Category: Industry Rotation

My Best Investments Over the Last 7+ Years

My Best Investments Over the Last 7+ Years

I’m going to go in reverse order here. These were my best investments in the Broad Market Portfolio over the past 7.7 years measured by total dollars gained. After this post, I should have one or two more to wrap up the series, to try to explain why I think my methods work, and flesh out the lessons that I have learned. I am a generalist, but if I have a core skill, I think it is being a portfolio manager, especially regarding risk control, though as I have admitted, I have had some real losers.

Drumroll, and here goes:

10) Anglo American plc

When I bought it originally, it was the cheapest of the diversified miners. I wanted some base metal mining exposure, because I felt it was an industry trend that was underdiscounted. The metal prices were ahead of the stock prices. (And, I wish I had never sold Cleveland Cliffs… then again, for many of the names on this post, I wish I had never sold a share, but discipline in risk taking gives you the confidence to take risks.)

The trading of this one was simple — one rebalancing buy in 2006 during a small metals panic, but aside from that, the thesis was perfect, and I kept selling as the price kept rising. As is common for me with big gainers in my taxable account, I gave away the last bit to charity. If you are charitable, giving away appreciated stock is a wonderful way to do it, and the Fidelity Charitable Gift Trust makes it sooooo easy.

9) Ameron International

You ever heard of Ameron International? I’m not sure to this day where I first heard of it. For much of the time that I owned it, it was one of the larger stocks with no analytical coverage. Ameron International is a multinational manufacturer of engineered products and materials for the chemical, industrial, energy, transportation and infrastructure markets.

Anyway, I bought some, and then Chris Edmonds, who at that time wrote for RealMoney, separately picked it for one of his Holiday Portfolios. I e-mailed my hearty assent.

Ameron didn’t do much for the first three years that I owned it, but I kept clipping the dividend, and doing rebalancing trades, while the internal value of the business grew. Finally, some institutional investor(s) realized what a gem this company is, and the price exploded. I gave the final slug to charity. Would that I had held on, but I have had other good stocks since then.

8 ) SPX Corp

SPX Corp is a diversified industrial corporation that fell on hard times. I looked at it as a turnaround, with global growth as a tailwind that would eventually drive the stock up. In the fall of 2004, I felt pretty dumb about my purchases, but I persevered, thinking that there was value to be unlocked through intelligent management.

Many companies that I own have significant declines for no good economic reason. SPX was one of them. It is difficult to tell apart those that will disappoint versus those that will persevere, but my experience is that more of mine persevere than fail.

Again, another company that in hindsight it would have been better not to sell, but it was outside my valuation boundaries, and as I would say along with Lord Rothschild, “I always sell too soon.”

7) Helmerich & Payne

I still own Helmerich & Payne, and have sold once more in May. As the oil price kept going higher, I looked for related entities that had not gone crazy and would benefit from the higher prices. HP was one of them. (And, as I wanted to say to my pal Cody Willard — “Hey, Cody, I own HP, but it’s the right HP.”)

Contract drilling is a great place to be, when oil prices are so high. During the rise in energy prices, I moved more of my exposure into services, because even if oil would not be found, still those that were aiding the attempt to find it would get paid.

6) Cemex SA

Cemex is the company that I have held the longest. I have long been a fan of the cement industry, because it is the cheap way to facilitate global growth, and catch up on delayed infrastructure investment in the US. My first article for RealMoney was on the cement industry, and I owned three companies in it at that time, a massive overweight that paid off.

It was not a popular idea to buy Cemex when I did. They had problems with derivatives and mis-hedging in recent memory, but the stock was cheap enough that I thought it was worth the risk. For the next year it got cheaper, and I bought more. Most investors would have assumed that they had gotten it wrong, and bailed out. That’s not my way.

