Category: Real Estate and Mortgages

FHA: Faulty Housing Assumptions?

FHA: Faulty Housing Assumptions?

As I get older, I still have a sense of wonder at the degree to which the US Government is a major lending institution. Today’s poster child is the Federal Housing Administration. What is the FHA?

“The Federal Housing Administration, generally known as “FHA”, is the largest government insurer of mortgages in the world, insuring over 35 million properties since its inception in 1934. A part of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), FHA provides mortgage insurance on single-family, multifamily, manufactured homes and hospital loans made by FHA-approved lenders throughout the United States and its territories.”

How is the FHA funded?

“FHA operates entirely from self-generated income and costs the taxpayers nothing. The proceeds from the mortgage insurance paid by the homeowners are captured in an account that is used to operate the program entirely. FHA provides a huge economic stimulation to the country in the form of home and community development, which trickles down to local communities in the form of jobs, building suppliers, tax bases, schools, and other forms of revenue.”

Well, good that it costs taxpayers nothing, if that is sustainable. The risk in the present environment is twofold. First, FHA is providing a lot of the loans that are getting done tight now. The backup plan is almost the primary plan now in a few places. Here’s an example:

‘David H. Stevens, president of Long & Foster’s affiliated businesses, said his real estate brokerage now holds regular FHA training sessions for its agents and the loan officers at its in-house lender, Prosperity Mortgage.

“Our FHA business in the Washington area went from virtually nothing at the end of 2007 to about 30 percent today,” Stevens said. “In some spots, FHA makes up 50 percent of all our loans.”‘

Now the percentage is much lower across the whole country. As the article points out, the loans have become more common in areas where housing prices are high, and the borrowers can’t come up with a down payment for a conforming loan.

As the number of mortgages originated/insured goes up, it FHA needs more capital to back those loans, all other things equal. The second problem is defaults. (Hat tip: Calculated Risk) Thery are one of the few places providing loans to lesser quality borrowers, so it is no surprise that their loss rate should be up considerably. Here’s the quote that caught my attention:

?Let me repeat: F.H.A. is solvent,? Mr. Montgomery said on Monday in a speech at the National Press Club. ?However, no insurance company can sustain that amount of additional costs year after year and still survive. Unless we take action to mitigate these losses, F.H.A. will soon either have to shut down or rely on appropriations to operate.?

Hmm… it looks like the US Government does not directly stand behind the liabilities of the FHA. Contrary to the original quotation from their website, it seems that in a pinch, they can ask Congress for funds, or, go out of business. (As an aside, I could not find out who regulates the solvency of the FHA. Thoughts?)

Well, not surprising. Our politicians like cheap solutions, which makes them lean on the GSEs and things like the GSEs, in order to get cheaper mortgage financing with dinging taxpayers. That works for a time, but the gambit comes to an end when the solvency of these quasi-public, quasi-private entities becomes threatened.

We’re not done with the fall in residential housing prices yet, and the difficulties at FHA are just another demonstration of that.

Declaring Victory Too Soon

Declaring Victory Too Soon

The last few months have seen a change in expectations of FOMC policy. The next expected move is a tightening, while some incremental loosening was expected 2-3 months ago.

One of the reasons for this is that the Fed has managed to calm the short term lending markets. They have also managed to defuse a possible crisis among derivative books by bailing out Bear Stearns with the aid of JP Morgan. Also, GDP growth hasn’t gone negative yet, at least the way the Government calculates it. As a result, Ben Bernanke feels that the risk of a substantial downturn has receded, and so, the next focus of the FOMC will be inflation.

Now, I don’t think the answer for the Fed is that simple. That said, there are many that would welcome a tighter FOMC policy.

  • China is importing our lax monetary policy, and they are unsuccessfully trying to fight the implications of the policy, because they won’t raise their exchange rate. They will have to eventually, perhaps after the Olympics, but a tighter US monetary policy relieves some of their stress.
  • Europe would welcome a tighter US monetary policy, because it would relieve pressure on the rising Euro. As it is, the ECB with its single mandate is moving to fight inflation. Even the Bank of England is not loosening aggressively, and their housing problems may be proportionately greater than those in the US.
  • The Gulf States would like a stronger US Dollar to help arrest the inflation that they are importing.
  • Savers in the US might like higher rates.

