Month: January 2009

Book Review: The Heretics of Finance

Book Review: The Heretics of Finance

I’m not against technical analysis per se, at least not anymore.? I don’t think I understand it well, but after reading The Heretics of Finance, I’m not sure anyone really does.? Let me explain.

When I wrote for RealMoney, I often thought it was two sites in one.? Technical analysts on one side, and Fundamental analysts on the other.? Little interaction, except to snipe at each other every now and then.? I’m happy to say that I stayed above the fray, because as a corporate bond manager, technical analysis helped me manage market risk better.? I wasn’t sure how to apply it to equities, though, particularly post-decimalization.

I posted something like this three times on RealMoney, and aside from one private response from Helene Meisler, no one ever bit on my questions regarding technical analysis:


David Merkel
The Two Questions on Technical Analysis
2/22/2008 12:15 AM EST

I received some e-mails from readers asking me to post the questions that I mentioned in the CC after the close of business yesterday. Again, I’m not trying to start an argument between fundies and techies. I just want to hear the opinions of the technicians. Anyway, here goes:

1) Is there one overarching theory of technical analysis that all of the popular methods are applications of, or are there many differing forms of technical analysis that compete against each other for validity (and hopefully, profits)? If there is one overarching method, who has expressed it best? (What book do I buy to learn the theory?)

2) In quantitative investing circles, it is well known (and Eddy has written about it recently for us) that momentum works in the short run, and is often one of the most powerful return anomalies in the market. Is being a good technician just another way of trying to decide when to jump onto assets with positive price momentum for short periods of time? Can I equate technical analysis with buying momentum?

To any of you that answer, I thank you. If we get enough answers, maybe the editors will want to do a 360.

Position: none

That’s where I’m coming from.? In The Heretics of Finance, I received half an answer to my first question, and no answer to my second question.? Now, I enjoyed the book a great deal; it is well-designed.? The book begins by interviewing thirteen well-known technical analysts:

  1. Ralph J. Acampora
  2. Laszlo Birinyi
  3. Walter Deemer
  4. Paul Desmond
  5. Gail Dudack
  6. Robert J. Farrell
  7. Ian McAvity
  8. John Murphy
  9. Robert Prechter
  10. Linda Raschke
  11. Alan R. Shaw
  12. Anthony Tabell
  13. Stan Weinstein

Each chapter asks them a bevy of similar questions.? As I read the first thirteen chapters, my growing conclusion was many of them all do different things, but they all call what they do technical analysis.? I did get a half answer to my first question, in that many of them pointed to the books, Technical Analysis of Stock Trends, 8th Edition, and Technical Analysis of the Financial Markets: A Comprehensive Guide to Trading Methods and Applications (New York Institute of Finance) to a lesser extent, as definitive (and large) reference books on TA that give what they think is the overarching theory.? So, maybe I have an answer to my first question, but I’ll have to buy the books to understand it.

The next seven chapters ask all of the interviewees the same questions, allowing them to agree or disagree with each other.? The questions were asked to each person separately, in interviews from 2004-2005.? It would have been more interesting to have them all in one room, so that they could debate more, and question each other.

That said, many of the questions were interesting:

  • Does lack of academic support bother you?
  • Can TA be learned from books, or only through experience?
  • Are there universally valid TA rules?
  • Is it an art or a science?
  • How big of a role does luck play?
  • Do those that incorporate astrology into TA harm the discipline?
  • How much can TA be mechanized?

In the introduction, the authors, Lo and Hasanhodzic saw increasing acceptance of TA by academics, sometimes directly (challenging the weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis), or via behavioral finance (how value investors do TA).

There was no answer to my second question, as to whether TA is just a way of implementing a momentum strategy.? Surprising to me, Lo and Hasanhodzic did not think to ask the question.? (My opinion: aside from a few technicians that like to try turning points, yes, TA is a way to implement momentum investing.)

Who Would Benefit from this Book

If you want a taste of a wide number of accomplished technicians, this book will give you that.? It wilol also give you jumping-off points into TA literature and TA-friendly academic work describing Technical Analysis.? If you are into some of the main characters in TA, this tells their stories, and elucidates the attitudes of disciplined appliers of TA.

You can buy it here:The Heretics of Finance: Conversations with the Leading Practitioners of Technical Analysis.