As you can see, though the price of Cemex rose, it rose in a volatile way, and my rebalancing discipline captured a lot of extra value in the process. I still own Cemex, and still think that it is cheap, and that management is pretty bright. I’m getting close to another rebalancing sale. This is a gift that keeps on giving.

5) Valero Energy

I own Valero today, but I sold out of it in entirety in 2005. I also owned Premcor during the best part of the run, and through the acquisition by Valero. At the end, I sold some and gave the rest away. If I added Valero and Premcor together, they would be my #1 gainer.

When I bought Valero, I felt that refining was in short supply, and would get rewarded. I don’t expect to be right that fast, but it is gratifying when it happens.

Now, after Hurricane Katrina, I felt that the price rises were overdone for refining stocks, so I sold, and gave the rest away.

4) Lyondell Chemical

Lyondell was an idea that I grabbed from that grand old man, John Neff. He is a humble guy, so you won’t hear him tooting his horn. My idea was that they owned half of a refinery with Citgo, and the rest of their business I was getting for the price of the refinery.

As it was, Venezuela needed cash because of the self-aggrandizing goals of Chavez, and they sold their half of the refinery cheaply to Lyondell. There was some confusion in the process and the rating agencies had their doubts, but Lyondell managed it well, until selling out to Basell, a Russian company. I gave the remainder away to charity.

3) Conoco Phillips

I have owned Conoco for a long time. It is my second longest holding, and it has rewarded me well. It looked cheap when I bought it, and on an earnings basis, it doesn’t look much different now. I have had a few rebalancing buys, but on the whole, the mix of exploration and refining has done admirably.

2) Plum Creek Timber

There is a small complexity in this investment. When Plum Creek bought The Timber Company [TGP], I swapped my holdings of Plum Creek for the Timber Company. When the deal closed, I had more Plum Creek shares. Even after that, to mid-2002, I bought more Plum Creek, making it a triple-weight in my portfolio. I felt that timber assets were undervalued, and I was happy to clip dividends while the market caught up with me.

In late 2004, I began the process of scaling out of the position, moving from a triple weight to a double, single, and then zero weight. I like the management of Plum Creek, but there are price levels that I can’t pay, and I must sell.

1) Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo — SABESP

What a company; this was an idea from Cramer (yes). I have long believed the thesis that potable water is scarce, and that companies that facilitate fresh water will be rewarded. SABESP is one of the few companies that was cheap enough to buy in 2005, and remains so today. Demand for water remains high, particularly in Sao Paulo, Brazil. I have sold many times, but not bought because there haven’t been any pullbacks; what a happy problem to have.

So, there are my top ten. They are a mix of:

  • Get the right industry.
  • Get a bright management team.
  • Don’t panic over small setbacks. Buy more.

It is worth noting that the top 11 companies that I have owned covered all of my losses. The gains have been bigger than my losses by a wide margin , and I have had three gains for every loss. In my next post or two, I will wrap up this series, and try to explain underlying ideas that helped me do so well.

Full disclosure: long SBS COP HP VLO CX

Average? I Like Average, if It?s My Average. (Part II)

Average? I Like Average, if It?s My Average. (Part II)

Finishing off the average 10, the slightly better 5…

Deltic Timber

Deltic Timber was an idea that I gleaned from Jim Grant.? They have a lot of timberland in the Southern US, a decent amount of which is next to Little Rock, Arkansas.? The land near Little Rock, once developed, could be quite valuable in a bull market for residential real estate.? I ended up selling because I lost confidence in the residential housing market.

Honda Motors

I still own Honda.? Does the world need cars?? Does the world need small cars?? Yes!? Is Honda cheaply valued?? Yes.? Can they beat the cost levels of Ford, GM, and Chrysler?? Yes.? I like Toyota as well, and have owned it in the past.? I have owned American auto part manufacturers, but never the automakers themselves; their credit quality is too low.