But the trouble is that there are still weak spots that might cause the Fed, which has a dual/triple mandate to not tighten monetary policy. (Dual — inflation and unemployment. Triple — financial system solvency, inflation and unemployment.)

  • The Fed is not out of the woods yet on real estate related credit. I commented many times at RealMoney that Home Equity Lending would be a big problem, back in 2006. I also warned on option ARMs. Well, both are looming problems now.
  • This will lead to problems in the regional banks. Many of them are exposed.
  • I still expect residential real estate prices to fall further.
  • The correction in commercial real estate prices has only begun.
  • Also, investment banks are still delevering and taking writeoffs. Lehman is the most recent poster child there, but other investment banks could still be affected.
  • Beyond that, we have defaults rising in speculative grade credit, which will do damage directly, and through the CDOs that they are in.
  • Places like the Philippines may be canaries in the coal mine — they may be experiencing outflows of hot money at present.

I think the Fed has less freedom to act than is commonly believed. As Yves Smith has commented at his blog, the Fed may have painted itself into a corner. I think the risks from inflation, unemployment, and financial system weakness are fairly well balanced. As it stands, the Fed has adopted the following policy:

  • Don’t let the monetary base grow. Sterilize all new lending programs.
  • Allow the banks freedom to expand their lendings; informally relax regulations for now.
  • Bail out any significant systemic risks.
  • Work out kinks in the short term lending markets through new programs.

The Fed may make some of those new programs permanent, but then they will need to find a new policy equilibrium involving greater tightness elsewhere in their policy tools. They will also need to decide what to do regarding investment bank leverage, both direct and synthetic. They will also have to figure out what comes first if there is a broader banking solvency crisis, and/or significant shrinkage of real GDP with a rise in unemployment.

It is my guess that Dr. Bernanke is talking a good game today, but that the Fed’s policies will be loose toward inflation, should systemic risk or unemployment prove to be more difficult problems than currently advertised today. They are not out of the woods yet.

The Amazin’ Ragin’ Contagion

The Amazin’ Ragin’ Contagion

When I wrote more over at RealMoney, I commented on how falling real estate values would eventually affect prime lending.? Here’s an example:


David Merkel
Hear Cody on Housing
8/24/2007 1:25 PM EDT

Much, but not all of the upset in the lending markets (which, if you look at swap spreads, the current manifestation of the crisis seems to be passing — down 4 basis points today), is from deflating values in housing. My estimate for how much further real estate has to decline on average in the US is 10-20%. We need to find owners for about 4% of the US housing stock that is vacant. The pain that has been felt in subprime and Alt-A loans will get felt in prime loans, and possibly conforming loans as well. Fannie and Freddie won’t get killed, but they will take credit losses.

So, listen to Cody. Residential real estate markets do not clear as rapidly as a futures exchange. The illiquidity and variations in lending standards tends to lead to markets that adjust slowly, and autocorrelatedly. I.e., if it went up last period, odds are it will go up next period, and vice-versa.

It will take a while for the residential real estate market to clear. When the inventory gets down to 3% it will be time to start speculating on homebuilders and mortgage lenders again, but real estate prices won’t start rising in aggregate until the inventory of unsold homes gets below 1.5-2.0%.

Position: none

Well, the chickens are now coming home to roost.? Residential real estate values have fallen enough that it has eaten through much of the equity of prime borrowers, leading to distress on prime mortgage collateral.? If that is not bad enough, the banks are also staring down falling commercial property prices.? Even Fed Governor Kohn is telling us to expect more loan losses, which I expect will cause monetary policy to be confused amid rising inflation.

At present, the fall in housing prices may be self-reinforcing, as lower prices make more homeowners marginal, and with a negative life event (unemployment, divorce, disease, disaster, disability), they can no longer afford their property.? Prime mortgages are no exception here, particularly if bought near the peak of the recent real estate craze.