PS — Not many book reviewers read the books that they review.? They read the summary that the PR flacks send, and rely heavily on that.? I throw away those summaries, and read the books.? That takes time, but I like reading books, and when I wrote for RealMoney, I often missed reading books.? Now I read them more, and you can benefit from that, because I don’t always endorse the books that I review.

I don’t have a tip jar, but if you buy anything through Amazon, after entering through a link on my site, I get a small commission, and your costs don’t go up.? I like taking? the fees out of Amazon, and not out of my readers.

Candidates for the Portfolio Reshaping

Candidates for the Portfolio Reshaping

Here’s my list of tickers that I have gathered over the last 3.5 months, that could lead me to replace companies in my existing portfolio:

AAP??? AAPL??? AB??? ABC??? AC??? ADBE??? ADI??? ADM??? ADP??? ADSK??? AEO??? AEP??? ALV??? AMN??? AMT??? AMX??? ANAD??? ANF??? ANN??? APA??? APD??? APH??? ARO??? ASF??? ASGN??? ASR??? ATI??? ATMI??? AUY??? AVX??? AVY??? AXP??? AYE??? AZO??? BA??? BAX??? BBSI??? BBY??? BDX??? BELFB??? BEN??? BGG??? BHE??? BHI??? BHP??? BLL??? BMS??? BRCM??? BRKA??? BRKS??? BRO??? BSX??? BVF??? BWA??? BWP??? CA??? CAH??? CALM??? CAT??? CBE??? CBG??? CCK??? CCL??? CDI??? CDNS??? CLX??? CME??? CMI??? CNH??? CNS??? COG??? COGO??? COGT??? COH??? COHU??? COST??? CPB??? CPWR??? CR??? CRK??? CRMH??? CROX??? CRS??? CRYP??? CSX??? CTAS??? CTSH??? CUTR??? CVX??? CW??? CY??? CYNO??? DE??? DEO??? DFG??? DLM??? DNB??? DOV??? DRYS??? DUG??? DUK??? E??? ECA??? ED??? ELRC??? EMR??? EOG??? EPB??? EPD??? EPE??? ESIO??? ESRX??? ETE??? ETN??? ETP??? ETR??? EXAR??? EXC??? EXPE??? FAST??? FBN??? FDO??? FDX??? FLEX??? FOE??? FORM??? FRPT??? FRX??? FSLR??? FTE??? FTO??? GD??? GFF??? GG??? GIS??? GNCI??? GNTX??? GOOG??? GPS??? GSIG??? GWW??? HES??? HI??? HLX??? HNZ??? HON??? HPQ??? HTCH??? HY??? IAG??? IBM??? ICE??? IM??? INTC??? IPAS??? IPG??? IR??? ISIL??? ITG??? ITW??? JCG??? JCI??? JNA??? JNJ??? K??? KALU??? KBR??? KCI??? KEI??? KFT??? KLAC??? KMB??? KMP??? KO??? KR??? LH??? LIMS??? LINE??? LOJN??? LUFK??? LUV??? MAN??? MCK??? MDT??? MEI??? MGG??? MHK??? MHP??? MHS??? MICC??? MLM??? MMM??? MMP??? MOLX??? MON??? MRO??? MSFT??? MTE??? MTSN??? MTW??? MUR??? MW??? MXIM??? NBL??? NDAQ??? NE??? NESN VX??? NKE??? NOK??? NOVL??? NPK??? NTRI??? NTY??? NUAN??? NVDA??? NVTL??? NYX??? ODC??? OI??? OKE??? OKS??? OPVW??? OPXT??? ORCL??? OXY??? PAA??? PAYX??? PBI??? PBR??? PCCC??? PCLN??? PCP??? PENX??? PKE??? PL??? PLCM??? PLXS??? PMTI??? POT??? POWI??? PPG??? PSE??? PSEM??? PSPT??? PTEC??? PTEN??? PXD??? QCOM??? RACK??? RFMD??? RIMG??? RNWK??? RTEC??? SATS??? SBAC??? SBUX??? SCX??? SD??? SEE??? SFN??? SHW??? SIAL??? SIGM??? SKX??? SLGN??? SMBL??? SNPS??? SO??? SPLS??? SPTN??? SRCL??? STJ??? STMC??? STMP??? STO??? STR??? SUN??? SWK??? SY??? T??? TAP??? TDK??? TECD??? TEF??? TEG??? TEX??? TGM??? TJX??? TMO??? TNB??? TNH??? TOMO??? TOT??? TRAK??? TRID??? TSCM??? TSN??? TSO??? TSRA??? TTC??? TUNE??? TWB??? TWLL??? TXN??? UMW??? UN??? UNP??? UPS??? URS??? USU??? UTX??? VAR??? VE??? VFC??? VLGEA??? VOXX??? WAG??? WAT??? WBSN??? WDC??? WFR??? WMB??? WMT??? WU??? XRTX??? XTO??? YHOO??? ZMH??? ZNT??? ZRAN

