please Washington in a slow way, but retain the benefits (to the government, and those connected with it) of a managed currency. Investment implication: business as usual in China; neo-mercantilism continues for now.

    Position: none

    -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

    For those that missed my logic at the time of the devaluation, China kept its currency fixed to the US Dollar until mid-2005, then appreciated it in a dirty float until mid-2008.? Since then it has returned to a dirty fixed rate versus the US Dollar.? Note that the last regime shift fits with when things really began to turn down in the global economy.

    Make no mistake, China’s currency has been managed since 2005.? Timothy Geithner was correct when he said in his written responses to the Senate:

    President Obama – backed by the conclusions of a broad range of economists ? believes that China is manipulating its currency. President Obama has pledged as President to use aggressively all the diplomatic avenues open to him to seek change in China’s currency practices.

    Now, it was a mistake and impolitic to say that.? Given all the money that China has loaned the US in US Dollars, you don’t want to let the sucker know how badly he has lost money bite the hand that feeds you.? We need to send economic policymakers to media school so that they can know how their statements affect markets and foreign relations.? Learning on the job wears on us all.

    I don’t have a big point here, except to say:

    • China’s currency policy changed in mid-2008.
    • China never let its currency float, even against a basket.
    • Timothy Geithner needs to consider his words more carefully.
    • We need to consider what a pseudo-fixed exchange rate implies for economic matters.

    Personally, I don’t think that China keeping its currency artificially cheap can work in the intermediate-term.? But the Chinese Government does not think in terms other than what benefits their long-term control over China.? Other things can and will be sacrificed.? But maintaining control over domestic affairs matters greatly to the Chinese Government, and all foreign affaqirs must bow to that.

    The pseudo-fixed exchange rate will require increased purchases of US assets, relative to? an appreciating Yuan regime.? Perhaps we should be grateful for that.? If so, we haven’t seen any benefits, and neither hasw China.

    I wish I could give a crunchier conclusion here, but I can’t.? In our deflationary world, the temptations toward protectionism, even through currency policy, are significant.? It is no surprise that we are seeing this change now.

    Against Bank Nationalization

    Against Bank Nationalization

    With options, we often talk about them being in, out or at the money. When options are in the money, there is a high probability of receiving a payoff.? When options are out of the money, there is a low probability of receiving a payoff.? When options are at the money, it could go either way.

    The same is true of banks.? There are some banks that were cautious during the boom era, and their underwriting stayed conservative.? There are others that were so aggressive that once the results of their sloppy underwriting/investing begin to be realized, it will be obvious that they are deeply insolvent.? Then there are those banks that hang in the balance.? Which way will they fall?? Will they survive or not?

    I’m not in favor of blanket nationalization of banks.? My best example is the stupid move by Hank Paulson where he forced bailout money on a bunch of big banks, with no attention to whether they needed the money or not.

    Who could use the capital?? The banks that have big holes in their balance sheets can’t use the capital, because it will just plug holes, and maybe it will not be enough.? Those that are healthy don’t need the money, and there is a public policy reason why the government should not forcibly buy stakes in solvent companies.? But those that are on the brink could really benefit from a capital injection.? Anything to remove the uncertainty, and the high cost of incremental capital due to uncertainty over survival.

    My point is that our dear Government, should it decide to intervene in the banks at all, should aim its capital injections toward banks that are on the cusp of creditworthiness.? (On the cusp assuming that assets and liabilities are fairly valued).? Those that will likely eventually be dead should be declared dead, the assets absorbed by RTC 2 (in concert with the FDIC), and the liabilities absorbed by other local banks.? Those banks that are healthy should continue on.? Giving them more capital in order to lend more is a cute idea, but really, why should the government get involved if there is no crisis?? Many solvent banks are looking for quality borrowers now, and finding few of them.

    An aside: Why are we giving money to bank holding companies? If there is trouble in the regulated subsidiaries there might be a reason to help there directly, after cutting off the subsidiaries’ ability to dividend back to the holding company (and watching transfer payments — a good transfer pricing accountant is worth his weight in gold.)? Let the unregulated subsidiaries die, and the holding companies too.? If there are excess assets of these entities let them be distributed through chapters 11 or 7 of the bankruptcy code.? I understand exceptions for systemic risk reasons, but if the operating regulated banks are firewalled, that shouldn’t be as big of a problem.

    I’ve been a critic of the industry that I grew up in for a long time, but the state insurance regulators have a better handle on their companies than the banking regulators do from a solvency standpoint.? The insurance risk models work better, even though the companies are more complex.? Imperfect as the insurance risk-based capital models are, they captured much of the action.? The banking regulators did not get as much data, and did not see the damages that could occur in a real credit bust, because many were obscured by securitization and derivatives.