Just be aware that the fall in housing prices will take a while to work out.? It may cause larger financial institutions to fail.? But eventually, there will be a bottom that can be bought, perhaps in 2009-2010.? Until then real estate related financials will remain under pressure, and some with concentrated interests, like the mortgage insurers, will die.

Now, That Was Fast!

Now, That Was Fast!

From the RealMoney Columnist conversation yesterday:


David Merkel
Stealing a March; Next Comes the Pile-On
6/5/2008 3:37 PM EDT

So yesterday Moody’s places MBIA and Ambac on Negative Watch. S&P grabs the ball and downgrades them, leaving them on negative outlook. I pointed out a while ago that the dike had been breached, and it was only a matter of time until the downgrades came.

And, as I pointed out yesterday, there will be new entrants to the market. Not only will Berky be there, with Assured Guaranty and Dexia, but Macquarie Group joins the party as well.

Even if Ambac and MBIA (the holding companies) survive, the business that used to be profitable for them will be occupied by others. I’ll throw this out as my next prediction in this space: they both go into conservation, and in runoff, claimants get paid off, senior debtholders get nicked, subordinated debtholders lose a lot, and the equity is a zonk.

Position: none


David Merkel
This Is a Great Country
6/5/2008 3:41 PM EDT

One last note: the stocks rally after the downgrade. Probably short covering and other derivative-related activity, but you have to admit it is amazing for the stock to go up when the franchise gets destroyed.

Position: none

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Okay, after yesterday’s piece, there was a fast, opportunistic reaction by S&P. Moody’s action gave them cover to downgrade, and S&P took the ball and ran with it. Now that action gives Moody’s the cover to downgrade freely. There is no longer any reason for them to stay at Aaa. There is no money in it, and their reputation can only take further his from here. Rating agencies are like wolf packs — there is safety in the pack. Don’t be an outsider.

From one of my old RealMoney pieces (12/1/2004): Many of the conflict-of-interest problems still exist today. One more example: Could the ratings agencies downgrade MBIA (MBI:NYSE) or Ambac (ABK:NYSE) even if they wanted to? MBIA and Ambac rely on their Aaa/AAA ratings to the degree that they would have a difficult time operating without the rating. Much of the bond market relies on enhancement from MBIA and Ambac. The loss of a Aaa/AAA rating would be a jolt to the guaranteed bonds.

In addition, MBIA and Ambac structure their risks according to models provided by the ratings agencies. It is the models of the ratings agencies that tell the guarantors how much equity must stand in front of the debt that is being guaranteed. The ratings agencies are an inherent part of the business model of the financial guarantors. MBIA and Ambac can’t get along without them.

The ratings agencies derive so much income from these major financial guarantors that their own financial well-being would be affected by a downgrade. I’m not saying that either should be rated less than Aaa/AAA, but there is a cliff here, and I am wary of investing near cliffs.

Well, we came to the cliff, and S&P shoved MBIA and Ambac to the edge. Now Moody’s can push them over the edge. It should come soon. As with the rating agencies actions on the other financial guarantors, once a guarantor is pushed below AAA, the rating no longer matters as much. There are dedicated “AAA only” investors that care about this, and they will be forced sellers now, or, they will modify their investment guidelines. 🙁

Now, as I have mentioned before, stable value funds will have their difficulties here. Some have positioned themselves as “AAA only” funds, and that led to large holdings of MBIA- and Ambac-guaranteed debt. What they do now is beyond me. I suspect they try to modify their investment guidelines. 🙁

Well, at this point, we have to contemplate life without the old guarantors. They will shrink and disappear, while new guarantors, who are all currently skeptical of doing much more than Municipal bond insurance, will grow, and make it impossible for the old guarantors to return, because they are much better capitalized. Once you lose your AAA as a guarantor, you will rarely get it back.

A Quick Run Through a few of my Indicators

A Quick Run Through a few of my Indicators

After this article, I plan on doing a run through some longer-dated thoughts of mine — I figure when things are relatively quiet, it is time to start thinking about the bigger picture.