Long list.? I’m beginning to think that I get more ideas when things are bad.? But this list will have to be evaluated for :

  • Survivability
  • Valuation, and
  • Likely industry performance.

We’ll see how that shakes out.? Now to dig into these candidates.

Liquidity Management is the First Priority of Risk Management

Liquidity Management is the First Priority of Risk Management

This leson goes way back with me, to my graduate student days, where I was assisting the teaching of Corporate Financial Management.? At UC-Davis, this was the class that attracted the bright and motivated students.? I happened to get it as my first assistant role at UCD, not realizing it was a plum role.

One of the things we taught was that most firms suffer financial distress from a failure to manage cash flow properly.? That is a salient lesson in the current environment.? I learned it again as a young life actuary, because life insurance companies can die from credit risk, run-on-the-company risk, or both.? Consider Mutual Benefit, which wrote fixed-rate GICs [Guaranteed Investment Contracts] putable on a ratings downgrade, or General American and ARM Financial, which wrote floating-rate GICs putable on a ratings downgrade.? The downgrades hit.? They were toast.

Illiquid assets must be funded by equity or long-term noncallable debt, where the term is as long as the asset’s horizon.? (Near asset price tops, longer, near bottoms, long enough for comfort.)? This is the first step in orthodox risk management: assuring that you can hold onto your assets under all conditions.

But in this current crisis, this rule has been violated many times:

  1. Taking on mortgages where the payments can reset upward.
  2. Hedge fund investors thinking that their funds were liquid.
  3. Venture capital investors presuming that they would easily have the money to fund future commitments.
  4. Banks financing illiquid assets with liquid deposits.
  5. Pension plans and endowments going overboard to buy alternative assets.? (More on pensions: one, two, three)
  6. General Growth, and other REITs choking on maturing short-term debt.
  7. US states, especially California, presume on continuing good times, and overspending what would be sustainable in the intermediate-term.
  8. Investment banks and mortgage REITs that relied on short-term repo funding.? Bye-bye, Bear and Lehman.? Mear miss to Merrill, protected by Bank of America.? Many mortgage REITs dead, or nearly so.
  9. Derivative counterparties like AIG do not factor in the need for more collateral during times of credit stress.
  10. ABCP and SIVs presume that easy lending terms will always be available.

This is the advantage of the actuarial model of risk over the financial model of risk.? I have previously called it table stability versus bicycle stability.? A table always stands, whereas a bicycle has to keep moving to stay upright.? What happens if markets stop trading in any reasonable fashion?? WIll you be broke?? I submit that that is not an acceptable risk to take, because markets do fail for moderate amounts of time.

Better to manage such that you can buy-and-hold for moderate lengths of time, with enough financial slack to tide over rough patches in the market.? Analyze your cash flows over pessimistic scenarios, and ask whether you can carry your positions with sufficient certainty.? Sell down your positions to levels where you are comfortable.

When I was the risk manager for two life insurance companies, one of the first things that I did was analyze the illiquidity of my assets and liabilities, making sure I had liquidity adequate to fund illiquid assets.? The second was analyzing cash flow needs and making sure there was always more cash available than cash needed, under all reasonable scenarios.

This is risk management at its most basic level.? Many on Wall Street looked at short-term asset/liability correlations, and missed whether they could adequately finance their businesses under stressed conditions.

With that, I ask you:

  • Do you have an adequate liquidity buffer against negative events?
  • Are you only risking money that you can afford to lose in entire?
  • Are the companies that you own subject to financing risks?