    There is no need to nationalize the banking system.? Set up RTC 2.? Let the regulators look at the banks on an asset-by-asset basis, and analyze what the hard-to-value assets are worth.? Compare values across companies to make fair comparisons.? Do triage then.? Send the insolvent to RTC 2.? Pump some money into the operating banks that are marginal, after cutting off dividends to the holding companies.? Let the healthy banks look for opportunities on their own.

    Our existing legal framework can deal with operating bank solvency problems.? We did not need something as big as TARP 1 to solve issues at the operating banks… but if we are profligate in handing out money to bank holding companies, then even TARP 2 might not be enough to deal with all of the mess.

    -==–=-==–==-=-=–=-=-=

    One more note: there have been times in insurance regulation where the regulators looked the other way and said to themselves, “Meh, the company is insolvent if we marked it to market today, but if I just give them a few years, operating profits will bail them out.? We didn’t pay close enough attention to the issues involved in the new assets they bought or new liabilities they issued, so I will be embarrassed in front of the Governor, legislators and media if this company goes down.? I will forbear for now.”

    And, about half of the time, that strategy worked.? Half of the time it didn’t, leading to a deeper hole and deeper embarrassment.? In more than a few cases where it worked in the short run, in the long run, the management culture of a firm that survived did not learn the lessons of undue risk taking, and blew it up again.? Part of fixing the system is weeding out bad management teams.

    So, when I see arguments that say, “Let the banks in trouble borrow at low rates.? The positive carry will bail out their balance sheets over a period of years,” I say, “Been there.? Done that.? Got the T-shirt, and a Polaroid of them drinking the Kool-aid.”

    Why provide a subsidy in such a haphazard way?? Manay banks have spent a great deal of time and effort developing low-cost deposit bases, and rotten managements should now receive a low funding cost?? If banks know that the regulators will forbear, and even subsidize their incompetence, why shouldn’t they take the free option, and continue to speculate?? Let the RTC 2 deal with the problem, and let them borrow at Treasury rates.

    Part of the need to collapse bad banks is a need to eliminate bad management teams.? Without that, the system will not reset properly as bad debts get cleared.? They will get cleared eventually, but what will the nation look like when it is done?? Will we still have the same level of property rights and the rule of law?? Will we have a currency that is worth anything?? If the last century changed the value of a dollar from a dollar to a few cents, what will happen with this century?

    A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part I

    A Day in the Life of John Davidson, Part I

    The alarm rang.? John shook himself awake, and rolled out of bed.? He dreaded that the day had come, but he was determined to face it like a man.

    Things were tough since the credit bubble burst.? Almost nothing worked that way it should, and today the CEO would tell him whether his subsidiary would live or die.

    Mega Insurance was a privately owned stock insurance holding company, owned by the Bullards, a wealthy New England extended family.? John Davidson ran one of the life insurance subsidiaries, Wonderful Life.? In the midst of the credit crunch, the holding company was doing triage.? Excess capital at the holding company was there, but not plentiful, and the Bullards did not want to pony up more capital.? As it was, they wanted to make sure that their capital was used in the best risk-adjusted way.

    Wonderful Life was a pretty bread-and-butter company as life companies went.? No equity indexed products, no variable annuities — just a variety of individual deferred and immediate annuities, structured settlements, term and permanent life products sold through their own field force.? They sat in the shadow of their more successful sister company, Whata Life.

    Whata Life had most of the lines of Wonderful LIfe, but they sold through independent agents.? They also sold EIAs, Variable Annuities and Life products, and had a group life, specialty heath, and pension business as well.? They had grown dramatically over the last decade, eclipsing Wonderful Life.

    John wondered why he had pursued such a conservative course as he drove to Mega’s headquarters.? He felt he could have entered many of the same lines of business, but the fixed costs would have proven too great of a hurdle, and the agency force was not anxious to do it.? Self-recrimination was easy, and John knew it was a weakness of his, so he laid it aside, putting his trust in God.

    Arriving at Mega’s headquarters, he met his longtime friend and colleague Peter Farell, the Chief Investment Officer for Mega.? Peter greeted him:

    P: Well, I’ve prepared the exhibits that you asked me to.? On the bright side, we didn’t do as much with hybrid securities in your subsidiary, because you asked us not to.? We still have the losses from Lehman, AIG, and many of our positions in financial bonds are trading rather poorly.

    J: How are the commercial mortgages?

    P: Under stress, but we stopped originating for you in 2005, so you aren’t that bad off.

    J: Any bright spots?

    P: Well, the long dated GSE debt that we bought when it was under stress was a hit, and the higher quality portfolio that you requested is holding up better than many of the other subsidiaries.? Also, the tactical move to buy a small amount of low investment grade and high yield in November paid off.