Quiet? Are things quiet now? Well, sorta… we still have problems:

  • We still have an oversupply of houses.
  • Investment banks are still overlevered in their swap books.
  • Commercial property prices are beginning to fall, and that will have negative effects on the equityholders, and those who finance them.
  • Though there is no logical replacement for the US Dollar as the global reserve currency, the US is gaming the system, passing inflation through to the rest of the world. Maybe the world doesn’t need a reserve currency. In any case, there are a lot of annoyed central bankers looking to drop their peg to the US dollar at a convenient time that doesn’t hurt their home economies badly.
  • We are still waiting for the junk issuance from 2004-2006 to start defaulting in size.
  • Our retiree healthcare cost crisis is coming in five years, and will last for two decades.
  • The pension crisis comes in the next 5-10 years, and will last for two decades.
  • Most of the demographic crises will cover the developed world.

But as for now, the news flow is light, and nothing is presently cratering. Consider the short-term lending markets:

This graph shows the difference between yields on A2/P2 commercial paper and the 2-year Treasury. What this says is that a BBB company can borrow unsecured for a month at 2.7%. Not bad. Now look at the Treasury-Eurodollar [TED] spread:

Things have improved. The TED spread is down to 0.78%. To me, normal is 60 bp or lower. The question still remains as to what happens when the Fed begins withdrawing its new lending facilities.? As it stands now, they seem to be increasing them further.? (I don’t get it.)

In the midst of this, the Fed has not increased the monetary base in a loosening cycle. The last permanent injection of funds was 5/3/07, long before they started to cut rates. What growth in credit has come from a loosening of the leverage policy toward the banks.

As you can see, we have hit levels of total liabilities of the banking system versus the monetary base of the Federal reserve that we haven’t seen since the early 80s. (I need to multiply that graph by 1000 to show that the multiple is 11x. Oops.)

But, my proxy for bank profitability on new money shows that if you can borrow at 12 month US LIBOR, and lend to fund Fannie Mae 30-year mortgage passthroughs, you can make good money now.

What of Fed funds policy? The market is expecting a 25bp hike in December. I think they are dreaming, but if you are going to bet, you have to know the line.


What of inflation expectations? Above is my 5-years forward 5-year inflation graph. The expectations of inflation are low, at least as far as institutional investors are concerned, even as the measure of inflation underlying TIPS rolls ahead at 4% or so.

At least the yield curve has resumed a normal shape, as noted before, that will be good for the banks in the long run.

Now, since mid-March, global long rates have bottomed.? I use 10-year swap rates here because they are more comparable than government bond rates.? From my viewpoint, this is due to an increase in expected nominal growth for the Gross World Product.? I can’t tell whether that is coming through inflation or real growth, but I am guessing at mainly inflation.

So, after all of this, where do I stand?

  • We still have problems to work through. (See top list above.)
  • The short term lending markets have largely normalized.? So has the yield curve.
  • The economy may not be in recession.? Then again, it is probably close to the line.
  • Long-term implied inflation measures are quiet amid a jump in global inflation measures.
  • Global long rates are rising.
  • If the banks can lend, they can make decent money on new loans.
  • The Fed is still trying to be “too cute,” solving problems through unorthodox means.? Hey, for now it is good, but who can tell what the long term effects will be.? I am still a skeptic here.? Until they unwind the new lending schemes, and return to a clean balance sheet, the game is not over.
Facilitating the Dreams of Politicians

Facilitating the Dreams of Politicians

I’m a life actuary, not a pension actuary, so take my musings here as the rant of a relatively well-informed amateur.? I have reviewed the book Pension Dumping, and will review Roger Lowenstein’s book, While America Aged, in the near term.

First, a few personal remembrances.?? I remember taking the old exam 7 for actuaries — yes, I’ve been in the profession that long, studying pension funding and laws to the degree that all actuaries had to at that time.? I marveled at the degree of flexibility that pension actuaries had in setting investment assumptions (and future earnings assumptions), and the degree to which funding was back-end loaded to many plan sponsors.?? I felt that there was far less of a provision for adverse deviation in pensions than in life insurance reserving.