Mueller Industries

This is a case where I found a cheap industrial, bought it, and waited.? The price rose, and I concluded that I had cheaper opportunities, so I sold.? Also, their raw materials prices were going to rise…

American Power Conversion

American Power Conversion was a cheap tech stock with products that are difficult to obsolete.? Eventually I had cheaper investments to buy, and I sold.? This is another example of how the rebalancing discipline can turn a flat stock into extra profits.

Australia & New Zealand Banking

This seemed to be a cheap, well-run foreign bank so I bought some.? As with many of my average investments, I sold it to fund other more promising investments.

Summary of Part II

  • Rebalance your portfolio regularly to fixed weights.
  • Dividends matter.
  • Buy cheap.
  • Trade away for better opportunities when you find them.

It is important in investing to have something to compare investments against.? Make them compete against each other for your dollars, and be rigorous about it.? Don’t invest because “That sounds like a good idea,” rather, is it better than what you currently have?? Keep improving the quality of your portfolio, in terms of cheapness, quality, and future prospects.

Full disclosure: long HMC

Average?  I Like Average, if It’s My Average. (Part I)

Average? I Like Average, if It’s My Average. (Part I)

Okay, same drill as my pieces for my worst losses, but this time I chose the ten most average investments of mine in terms of dollars earned. Remember, one of my key disciplines is rebalancing.

Honeywell

Honeywell was short and simple. I felt it was out of favor, and I bought some. Six months later, I had cheaper stocks to buy, so Honeywell was gone.

Stone Energy

Stone Energy was a weird one. As you will note, the initial purchase and final sale prices aren’t that much different. Interim trading made a difference to the total return.

The stock popped after hurricane Katrina, and sagged quickly thereafter on an audit of proven reserves that came up light. The rebalancing discipline was a big help here.

Dow Chemical

Dow Chemical has two stories. First, dividends are valuable. Second, rebalancing adds value. Dow was a cheap stock that did not get respect, but I still made decent money off of its gyrations, and dividends.

Universal American Financial Corporation

This one is too early to tell. I still own it. Sometimes investments make significant money out of the gate. That is not often, in my experience. This is a little individual and group healthcare company that has gotten smashed over the merger integration. That is a relatively stable business, but small healthcare players have been harmed in the past. Insider buying here is a plus.

Aspen Insurance Holdings

Aspen was a relatively cheap reinsurer. I bought some and sold a chunk into a runup, and sold the rest as I concluded that I had better places to put money.

Summary of Part I

  • Rebalance your portfolio regularly to fixed weights.
  • Dividends matter.
  • Buy cheap.

If done consistently, these principles will raise your overall return, and reduce overall risk. Pretty good performance from a bunch of average stocks.

Full disclosure: long UAM

Losing Money is Part of the Game (Part II)

Losing Money is Part of the Game (Part II)

Continuing on, here are losses six through ten:

Dana Corp

In some ways, this one was pure slop on my part.? In September 2005, I thought the setback in Dana’s auto parts business was temporary, and bought a little more.? After the second dose of bad news, I looked at the statements afresh and kicked myself.? How could I have missed the growing negative divergence between earnings and cash flow?? I waited a few days for a rally, and sold.? As it was, Dana filed for Chapter 11 in March 2006.? This could have been a lot worse for me.


David Merkel
Dana Files Chapter 11
3/3/2006 2:19 PM EST

How much can you lose on a $7 stock? Seven dollars. Dana (DCN:NYSE) just filed for bankruptcy, and trading is temporarily suspended. I think the common will get wiped out, so any long trades here are purely speculative. Unsecured debt is trading in the high $60s, so they look like they are the new owners of the company (but that’s just a guess).

Just another reason to not be afraid to take losses when you make a mistake. Same for PXRE Group (PXT:NYSE), which has continued to fall since my sales.

Don’t be afraid to take losses, if you know the situation is worse than the current price would indicate.

The common was wiped out when Dana recently emerged from bankruptcy in February of this year.? PXRE made out better, merging with Argonaut.