    John thanked Peter, and considered that maybe he wasn’t as bad off as he thought.? Sure, his division was a slow grower, but it threw off excess cash flow which Mega usually clipped as dividends.? Trouble was, that dividend would be reduced this year.? John paused and remembered what the prior CEO of Wonderful Life had told him regarding dividend reductions to Mega Insurance: “They fired that guy so fast that his severance check arrived home before he did.”

    Checking his watch, the big meeting was in a half hour.? He prayed in his own head and went to the boardroom.

    Hidden Credit Risk in Currency Funds

    Hidden Credit Risk in Currency Funds

    With more than a hat tip, but a full bow to my reader Eric, I present a recent comment of his:

    Eric Says: Regarding your existing portfolio, you?ve sometimes held FXF and other Proshares Currency funds. Based on the following excerpt, does it seem to you that these funds are too dependent upon the solvency of JP Morgan?

    ?The Trust has no proprietary rights in or to any specific Swiss Francs held by the Depository and will be an unsecured creditor of the Depository with respect to the Swiss Francs held in the Deposit Accounts in the event of the insolvency of the Depository or the U.S. bank of which it is a branch. In the event the Depository or the U.S. bank of which it is a branch becomes insolvent, the Depository?s assets might not be adequate to satisfy a claim by the Trust or any Authorized Participant for the amount of Swiss Francs deposited by the Trust or the Authorized Participant, in such event, the Trust and any Authorized Participant will generally have no right in or to assets other than those of the Depository. In the case of insolvency of the Depository or JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the U.S. bank of which the Depository is a branch, a liquidator may seek to freeze access to the Swiss Francs held in all accounts by the Depository, including the Deposit Accounts. The Trust and the Authorized Participants could incur expenses and delays in connection with asserting their claims. These problems would be exacerbated by the reality that the Deposit Accounts will not be held in the U.S. but instead will be held at the London branch of a U.S. national bank, where it will be subject to English insolvency law. Further, under U.S. law, in the case of the insolvency of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., the claims of creditors in respect of accounts (such as the Trust?s Deposit Accounts) that are maintained with an overseas branch of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. will be subordinate to claims of creditors in respect of accounts maintained with JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. in the U.S., greatly increasing the risk that the Trust and the Trust?s beneficiaries would suffer a loss.?

    I have written about credit risk of ETNs before, but now I have to write about credit risks of ETFs. When an investment consists of foreign currency bank deposits of a single bank, there is a concentrated credit risk. In this case, the credit risk is to JP Morgan’s London branch. A default could be messy, with different laws in the UK.

    This just highlights the risk involved with esoteric asset classes, where the “cheap” way of getting the exposure comes through credit or derivative agreements.? Be wary as you consider unique ETFs and ETNs; there can be credit risks that you have not considered.

    Book Review: Margin of Safety

    Book Review: Margin of Safety

    This book review is different.? I liked this book a lot, but I don’t want you to buy it.? Why?? I’m a value investor, that’s why.? More on that in a moment.

    What commends this book to our attention?? It is a well-written book on value investing by one of its leading practicioners, Seth Klarman.? I love reading books on value investing written by the experts who have done it so well.? It is useful to get their differential insights.? It sharpens you.

    What I found in Margin of Safety was a very good basic book on value investing.? It contains the usual warnings against speculation, which most retail investors do, and how Wall Street frequently overcharges and misleads retail investors.? Even institutional investors get cheated by focusing on relative performance, rather than absolute performance, according to Mr. Klarman.? As an absolute value investor, he wants to make money all the time, not just beat the market.? (A word here, if stocks beat safe bond investments on average, then there may be some validity to relative value investing.)

    The book was written in 1991, after the junk bond market collapse, and contains a decent amount of criticism of the era.? Buying high yields is not enough, those yields be realizable from companies that can produce cash flows to support the price of the bonds.

    The book also reflects the author’s early career in the investment shop founded by Max Heine, and run by Michael Price, until it was sold to Franklin Resources.? The Mutual Series Funds did ordinary value investing, but they also bought special situations, did deal arbitrage, bought distressed debt, and more.

    The eponymous and key idea of the book is Ben Graham’s concept of a margin of safety.? Invest in assets where your likelihood and severity of loss is low, given your purchase price.? Don’t take risks unless you are handsomely paid to take them.? If you buy enough of them cheap enough, you will do well in the long run.

    All in all, a very good book on value investing.? Why not buy it?? Too expensive.? The book is good, but very basic.? You can do better for free with:

    So how much would it cost to buy a copy?? $900-$2000.? You can see the results at Ebay and Amazon.? Put on your cost-sensitive sunglasses before viewing.

    It’s a very good book, but relative to what is available for free or at nominal (<$30) cost, it doesn’t make sense to buy it, aside from bragging rights.