I have also met my share (a few, not many) of pension actuaries who seemed to feel their greatest obligation was to reduce the amount the plan sponsor paid each year.

I also remember being in the terminal funding business at AIG, when Congress made it almost impossible for plan sponsors to terminate a plan and take out the excess assets.? Though laudable for trying to protect overfunding, it told plan sponsors that pension plans are roach motels for corporate cash — money can go in, but it can’t come out, so minimize the amount you put in.

The IRS was no help here either, creating rules against companies that overfunded plans (by more than a low threshold), because too much income was getting sheltered from taxation.

Beyond that, I remember one firm I worked for that had a plan that was very overfunded, but that went away when they merged into another firm which was less well funded.

I also remember talking with actuaries working inside the Social Security system, and boy, were they pessimists — almost as bad as the actuaries from the PBGC.

But enough of my musings.? There was an article in the New York Times on the troubles faced by some pension actuaries who serve municipalities.? For some additional color, review my article on how well funded most state pension and retiree healthcare plans are.

Pretend that you are a financial planner for families.? You can make a certain number of people happy in the short run if you tell them they can earn a lot of money on their assets with safety — say, 10%/year on average.? Now within 5 years or so, promises like that will blow up your practice, unless you are in the midst of a bull market.

Now think about the poor pension actuary for a municipal plan.? Here are the givens:

  • The municipality does not want to raise taxes.
  • They do want to minimize current labor costs.
  • They want happy workers once labor negotiations are complete.? Increasing pension promises little short term cash outflow, and can allow for a lower current wage increase.
  • A significant number of people on the board overseeing municipal pensions really don’t get what is going on.? It is all a black box to them, and they don’t get what you do.
  • You don’t get paid unless you deliver an opinion that current assets plus likely future funding is enough to fund future obligations.
  • The benefit utilization, investment earnings, and liability discount rates can always be tweaked a little more to achieve costs within budget in the short run, at a cost of greater contributions in the long run, particularly if the markets are foul.
  • There are some players connected to the pension funding process that will pressure you for a certain short-term result.

Even though I think pension plan funding methods for corporate plans are weak, at least they have ERISA for some protection.? With the municipal plans, that’s not there.? As such, more actuaries and firms are getting sued for aggressive assumptions, setting investment rates too high, and benefit utilization rates too low.

The article cites many examples — New Jersey stands out to me because of the pension bonds issued in 1997 to try to erase the deficit they had built up.? They took the money and invested it to try to earn more than the yield on the bonds — the excess earnings would bail out the underfunded plan.? Well, over the last eleven years, returns have been decidedly poor.? The pension bonds were a badly timed strategy at best.

Now, like auditors. who are paid by the companies that they audit, so it is for the pension actuaries — and there lies the conflict of interest.? One of my rules says that the party with the concentrated interest pays for third-party services, so it is no surprise that the plan sponsor pays the actuary.? I’m not sure it can be done any other way, unless the government sets up its own valuation bureau, and tells municipalities what they must pay.? (Now, who will remind them about Medicare? 😉 )

The suits against the pension actuaries and their firms could have the same effect as what happened to Arthur Andersen.? These are not thickly capitalized firms, and many could be put out of business easily.? For others, their liability coverage premiums will rise, perhaps making their services uneconomic.

Finally, the flat markets over the last ten years have exacerbated the problems.? Partially out of a mistaken belief that the equity premium is large (how much do stocks earn on average versus cash), actuaries set earnings rates too high.? The actuarial profession offers some guidance on what rate to set, but the reason they can’t be specific is that there is no good answer.? With all of the talk about the “lost decade,” well, we have had lost decades before, in the 30s and 70s.? Even if the statistics are correct for how big the equity premium is, equity performance comes in lumps, and in the 80s and 90s, when we should have taken the returns of the fat years and squirreled them away for the eventual “lost decade,” instead, politicians increased benefits as if there was no tomorrow.