National Atlantic Holdings

I’ve written more than my share on NAHC, and for the good of my readers, probably too much.? Perhaps this one might be a good example of taking time to accumulate a position.? My average cost is $6.67, which means that if the deal goes through at $6.25, this isn’t one of my ten largest losses.? Tentatively, though, I plan on filing for appraisal rights if the deal goes through.

Consider the 1Q08 earnings conference call on Monday:

Operator:
And we have a follow up from David Merkel with Finacorp Securities.
<Q – David Merkel>: Hi.? Sorry to trouble you, one follow up. It’s basically the questions I asked on the last call.? Your loss reserves, there’s nothing there in terms of future development that should have been reflected in the first quarter that isn’t there in the statements, and your bonds are stated at their fair market value to the best of your knowledge.? You’ve got a high-quality portfolio there.
<A – Frank Prudente>: Yes we do, David.? This is Frank Prudente. I’ll take the second part of your question first if you don’t mind.? Our portfolio remains to be very conservative and very high quality.? With the implementation of the new accounting standard we’re at Level 2 two for all of our available for sale securities.? So we continue to feel very comfortable about our investment portfolio.? And as Bruce alluded to earlier, we do a comprehensive actuarial analysis every quarter which is further validated by the review performed by our external auditors each and every quarter.? And what I can tell you is we base our estimates of loss and loss adjustment expense reserves based on all of the most relevant data we have available to us for each and every financial statement close process.
<Q – David Merkel>: Thanks, Frank. I appreciate that. Take care.
What that may mean to the court is that twice after the announcement of the merger, they publicly stated that their most variable assets and liabilities were correctly and conservatively stated on their balance sheet.? That means anyone receiving much less than book is not getting fair compensation.? This one is not over yet; I may get out of this one with a gain.? :(? (Dreamer…)
My failure here was not carefully evaluating the management team, and rely on my usual benchmark that a short-tail P&C company earning money, and trading below book is a good deal.

Vishay Intertechnology

I am still invested in Vishay.? It earns money, generates free cash flow, debt is being reduced, and the balance sheet looks decent.? The sorts of electronic components that they make will be difficult to make obsolete.? I still like the name; I don’t think this one will be a loss for me in the end.

Tellabs

Tellabs looked cheap and got cheaper.? Almost every small tech company was getting thrown out; valuations reached record low levels by the end of third quarter 2002.? Tellabs had disappointment after disappointment, and I concluded that if it couldn’t earn money, the book value was overstated.? I sold, and bought stocks that I thought have more promise.

That said, my rebalancing discipline allowed me to reduce the overall losses from this volatile stock.? I didn’t lose nearly as much as a buy-and-hold investor would have.

Deutsche Bank

This was a failure to integrate my overall markets view, and allowing short-term valuation issues to dominate my decision.? I thought the investment banks wouldn’t do well, but I thought Deutsche Bank might escape the troubles.? Well, I was wrong.? European institutions mimicked Wall Street to a higher degree than most would have expected.

My last buy was a rebalancing buy, but as results came in from other European banks, I ended up selling Deutsche Bank, and RBS as well.? Time will tell how smart that was… the investment banks of our world are tied together through counterparty exposure — to a degree, they succeed and fail as a group… that’s why the Fed bailed out Bear Stearns.

Summary of Part II

I’ll repeat what I said in part one, and add a little.

  • Don?t play with companies that have moderate credit quality during times of economic stress.
  • Measure credit quality not only by the balance sheet, but by the ability to generate free cash.
  • Spend more time trying to see whether management teams are competent or not.
  • Cut losses when your estimate of future profitability drops to levels that no longer justify holding the asset.

The next two articles in this series will be about investments that went right.? They should come soon.