Asset allocation is paramount in investing.? Bonds and cash get sneered at, but they play an important role in risk reduction for both individuals and institutions.? As my boss at Provident Mutual taught me, “Never risk the franchise.”? That motto guided me, and I avoided crises that other companies suffered.

Will it be the same for you and your assets?? Analyze your survivability in personal finance, and that of your assets, and make adjustments where needed.

Invest in Strength Amid Weakness

Invest in Strength Amid Weakness

Required reading: a word from my favorite deflationists — bond investors that have beaten all others handily, at Hoisington Investment Management.? They agree with my view that most of the actions taken by our government are useless or even counterproductive.? They cite Kindleberger, Schumpeter, MInsky and Kondratieff.? I would add in the Austrians.? High levels of debt and debt complexity lead to large recessions/depressions eventually.

High levels of debt and debt complexity rob an economic system of flexibility.? So long as the debt is increasing, there can be one tremendous boom.? But when the asset cash flows can no longer carry the debt, the system goes into reverse, with falling asset values. During that time, monetary policy is useless, and fiscal policy is useless, until the debt levels are reconciled.

We are in the midst of a great experiment.? Are the Neoclassical heirs of Keynes right?? Can you prevent a depression via loose monetary and fiscal policy?? Since loose monetary policy led to this crisis, why should looser policy solve it?

Also, fiscal policy has been loose for seven years — should extremely loose fiscal policy solve the problems?? And what of those who lend us money?? Should they be happy with dilution of their claims on the US economy?? What if they stop lending, which is in their long-term interests to do, but not in their short-term interests?

As for the Federal Reserve, with all of their cleverness regarding credit easing versus quantitative easing, the problem sill remains.? The central bank attempting to fix a lending market becomes a new offeror of credit, at rates the private market won’t touch.? As the central bank brings the rates down, grateful borrowers borrow, but private lenders would hang back, unless they became convinced that there was nothing to fear in the absence of central bank lending.? That’s pretty tough to achieve.

I don’t like quantitative or credit easing.? If we are going to be Keynesians here, let’s let the money supply expand, creating real inflation, and raise the nominal prices of homes that are currently underwater.? Rather than trying to be too clever, and trying to solve all problems without inflation, let’s have inflation.? I don’t think the problems can be solved without a rise in the price level, which will also make foreign countries adjust their policies to match US actions.

I don’t find the Federal Reserve exit strategies credible.? As we have learned before, introducing subsidies is easy, removing them is hard, and it doesn’t matter if the subsidies are monetary or fiscal.

My view is that we will go through continued deflation until the pain is too hard, and then we will experience inflation in a big way.? Thus I continue to advocate TIPS, and short corporate debt.? Away from that, I encourage caution — focus on companies that can survive the worst.

Can Someone Explain The Concept of Tough Love to our Government?

Can Someone Explain The Concept of Tough Love to our Government?

I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again, but bailouts must involve significant pain in order to be effective.? The bailout of Bank of America was far too gentle.? Many firms would want capital on those terms.? Bailouts should be an unwanted last resort that preserves stakeholders with priority claims, but destroys equityholders, and other junior claimants.

I’ve submitted many of my policy ideas to the Obama administration, but they haven’t gotten a warm reception.? If any of you would like to vote my ideas up, go ahead and do so here.? Thanks; maybe the Obama administration will prove more open-minded than the Bush, Jr., Administration.

Hidden Leverage

Hidden Leverage

When assets deflate, a lot of hidden problems emerge.? Long term guarantees seem quite expensive, as the ability to safely receive cash flows in the future diminishes.

That affects defined benefit [DB] pension plans.? When times were good back in the late 90s, DB plans raised their expected earnings rates on assets, which depressed contributions, and made the plans look even better funded than they were.? Flash forward to today — one decade later pension assets have done little to nothing, but the liabilities have inexorably accrued forward at their discount rate.? Now corporations and states need to make contributions to their DB plans when they can least afford it.

Think of endowments.? They are shrinking at a time when it is more difficult to get charitable donations.? Charities are shrinking activities as a result, at a time when more charity could be socially useful.

Think of charitable giving from the rich, which stems from the donation of appreciated assets.? There are few appreciated assets at present, and who wants to give extra from their operating cash flow when times are so uncertain?

Consider companies that bought other companies near the peak of the boom, or soon thereafter.? They are facing a hard road in debt service.? This applies to private equity as well.