The states and smaller government entities have dug a hole, and they will have to fill it somehow.? Lacking the ability to print money, they will raise taxes as they can, and borrow where they may.? We are seeing the first pains from this today, but the real crisis is 5-10 years out, as the Baby Boomers start to retire.? You ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

Toiling Over Bubble Troubles

Toiling Over Bubble Troubles

There is a religious war aspect to what I will discuss this evening. It surprises me, but there are many people who believe that bubbles cannot exist, because economic players are rational in aggregate. I question the latter assumption — anyone who follows the equity markets understands the fads that sweep through the markets, leading to a lot of disappointment later.

From one of my comments in the RealMoney Columnist Conversation:


David Merkel
Housing Bubblettes, Redux
10/27/2005 4:43 PM EDT

From my piece, “Real Estate’s Top Looms“:

Bubbles are primarily a financing phenomenon. Bubbles pop when financing proves insufficient to finance the assets in question. Or, as I said in another forum: a Ponzi scheme needs an ever-increasing flow of money to survive. The same is true for a market bubble. When the flow’s growth begins to slow, the bubble will wobble. When it stops, it will pop. When it goes negative, it is too late.

As I wrote in the column on market tops: Valuation is rarely a sufficient reason to be long or short a market. Absurdity is like infinity. Twice infinity is still infinity. Twice absurd is still absurd. Absurd valuations, whether high or low, can become even more absurd if the expectations of market participants become momentum-based. Momentum investors do not care about valuation; they buy what is going up, and sell what is going down.

I’m not pounding the table for anyone to short anything here, but I want to point out that the argument for a bubble does not rely on the amount of the price rise, but on the amount and nature of the financing involved. That financing is more extreme today on a balance sheet basis than at any point in modern times. The average maturity of that debt to repricing date is shorter than at any point in modern times.

That’s why I think the hot coastal markets are bubblettes. My position hasn’t changed since I wrote my original piece.

Position: none

(If you have a subscription to RealMoney, you should look at the Real Estate piece. It was prescient. I occasionally get things right.)

At present, we are hearing murmurs about a crude oil bubble. Here’s my initial question: Who is borrowing money to buy oil? When we had the housing bubble, we had many investors that had to feed their properties to keep them afloat. They were relying on capital gains to keep themselves solvent. That is always a sign of an overheated market. With the tech bubble, we had vendor financing, and stock options on which people had a hard time affording the taxes. In the commercial real estate bubble 1989-92, rents were not sufficient to cover financing costs.

Think of it this way: at the end of a bubble, someone looks at buying an asset, and concludes that it is not worth buying because of the likely stream of payments he will have to make after the initial purchase.

But what of crude oil? There are a number of noises over short covering in the press. The futures curve looks like a bowl, with the far distant futures higher than spot. Crude oil has had a vicious move upward over the last three months. That doesn’t bother me because vicious moves are common in markets where supply and demand are inelastic in the short run.

But there are speculators. Not your common run-of-the-mill speculators, but ones that dress in fancy suits, and have fancy asset allocation equations. Pension funds, and other long term investors are buying commodities and hoarding them, because they think the commodities will be more valuable in the future. But, they are not borrowing to do it, are they? Er, no, not exactly, but yes, in practice. Every pension plan is borrowing implicitly at the discount rate specified by their actuary. If you don’t earn that rate, you fall behind. For now, ignore the correlation arguments that are meaningless because correlations aren’t stable, and think in absolute terms. Every investment that my pension plan invests in should aim to beat the actuarial funding rate.

Will crude oil appreciate at an 8% rate for the next 10 years? Maybe. Can the pension fund emotionally survive a 40% drawdown? Probably not; most pension trustees are scaredy-cats. They will sell oil during the panic. The consultants, with new statistics, will help them do it.

Now, in the present environment, I think that oil has some bubble in it, but it is not the majority of the recent move. As in the late 70s and early 80s, conservation moves slowly, but it does grind prices down. What is different here is that there are many countries willing to take up the slack near current prices, thank you.