Full disclosure: long NAHC VSH

Losing Money is Part of the Game (Part I)

Losing Money is Part of the Game (Part I)

I’ve been debating in my mind how I would write this piece. In the end, I just decided that I would tell it plain. Part of investing is losing money. There is a connection between willingness to lose money in the short run, and ability to make money in the long run. My experience has been that if you don’t take the risk of losing significant money, you don’t make significant money. Another way of saying it is that if you don’t blow one up every now and then, you’re not taking enough risk.

With that introduction, let me present my 10 worst losses since starting this strategy 7.7 years ago, beginning with the worst, and moving to progressively lesser losses. These ten losses comprise 55% of the total dollar value of losses since I started this strategy.

Deerfield Capital

What can I say?? My original thesis was that Deerfield was a mortgage REIT that did it right.? In spite of my negative real estate views, I did not think that the risk would extend all of the way to prime mortgage and Alt-A (no stated income) collateral.? Alas, my training as an actuary should have told me to avoid companies dependent on market confidence to maintain financing.? As the repo haircuts rose, free assets diminished, aand they had to collapse their balance sheet.? My main mistake was thinking that repo haircuts couldn’t get that high.? I was wrong. I finally sold when I thought the likelihood of insolvency was significant.

YRC Worldwide

I got in this one too early.? My industry models sometimes flash “cheap” when things will get cheaper.? Sometimes I have the sense to remember that.? This time I didn’t.? YRC has more debt than I would like, but it has a huge amount of upside when the economy turns.? Waiting for that turn could be fatal, but I continue to do so.? One other note: for the remainder of this piece — where my graphs say exit, it does not mean sale. For companies that I still owned at 4/30/2008, I market them down as “exited” because that is where my calculations end.

The jury is out on this one.? As with all of my investments, I try to analyze a company versus its likely future prospects.? I don’t care a lot about the past, I just try to analyze current price versus future prospects.? My estimate of future value warrants continued inclusion in the portfolio.

Dynegy

Catch a falling knife?? When there is fraud, I give other investors a pass.? As for me, I should have known better.? Cash flow was light relative to earnings — not a good sign.? Another warning sign ignored: avoid managements that are self-absorbed.? Dynegy and their investment banks had to kick in to fund a settlement.? (Note: it is only worth going through the settlement process when a deep third pocket gets tagged.? Most fraud cases are broke, and only the lawyers do well.)

I’m afraid that friends influenced me here; a number of people in my investment department owned Dynegy, and when I bought, e comment was “Welcome to the Dark Side.”? Dark? — better to say red ink. I can’t prevent being taken in by fraud, but I can minimize it if I focus on companies with strong cash generation.? It’s hard to fake free cash flow.

Jones Apparel Group

Again, my industry models flashed “Cheap” too soon.? Everything depends on whether Jones can turn their operating businesses around.? I think they have a chance, and given the recent sale of one of their subsidiaries, there is enough cash.? That said, I tend to worry when debt levels verge on high, and the debt maturities are near.? There is a new CEO, who was the old CFO.? At present, I still think there is value here, but I will take my loss before the end of 2008 if earnings results don’t turn.

Cable & Wireless plc

One of my ways of trying to make money is to buy strongly capitalized companies in an industry that is having troubles.? Well, the strength of C&W’s balance sheet was overstated; there was a bit of a fraud issue there.? And, I should have listened to Cody Willard, who e-mailed me before we really knew me, and said something to the effect of, “Yeah, they have a balance sheet, but no good businesses.? Can’t make money with that.”

Part I Summary

Every loss is stupid in hindsight.? We all get tempted to say “woulda, coulda, shoulda.”? But the same principles that led to my losses also led to my greatest gains.? Two articles from now in this series, I’ll go over those.? But it is best to lead with failure… we learn far more from our failures than our successes.? What are my lessons here?

  • Don’t play with companies that have moderate credit quality during times of economic stress.
  • Measure credit quality not only by the balance sheet, but by the ability to generate free cash.
  • Spend more time trying to see whether management teams are competent or not.