Now think of governments.? They happily expanded programs, with little care for the future, as long as real estate and stock values were expanding.? The wind was at their back.? But now, with asset prices down, and transaction volumes diminished, the economic winds are in their faces.? What state (aside from Alaska) has a big enough “rainy day” fund?? Now states and municipalities are squealing for bailout cash.? Wonderful.

Even the Federal Government in in the same spot, but they have a printing press behind them, whether they issue money or debts.? They don’t have to run a balanced budget, so long as lenders comply.

Even foreign countries are exposed to hidden leverage.? Countries with large export sectors, where the government helped promote economic growth though subsidizing imports, are hurting now.? There was only so much additional demand that could be generated, and those markets are saturated now.

“You don’t know where the rocks are in the harbor until the tide goes out.”? Well, the tide is out, and most of the rocks are visible.? Firms with bad balance sheets have been revealed.? Entities relying on prosperity are being shamed.

I have said for a long time that leverage needs to come out of our economic system, and our government is fighting something that is inexorable.? We pushed too hard at the limits of what our economic system could deliver, and now the system demands a big pause to reconcile bad debts.

We will go down kicking and screaming on this one because the Keynesian received orthodoxy is so blind.? But eventually the need to reduce total financial leverage will be heeded, after every other wrong solution is pursued.

Next are JP Morgan and Wells Fargo?

Next are JP Morgan and Wells Fargo?

Part of the too big to fail/succeed legacy was the four banks that were inviolate: Citi, Bank of America, JP Morgan and Wells Fargo.? The Fed can’t let any of these fail, so Bank of America (what a nice name) gets extra aid, even after the almost failures of Citi and? Wachovia.

From an idealistic strandpoint, I don’t get the aid.? If aid were not available, Bank of America would have been less aggressive, and we would be moaning about the smaller Merrill and Countrywide troubles today.

But, that’s not the case.? The aid provided has perverse incentives to banks.? The more you moan, and the bigger you are, the more you get.

This will not end well.? My experience tells me that those who are dependent tend to be so, until something big jolts them back to independence.? After all, dependence is comfortable.

What I Would Do

What I Would Do

My friend Dr. Jeff wrote in response to one of my articles:

  1. Jeff Says:
    Most of the questions you ask have been answered on the public record. They are available for our evaluation.

    In the case of Lehman, the Fed could not take the collateral because it did not qualify. If they had, you would have been leading the charge in objecting. Treasury had no authority.

    In the case of AIG, there was concern about counter-party risk that extended worldwide. We got a demonstration of that from Lehman.

    I am mystified by your criticism of the Obama administration ? yet to weigh in on this.

    As a careful, loyal, respectful, and interested reader of your work, I have some questions. You have been critical of elected officials, appointed officials, independent bodies ? in fact ? every agency of government. Just how do you think we should be setting policy?

    Is there some other country or system that is doing this better?

    Just wondering?

Look, Jeff, I feel the same way,? I hate being merely a critic.? That is one reason that I submitted many of my policy ideas to the Obama administration.? Given the limitations of their website, though, I can’t easily point to what I submitted.

Aside from China, the competitive fringe in Asia is doing better.? Aside from that, other countries are a tie at best.

But what I would propose as a solution to our current crisis is this:

If I were offered the opportunity to fix things, I would take it, and:

The last one I like the least, but I?m afraid it would have to be done.? Phase two would be:

  • Move to a currency that is gold-backed.
  • Replace the Fed with a currency board.
  • Create a new unified regulator of all depositary institutions.
  • Slowly raise bank capital requirements, and make them countercyclical.
  • Bring all agreements onto the balance sheet with full disclosure.
  • Enforce a strict separation between regulated and non-regulated financials.? No cross-ownership, no cross-lending, no derivative agreements between them.
  • Bar investment banks from being publicly traded, and if regulated, with strict leverage/risk-based capital limits.
  • Move back to balanced budgets, and prepare for the pensions/entitlements crisis.

That is my proposal, and it is better thought out than the politically driven drivel that occupies DC today. I am thinking longer term than most politicians do, and aiming for a society that can work in the long run.

Reverse Engineering the Rating Agencies

Reverse Engineering the Rating Agencies

I get odd quant projects.? Calculate the value of an odd CDO.? One of the subprojects involved in that required me to reverse engineer the senior unsecured corporate credit ratings of the rating agencies.? My parsimonious model explained roughly 2/3rds of the variation in ratings. What were my factors?