So, I don’t buy the bubble rhetoric for crude oil here. Supply and demand are tight, and over time, high prices will create new technologies that use less fuel. But it will take time. For the next few months, will be volatile, but the one scenario I don’t think will happen is a large fall in the price in the short run.

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Before I leave for the evening, one last comment from the past on bubbles from me:

Rapid money supply growth with no consumer price inflation can only really occur within the confines of an asset price bubble, or else, where does the money go? Interest rates are low at such a time because of the incredible liquidity, and complacency of lenders that they will get an equal amount of purchasing power back. Perhaps another possibility is when a country?s currency is being used more and more as a shadow currency, like the US in the Third World. But even that will come home someday.

Post 700

Post 700

It’s that time again. As WordPress counts, this is post 700 on my blog, though the actual number is more like 80% of that. I take this time to write a post about the blog itself, rather than the things I ordinarily write about.

My blog is a tough one in some ways. I admire many narrowly focused blogs, because they do such a good job at their narrow tasks. Many of them are in my blogroll. I read my blogroll daily; that’s what is in my RSS reader.

But I care about a wide range of topics in economics, finance and investments. Anytime I focus on one narrow area for a time, I get negative e-mail saying that I’m not writing about what he wants to read. Well, I’m sorry. My interests are broad, and you will get a melange when you read me. I felt the same way at RealMoney, because I was one of the few writers that you could not predict what area I would write about next.

The markets have calmed down, and my equity portfolio has done well, but I do not think we are past the troubles yet:

  • We still have an oversupply of houses.
  • Investment banks are still overlevered in their swap books.
  • Commercial property prices are beginning to fall, and that will have negative effects on the equityholders, and those who finance them.

As for my business life, I am busy preparing to pitch my equity management methods to institutional investors. I have been on the other side of the table in my life. Hopefully that will help me meet their needs.

In closing, I want to thank Abnormal Returns, The Big Picture (thanks, Barry), Alea (thanks, jck), FT Alphaville, The Kirk Report, Seeking Alpha, and Newsflashr for their support. I also want to thank the many small blogs that like me and have me on their blogroll. That means something to me; I thank you for your support. I also thank the TSCM/RealMoney fraternity for their support. TSCM has done the world a service by training young financial journalists, and bringing talented investors into writing for the public.

I have a list of thing to write about next, and it is long. If you have opinions about what you want me to cover e-mail me here. I am horrendously behind on my mail, but I read everything that gets written to me.

Again, many thanks for reading me. I appreciate all who take their valuable time to read my blog.

Average? I Like Average, if It?s My Average. (Part II)

Average? I Like Average, if It?s My Average. (Part II)

Finishing off the average 10, the slightly better 5…

Deltic Timber

Deltic Timber was an idea that I gleaned from Jim Grant.? They have a lot of timberland in the Southern US, a decent amount of which is next to Little Rock, Arkansas.? The land near Little Rock, once developed, could be quite valuable in a bull market for residential real estate.? I ended up selling because I lost confidence in the residential housing market.

Honda Motors

I still own Honda.? Does the world need cars?? Does the world need small cars?? Yes!? Is Honda cheaply valued?? Yes.? Can they beat the cost levels of Ford, GM, and Chrysler?? Yes.? I like Toyota as well, and have owned it in the past.? I have owned American auto part manufacturers, but never the automakers themselves; their credit quality is too low.

Mueller Industries

This is a case where I found a cheap industrial, bought it, and waited.? The price rose, and I concluded that I had cheaper opportunities, so I sold.? Also, their raw materials prices were going to rise…

American Power Conversion

American Power Conversion was a cheap tech stock with products that are difficult to obsolete.? Eventually I had cheaper investments to buy, and I sold.? This is another example of how the rebalancing discipline can turn a flat stock into extra profits.

Australia & New Zealand Banking

This seemed to be a cheap, well-run foreign bank so I bought some.? As with many of my average investments, I sold it to fund other more promising investments.