I’ll see if I can’t do better on these concepts in the future.

Full disclosure: long YRCW and JNY

Seven-Plus Years of Trading for the Broad Market Portfolio

Seven-Plus Years of Trading for the Broad Market Portfolio

If you ask me what is more fundamental to me — am I an economist or and an investor? I will tell you that I am an investor. At present for my work I am putting together a pitch book for my company detailing my value investing for potential clients. In the process of doing that, I decided to analyze all of my investments over the past 7+ years, in an effort to find some stories that are representative of my money management methods (both good and bad).

In order to get those stories, I had to download and clean all of my transactions over the past 7+ years, and then calculate the internal rate of return on each stock that I bought over the period. I still haven’t written the stories, and would appreciate advice from readers as to which stocks to use.

As I did my analysis, I learned a few things:

  • Over the 7+ years, I have owned 186 stocks.
  • Slightly more than 75% of my investments have been profitable.
  • My average holding period has been 503 days.
  • I have hit some home runs, and hit into triple plays.
  • My top 11 gains pay for all of my losers.
  • My cumulative profits comprise more than two-thirds of my assets.

Holding Period

Now, on this graph, the days are averages, so zero represents 0-50 days, 100 represents 50-150 days, etc. As you can see, I occasionally trade (though usually not intentionally) , but most of the time I invest.

Internal Rates of Return
What is an internal rate of return [IRR]? It is the constant rate one earns on an investment from start to finish. It is a way of averaging out all of the cash flows, and annualizing the result, so that it can be compared against other investments. Here is a histogram of the internal rates of return on my investments:

But, IRRs can be misleading. A small gain/loss in a short period of time can result in large absolute IRRs. That’s why I decided to create the imperfect concept of the pseudo-cumulative return. Suppose you earned the IRR over the full length of the investment? What would the cumulative return be?

Now, those who have followed me for a while know that my rebalancing discipline forces me to buy or sell after large moves. The pseudo-cumulative return usually overstates my return, because I sold on the way up, and bought on the way down.

The above graph, tough as it is to interpret, gives a reasonable idea of how my investments have worked. Most of my investments last for a few years, some more, some less. I have tended to make money pretty regularly, but I have had some real stinkers. I’ll pick up on that theme in my next post on Monday.

The Financings of Last Resort, Part II

The Financings of Last Resort, Part II

When I wrote my last piece, “The Financings of Last Resort,” I did meant to add that this will be a common phenomenon for a year or so. Pretend you are part of a senior management team of a credit-sensitive financial institution, and your worst nightmare is slowly unfolding in front of you. You’re looking looking at delinquency and loss statistics stratified by year of issuance (“vintage”) and time since issuance. Every vintage since 2003 looks worse than the prior year, and the loss seasoning curves are all pointed upward — in the early vintages, mildly, and in the 2006-2007 vintages, wildly.

You are seeing current losses come through, and they are erasing much of current profits, or, creating crushing losses if you try to get ahead of the loss curve and put in sufficient reserves to handle likely future losses. Any loan loss estimate toward the beginning of a “bust” phase is a wild guess, and management teams are often behind the curve as they hope that the most recent data point was a statistical fluke.

But management teams often think along two tracks. The first is the “best current estimate,” which they give to the market through GAAP accounting. The second is “What if things get bad, and we run short of capital? Better to get financing now, while our stock price is relatively high, and bond and preferred spreads low.”

That reasoning drives two types of capital raising — financings of last resort, and protective financing. That second class of financing was what I commented on at Felix Salmon’s blog regarding JP Morgan.? Borrow when you can, not when you have to.? Get in front of the loss curve, not behind it.

But, for those that are behind the curve, the financings of last resort are protective, at least for a little while, of management teams and bondholders.? Consider the actions at:

But who loses? Current stockholders get diluted.? I can imagine the management consoling their consciences with the thought, “Yes, the stockholders lose, but what would they get in bankruptcy if things got worse, and we didn’t raise capital?”