    So, how did I end up with a copy?? I don’t have a copy.? I borrowed it via Interlibrary loan and quickly read it, sending it back to the nice library in Florida that lent it to my library.? I recommend that you do that as well, if you want to read the book.? If you are game, I also ask that you write Seth Klarman at:

    THE BAUPOST GROUP
    10 St. James Avenue – Suite 1700
    Boston, MA 02116

    617.210.8300

    Write a nice letter, asking him to do a second edition of the paperback version for a new generation of young value investors.? At least a reprint…

    For those just wanting to know what he holds for clients, the 13F is available here.

    PS — No link to buy it here, but remember, I do book reviews of all sorts of books, not just new ones.? Often the old stuff is better, like today’s book.? If you enter Amazon through any link on my site and buy anything there, I get a small commission.? It is my version of the tip jar, and the best thing is, it comes out of Amazon’s pocket, and not that of my readers.

    It is Good to be the World’s Reserve Currency

    It is Good to be the World’s Reserve Currency

    I decided to write this piece because of a short post at Alea; rather than comment there, I thought I would post something slightly longer here.? Consider the similarities between the US and Britain in the current crisis:

    • Accommodative monetary policies.
    • Generally free-ish with respect to financial regulation and credit.
    • Overleveraged housing markets after a bubble.
    • Banks that felt they could hedge risks and enhance returns through structured finance and derivatives.
    • Aggressive approaches to bail out financial institutions.

    There’s probably more, but now I want to highlight one difference: the US Dollar is the global reserve currency and the British Pound is not.? Thus Britain, as it tries to reflate, runs up against borrowing constraints faster than the US does.? Those limits aren’t showing up in their interest rates yet, but it is showing up in the currency, which has been falling rapidly of late.

    With the creation of so much liquidity out of thin air, the surprise is not that the British Pound is weak, but that the US Dollar is strong, and still regarded as a safe haven.? Then again, what are the alternatives?

    The Yen?? Japan has its own problems, and their economy is not large enough to deal with all of the financial flows entailed.

    The Yuan? Banking system too immature.

    The Euro? Too young.? Tha current danger of the Euro is not that it will be weak, but that it might be too strong, leading to hard adjustments in Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and tangential European economies with weak fiscal policy positions.? I’ve said it before; I’ll say it again: the Euro is a noble experiment, but currency unions that are not political unions don’t typically work.? Then again, most fiat currencies eventually fail.

    External commodity-based currencies?? None that I know of; few governments want to limit their power by tying their hands on monetary policy.

    That leaves the imperfect US Dollar.? For now, lending to the US remains open, despite the many problems, and the paltry compensation for lending to the US Government and those that they guarantee to varying degrees.

    If you live in the US, it’s a small reason for optimism that we don’t deserve, but it allows our government to borrow more.? Now, whether they will use it wisely is dubious, but things could be worse.? Ask Britain.

    A Different Look at Industry Momentum

    A Different Look at Industry Momentum

    Since 1996, I’ve been aware of research that indicates that momentum works in the stock market.? My quandry as a value investor has been to figure out how to incorporate it, if at all.? My approach was to play for the weaker mean-reversion effect, and have a lower turnover rate than would be needed in a value plus momentum strategy.? I am now questioning that decision, even though I have done well in the past. I just finished the initial stages of an analysis that will be available to my clients highlighting the value of momentum strategies.? Using the industries in the S&P 1500 Supercomposite, from October 1995 to December 2008, investing in the Supercomposite yielded an annualized price return of 4.0% (with dividends 5.5%).? The annualized price return for each momentum quintile, where momentum was defined as return over the previous 200 business days, was as follows:

    • Top — 11.3%
    • Second — 4.4%
    • Middle — 6.5%
    • Fourth — 1.7%
    • Bottom — 0.2%

    Now, there are several weaknesses with this analysis:

    • No trading costs.? (I think those could be minimized.)
    • Some industry groups are small, and could not accommodate a lot of money.? (Probably a large problem)

    That said, even with those difficulties, there should still be some excess return from following a momentum strategy.? What industries would that imply at present?

    • Education Services
    • Brewers
    • Biotechnology
    • Water Utilities
    • Insurance Brokers
    • Environmental and Facilities Services
    • Hypermarkets & Supercenters
    • Health Care Services
    • Packaged Foods
    • Pharmaceuticals
    • Gold
    • Multi-Utilities
    • Restaurants
    • Tobacco
    • Household Products
    • Home Improvement Retail
    • Food Distributors
    • Distillers & Vintners
    • Reinsurance
    • Food Retail
    • Integrated Oil & Gas
    • Health Care Technology
    • Airlines
    • Health Care Supplies
    • Electric Utilities
    • Distributors

    For a quick summary, think staples, utilities, health care (excluding insurance), and other industries with stable cash flow.? This is about as bearish as it gets, so be careful for now, and don’t speculate on when the turn in the economy will come.? Focus on what consumers always need. Or, as James Grant once said (something like), “Could this be a bull market in cash?” 😉

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