Summary of Part II

  • Rebalance your portfolio regularly to fixed weights.
  • Dividends matter.
  • Buy cheap.
  • Trade away for better opportunities when you find them.

It is important in investing to have something to compare investments against.? Make them compete against each other for your dollars, and be rigorous about it.? Don’t invest because “That sounds like a good idea,” rather, is it better than what you currently have?? Keep improving the quality of your portfolio, in terms of cheapness, quality, and future prospects.

Full disclosure: long HMC

One Dozen Notes on Markets Around the World

One Dozen Notes on Markets Around the World

1) Desperation and the Dollar. In mid-March, pessimism over the US economy and monetary policy were so thick that people were considering the old Greenspanian rate of 1% Fed funds as possible. Well, times change, at least for now. The orange line above is the 2-year Treasury yield which gives a fair read on expectations of monetary policy, which bottomed in mid-March. It took the Dollar a little longer to move along, but the present course of dollar is up in the short-term (consider the Euro). That doesn’t address the possibilities of a wider lending problem, or the overly aggressive fiscal policies that will be employed by the next President. (Deficits don’t matter, until they are big enough to matter.)

2) I’ve talked about the US Dollar and the five stages of grieving. I think the G7 got to the second stage, anger, in threatening action recently. I think they get a respite from fear because of the bounce in US monetary expectations. My guess is that they would intervene when the Dollar gets to $1.70/Euro. Neither the threats nor the intervention will have much impact in the long run, though. This will only change when foreigners stop buying our bonds, and start buying our goods and services.

3) Another thing that correlates with the shift in expectations of US monetary policy are yields in long government bonds around the world. Surprise, as the anticipated future financing rates rise, the willingness to try to clip a spread off of long bonds declines.

4) So what could replace the Dollar as the global reserve currency? The Euro, maybe? The Yen and Pound are too small, and everything else is smaller still. The Yuan might be ready in 15 years when their financial markets are developed. It takes a long time for the reserve currency to shift.

5) So, why not the Euro? I’m still a skeptic that the EU will hang together without political union. Also, a strong Euro is testing the monetary union in places where credit markets are weak, and export markets are weakening because the US is getting more competitive with the weak Dollar. That said a persistently weak dollar raises the incentives for other countries to look for a new reserve currency. Leaving aside the potential instability of the EU (unlikely in the short run) the Euro is probably the best alternative.

6) This piece by Felix Salmon helps point out why why Iceland is the canary in the coal mine. They are the smallest economy with a floating currency. It seems like they are successfully defending their currency at present, at the cost of 15% interest rates.

7) Is the UK economy just a miniature version of the US economy?

8 ) Why is Chinese inflation rising? Loose monetary policy, and an undervalued Yuan, at least versus the Dollar. Now, maybe the Chinese will start buying Euro-denominated bonds, and sell more to the EU than they buy. (Note that I am not the only skeptic on the Euro’s survival.)

9) What of the Gulf States? What will they do with all of the dollars that they have? Along with China, their huge depreciating Dollar reserves are fueling inflation. Personally, if I were in their shoes, I would buy US corporations quietly, perhaps through the purchase of ETFs. But the huge accumulation of dollars threatens to create the same “white elephant” development schemes that they experienced in the early 80s, when the socialist Gulf governments had too many Dollars, and too few places to use them.

10) Inflation is rising in the OECD. This is a “sea change” in terms of economics. Policymakers have enjoyed falling inflation rates for so long that perhaps they aren’t ready for the degree of monetary tightening necessary to squeeze out inflation.

11) Development isn’t easy after a point. It reveals shortages, as India is experiencing in semi-skilled and skilled labor. This will eventually work out, but in the short run, it makes infrastructure and construction projects difficult. Bodies aren’t enough; skills are needed, and many better skilled Indians work abroad, where they can make more.

12) A rice cartel? Everything old is new again. I remember in the 1970s when the US talked about a wheat/corn cartel, in response to the new strength of OPEC. Personally, I don’t think it would be effective. Agriculture is too flexible for cartel-like schemes to work in the intermediate-term. But, let them try. It will be interesting to see what happens.

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