So, even if credit-sensitive financial companies avoid going broke, they may not be good equity investments because of the dilution.? I said that early on with the financial guarantors.? The big guys are still alive, but their stock prices are down significantly.? (Oh, and note that the regulators like this approach.? No public funds get used.? No embarrassing front page insolvency news.? “What was the regulator doing?”)

How long will this continue?? Financings of last resort can go on until the stockholders rebel and throw out management (hard to do), or the estimated net present value of the profit stream of the company is negative; no one will finance that.? (Think of ACA Capital Holdings, maybe.)? The nature of a financing of last resort is that the financier hands over cash in exchange for cheap equity that can be recycled into the market.? It’s a coercive way of doing an equity or debt offering, and requires a significant discount to current financing valuations.

So, how long will the bailouts go on?? I think for quite some time, which I why I am avoiding that area of the market.? Avoid the equity “fire sales” if you can.? Remember, management teams usually know more than the average analyst when it comes to knowing the true value of cash that can be generated from illiquid assets.? So when you see financial firms pursuing liquidity during a time of debt deflation, don’t be a hero — avoid those companies.

Second Quarter 2008 Portfolio Changes

Second Quarter 2008 Portfolio Changes

For this quarter, I sold two my two placeholder assets, the Industrial and Technology SPDRs, and Arkansas Best, which had richened enough for me to trade out of it.

I had two rebalancing buys, Charlotte Russe and Avnet.? On Charlotte Russe, the rebalancing buy occurred because I tendered all my stock @ $18 in the Dutch Tender, and 45% of it got bought.? On Avnet, things aren’t as bad as the market thought on 4/15, in my opinion.? I had one rebalancing sell, Helmerich and Payne.? Just taking some off the table for risk reduction purposes.

Here is my final comparison file that was based off of data at the close of business on Monday.? To comply with the Bloomberg data license, all numeric fields remaining are ones that I calculated.? The columns of the file rank the 290 stocks on the following metrics (lower better unless noted):

  • 52-week RSI
  • Trailing P/E
  • P/Book (2)
  • P/Sales (2)
  • P/2008E
  • P/2009E
  • Dividend Yield (higher better)
  • Net Operating Accruals (2)
  • Implied Volatility
  • Neglect (higher better)

The grand rank sums up the ranks giving double weights to P/B, P/S, and NOA.? My current stocks are highlighted in yellow, except for the two middle ones, which are in orange.? Candidates for sale come from the lower half (high grand ranks), candidates to buy from the upper half.

Here were my purchases (P/2008E):

  • International Rectifier — 9.5x
  • Group 1 Automotive — 7.1x
  • OfficeMax — 9.3x
  • Universal American Financial — 5.8x

Cheap names all (and could get cheaper?).? If you asked me what my concerns might be over this group of names, I would say that credit quality is adequate but not stellar.? I would also confess a little doubt on Universal American.? It looks cheap, and lines of business they are in are stable lines.? They lost money on mezzanine subprime mortgage ABS.? I looked at the writedowns, and they seem adequate.? If you send the security vintages 2006-2007 to zero, this stock is still cheap, in my opinion.?? What I can’t evaluate is whether they could have operational problems in their senior health insurance business.? It’s a good business, if managed properly.

As for International Rectifier and Group 1, I have owned them before.? With IRF, I like industrial technology — stuff that is harder to obsolete.? On Group 1, I looked at all of the small cap auto retailers, and picked this one.? I liked its business mix, and what seemed to be a clean balance sheet, with few immediate needs for liquidity.? The group as a whole has been smashed, and is discounting very unfavorable conditions.? I don’t think things are that bad, and besides, a lot of the revenues come from repairs and sales of used cars.

With OfficeMax, I think prospects are less cyclical than the market seems to believe.? Office supplies get purchased during bad economic times as well, and the current price already discounts? a lot of pain.