  • Market capitalization
  • Bond sector (Financial, Industrial, Utility, Cyclical)
  • Equity implied volatility
  • Past total returns, which were significant last year, and not this year.

Note the absence of obvious fundamental factors.? I tried a bunch of factors, but none proved consistently significant.

My regression coefficients were very similar in 2007 and 2008.? I think the model is fairly stable.

Given the fundamental models used by the rating agencies for their ratings, this may mean that the markets reflect the analyses of the rating agencies.

For the average investor, this simply indicates that the values that the markets calculate in the short run are largely consistent with more complex fundamental models on average in this case.

-=-=-=-=-=-=-==–=-=–==-=-

For those that understand Regression, here is the output of the main model at the 2008 year end:

And here is the same output of the main model at the 2007 year end:

output of the main model at the 2008 year end:

Here are the variable definitions:

  • LNMC — natural logarithm of the market capitalization
  • New — Less than one year old
  • Financial, Utility, Cyclical — If not a Industrial firm, which is the default, what is the difference in credit quality?
  • Volatility — 90-day implied volatility
  • OYTR — one-year total return
  • TYTR — three year total return
  • TYTRD — has the firm been around for three years?
  • DebtMC — Debt/Market Capitalization
  • CDebtMC — Change in Debt/Market Capitalization over the past two years

The dependent variable grades from 1 for a AAA company to a 22 if it is in default.

Closing Out Ten Odd Lots

Closing Out Ten Odd Lots

1) Do you need new investment ideas?? John Dorfman’s column at Bloomberg is back.? There are some good ideas in the second column.? I always liked it in the past, and so I recommend it to you.? They don’t have a page for him yet, so perhaps this link will help if you want to see his ideas in 2009.

2) I have never read Atlas Shrugged.? I have better things to do.? But, I still believe that much of what the government is doing will cause more harm than good, because they delaying the reconciliation of bad debts.

3) We must restore confidence!? But what is confidence?? Are we talking about some loony Keynesian idea like “animal spirits?”? (We are sentient men, not animals, and have our own unique follies.)

When am I confident about my economic status?? I am confident when I think my goods and services have adequate demand, and my assets are going to throw off cash flow because the economic processes they depend on have adequate demand.? But that is a bicycle stability answer.? What if I am in debt, and most of my economic contacts are in debt, and many of our assets rely on the repayment of debt that is coming from assets with impaired prospects?

Confident men are willing to take on debt; they are so confident that they are willing to take some risk of a large loss from borrowing.? Men who are frightened try to preserve some subset of what they have.

My point is this: in the bust phase of the economic cycle, it is normal for those that have not planned prudently, keeping debts down, and leaving enough in reserve, to be scared.? Given the foolish nature of our government to encourage, rather than discourage debt, it has left us all less confident in the future.? 1984-2007 was one incredible bull phase, and it will be followed by an similarly large bust phase, as debts will have to be reconciled.

Instead, our dear government layers on more debt to try to solve the problem, risking the national credit for political gains.? Some of the debt proceeds are used to buy up other bad debts, others are used to recapitalize marginal institutions.? Nothing much happens, and the big risk appears slowly, that needed change has been postponed through government intervention, leaving a larger problem to solve later.

4) Are Defined Contribution [DC] plans fatally flawed?? No more so than Defined Benefit [DB] plans.? From the article:

The most obvious pitfall is that 401(k) plans shift all retirement-planning risks — not saving enough, making poor investment choices, outliving savings — to untrained individuals, who often don’t have the time, inclination or know-how to manage them. But even when workers make good choices, a market meltdown near the end of their working careers can still blow their savings to smithereens.

“That seems like such a fundamental flaw,” says Alicia Munnell, director of Boston College’s Center for Retirement Research. “It’s so crazy to have a system where people can lose half their assets right before they retire.”

Uh, many of the same flaws apply to DB plans, which are also under stress now.? After large market losses, DB plans will look for ways to reduce their liabilities.? There’s no magic here.? When the market goes down, everyone gets hurt, and corporations do not want to contribute more to their DB plans — they would rather terminate them, or shed them to the PBGC after bankruptcy.