Well, those are my purchases.? Let’s see how they fare over the coming years.

Full disclosure: long HP CHIC AVT GPI UAM OMX IRF

Industry Ranks April 2008

Industry Ranks April 2008

Okay, here are my industry ranks for April 2008. Please remember that my model can be used in value mode (the green zone) or in momentum mode (the red zone). I usually just stick to the green zone, but this time I included a few red zone ideas. So, this time I added in technology companies, insurance, industrial and healthcare companies. Yeah, I know that’s a lot, and my results reflected that — usually I have just 20 or so companies from the screen, but this time it is 80+.

Oh, my screen, aside from industry, has only two factors: market cap greater than $100 million, and Price-to-book times Price-to-forward earnings must be less than 10. Ben Graham had a similar criterion, except that he used trailing P/E, and his cutoff was 22.5. Here are the tickers:

ABG ACGL ACMR ACW ADPI AEL AFFM AGYS AHL AIG AMSF ARM AWH AXS BBW BC BRLC BRNC CBR CHUX CLS CMOS CNA CVGI DK EDS ENH ENSG FFG FL FLEX FMR FRPT GPI HMX HOTT HTRN IKN INDM IPCR IRF KEM KG LAD LNY LTR MENT MIG MRH MRT MWA MXGL NCS NNBR NSIT NSTC NYM OCR ODP PCCC PDFS PKOH PLAB PMACA PNX PRE PSS PTP RE RMIX RNR ROCK RTEC SAF SAH SANM SEAB SMP SNX TECUA THG TRS TRW TRX UAM UNM XL XRIT

Lots of insurers — what can I say, the group is cheap… cheaper than the lack of pricing power should make them. Add in two more tickers that crossed my desk today: MRO and AWI, and I think I am ready to put my spreadsheet together and start analyzing promising cheap companies. One nice thing about my methods is that it can accommodate a large number of tickers. When you add up the tickers from yesterday and today, and add in the 32 existing tickers, that’s almost 300 tickers altogether.

Fortunately, my ranking system helps my winnow down the list pretty quickly, as it scores cheapness on a wide number of variables at once, and throws in many of the anomalies that are mispriced in the markets. Then it is up to me to use business judgment to decide what makes sense, because most cheap stocks are cheap for a reason, while the gems are merely overlooked.

Feel free to pitch in more stock ideas. I should come to decisions within a week or so.

PS — Have you checked out Newsflashr.com yet? It looks like a promising way of aggregating financial news, as well as other news.

Investment Banks Are Priced Like Bermuda Reinsuers

Investment Banks Are Priced Like Bermuda Reinsuers

Late in the day, I looked at a table of valuations of the remaining major investment banks, and thought, “Huh, they’re priced like Bermuda Reinsurers.? Price-to-book near 1 or lower, and expected P/Es in the middle single digits.”? Well, that got me thinking… how are those two groups of companies alike?

  • ?When losses come they can be severe.
  • Both have strong underwriting cycles where a lot of money is made in the boom phase, and a lot gets lost in the bear phase.
  • Earnings quality can be poor, unless management teams have a bias against meeting Street expectations, and allowing earnings to be ragged.
  • The opacity of the investment banks’ swap books is matched by that of the reinsurers’ reserving.
  • Both businesses are highly competitive, and global in scope.

Now, what’s different?

  • The reinsurers typically don’t have asset problems, only reserving problems.
  • The Bermuda reinsurers know that one day a change in their tax status may come (somehow forced to pay US tax rates — ask Bill Berkley), and that would lower earnings.
  • The financial leverage of the reinsurers is a lot lower.
  • The financing of reinsurers is a lot more secure.

The risk-reward seems balanced to me across the two groups.? The reinsurers are lower-risk/lower-reward, and the investment banks are higher on both scores.? Choose in accordance with your risk tolerance — as for me, I’ll look at the reinsurers.

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