5) As an example, consider the pensions of the automakers.? I was somewhat skeptical about the health of their DB plans, partly because GM had contributed a big slug of its own common stock as an asset in the past.? Where was the PBGC when the bailout discussion was active?? They could have derailed the talks by pointing out the underfunding.? Oh, wait.? They want more money to go to the automakers because it might minimize their liabilities.

6) What GSE (government sponsored enterprise) sounds like a mistake?? The Federal Home Loan Banks [FHLBs, pronounced “flubs.”]? They lurk behind the banks that own them, and provide credit to their owners.? As it is now, a large portion of the FHLBs may no longer deserve their AAA ratings because of the losses they may take from risky mortgage assets.

If the Treasury has to rescue the FHLBs, we are truly in sad shape.? They have operated behind the scenes for so long that few know about them.? Better that the owners bail out the FHLBs than the taxpayers.? As it is, the owners are already taking pain.

7) Do you need a free reading on your credit score?? Consult quizzle.com.? I tried it and found it to be free and safe.

8 ) Need some productivity enhancement tools?? Jack Ciesielski provides a year end list at his blog.

9)? I was unimpressed to say the least with this piece by Dean Baker on Social Security.? If all that he is saying is that some benefits will be paid in some form for some time, then I have no argument.? But if he is saying there is no plausible scenario where benefits will not be paid over the long term, then I disagree.? Here’s my argument:

Consider my piece The Biggest, Baddest Bubble of Them All.? The present value of the net liabilities of the US Government on a consolidated basis was $25 Trillion at fiscal year end 2002, $50 Trillion in 2007, and $53 trillion at the most recent reading.? We are facing deficits verging on $1 Trillion for the near future, and on an accrual basis, those deficits are over $1 Trillion, as we take in more than we pay out on our social insurance programs.

To close annual gap of $1 trillion, or even $450 billion (most recent cash deficit) through tax increases and spending reductions will be painful.? Much of the budget involves entitlement programs like Social Security that would be hard, but not impossible to change.? As William Proxmire said back in the early 80s in this famous exchange:

    Senator William Proxmire: “…there are 37 million people, is that right, that get Social Security benefits?”
    Social Security Commissioner James Cardwell: “Today between 32 and 34 million.”
    Proxmire: “I am a little high; 32 to 34 million people.? Almost all of them, or many of them, are voters. In my state, I figure there are 600,000 voters that receive Social Security. Can you imagine a senator or congressman under those circumstances saying, ‘We are going to repudiate that high a proportion of the electorate?’ No.
    Furthermore, we have the capacity under the Constitution, the Congress does, to coin money, as well as to regulate the value thereof. And therefore we have the power to provide that money. And we are going to do it. It may not be worth anything when the recipient gets it, but he is going to get his benefits paid.”
    Cardwell: “I tend to agree.”

    My point here is that benefits may get paid in dollars that aren’t worth that much. The cost of living adjustments will be limited or eliminated.

    Increased means testing will eliminate benefits to those that are better off, and turn the program into an old age welfare program, which will bring back the stigma of receiving benefits, and reduce its political legitimacy, because it would no longer have the useful fiction of something that is everyone’s right.? The “contributions” to Social Security are just another tax to support

    Benefits will be cut, and taxes will be raised, to be sure.? The point is that the government took the excess “contributions” and spent them on whatever the government needed at that time.? There was little care for future generations — spend it now.? Each succeeding generation gets a progressively worse deal from Social Security, paying in more relative to what will be received.? (As an aside, I know of few that are more pessimistic about the situation than the actuaries I have met at the SSA.)

    It is not impossible that younger generations might finally rebel against the burdens placed on themselves over which they have no say.? Social Security could be dramatically scaled back in such a crisis, to the point where it no longer resembles the current program.? At least that would be better than a failure of the nation as a whole.? There is some level of indebtedness at which the US government would fail, whether through internal or external debt repudiation, or inflation.? I guess we have to test how much US debt the rest of the world can take down before the door finally shuts to the US Government borrowing in its own currency.

    10) On that note, I want to close by mentioning my friend Cody Willard‘s new website SpokeUp.com.? Cody has been amazed at the anger he has been hearing over the current crisis, and our government’s seemingly unfair methods of handing out relief.? SpokeUp.com is an effort to enable people to connect over political issues, and possibly organize to effect political change.

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