Category: Stocks

Tribunes are to Promote Justice among Common Men, Redux

Tribunes are to Promote Justice among Common Men, Redux

I often fail, and am no good at identifying short candidates because I am not good at timing.? I can spot a bad balance sheet easily, but often companies with the worst balance sheets soar during the bull phase of the market.? What that suggests to me regarding shorting is:

  • During the bull phase identify bad balance sheets, but don’t short anything.? Make your list of future failures.
  • Watch for when junk yields rise over 500 bps, then start shorting the names you identified.? There is a risk that you can’t get a borrow, but then buy puts if you can’t get the borrow.

So, maybe I could do shorting.? I’ve gotten a lot of names right, but timing is problematic.? You don’t want to short names too soon, or you won’t be able to carry your position to its demise.? But one name you could not short (using stock) was Tribune after Sam Zell took it private.? I wrote twice about Tribune, and for two reasons:

As I have said elsewhere, it stinks that Sam Zell influenced Tribune employees to invest in a failing business.? It is usually a bad idea to invest in the company that you draw wages from, because it lacks diversification.? Beyond that, if the buyout by Zell had lasted five years, I could argue that the employees had gotten their money’s worth through wages.? As it is, after one year-plus, they got hosed.

It’s sad, and it may get sadder still, as other newspaper holding companies die.? Will the New York Times survive?? Maybe.? What I do know is that its economics are poor, and that they are borrowing against their last solid assets.? Does that sound like a recipe for success?

A Bold Move from Mr. Heebner

A Bold Move from Mr. Heebner

Just a quick note because I am tired, but Ken Heebner has turned bullish on financials.? I’m not there yet, because I think there is more pain to come in losses from benk lending in HELOCs, Credit Cards, Commericial Mortgages, etc.? I am slightly underweight at present with exposure to insurance only.

I admire Ken Heebner a great deal… I think he is early here, unless collateral prices stop declining.? Unlike Ken, I think the actions of our government will prove ineffectual.? Perhaps it would be better to buy the bank loans or senior debt of these firms.? Less downside, and reasonable upside.

Momentum in the S&P 500

Momentum in the S&P 500

Time for another break from “All crisis, all of the time.”? I have long been fascinated by momentum anomalies, and this is an initial attempt to under stand them better.? My contentions have been that:

  • Sharp moves mean-revert, gradual moves persist.
  • In the short-run momentum persists, in the intermediate-term, it mean-reverts, and in the long-run, oddly, it persists.

Let’s see how well my default views stack up against the evidence.? I used Professor Shiller’s augmented S&P 500 data from 1871 to mid-2008 to ask the following question: given the performance of the last year and the last month, what can that tell us about the likely returns for the next year and next month?

I divided performance into ten deciles for the past year and the past month.? Here are the monthly and annual returns by decile:

For purposes of completeness, I also calculated the number of observations by decile:

Note the correlation.? The main diagonal elements support the idea that monthly and yearly returns are correlated.? Not too surprising.

Returns Over the Next Year

So, how do returns over the next year relate to returns over the last month and year?

Okay, the R-squared is low on this calculation, but the drift from the regression is that there is mean reversion from the past year’s return, and momentum from the monthly returns.? Oddly, some of the worst return occurred when yearly returns were pretty average.

Returns Over the Next Month

So, how do returns over the next month relate to returns over the last month and year?

The R-squared is a little better here, and the main result is that the past year’s returns do not impact the next month’s returns much, but the past month’s returns do.? There may be some evidence for when monthly momentum is strong, if annual momentum is strongly positive or negative, there will be outperformance.

So, what do I conclude here?

  • Monthly momentum persists over the next month and year.
  • Annual momentum might persist over the next month, and with a lesser tendency might revert over the next year.

One constant I have observed in financial economics: mean-reversion exists, but the tendency is weak.

PS — where are we now?? Lowest deciles for both monthly and annual returns, which indicates bad performance for the next month , but good performance for the next year.? Buckle in, it will be volatile.

One Dozen Observations on the Current Market Stress

One Dozen Observations on the Current Market Stress

1) What a mess.? I had been lightening up on equity exposure over the last week, but seemingly not enough.? The last three months have been hard for me, with my performance trailing the S&P 500 in each of the last three months.? Well, at least I admit it when I lose; let’s see if I can’t do better in the future.

2) The rally in long Treasuries is the cousin to the fall in equities.

A $4 move in the long bond would be significant enough — that is a top 5 move, but the shocker is seeing the 30-year yield near 3.20%.? That should lead to lower mortgage yields, refinancing, and perhaps, lower rates in the short run.? The long run is another matter.

3) Part of this came from Bernanke’s comments that the Fed would buy Treasuries.? If I may, what isn’t the Fed going to buy?? Do they really want to flatten the yield curve when the long end is this low already?? Don’t they have enough to do with instruments that have credit risk?? They can flatten the Treasury curve, but the corporate yield curve is out of their reach for now.

4) One example of that is the junk bond market, where the average yield is now over 20%.? Areas where the government does not guarantee see little liquidity, because government guarantees in other areas help siphon liquidity away.

5)? So I’m not impressed with the FDIC insured bond offerings from a public policy standpoint.? They crowd out non-guaranteed bonds.? But I would be inclined to buy the bonds in place of allocations to Treasuries or Agencies.

6) TIPS, excluding the long end, are trading below par.

Also, the on-the-run securities are trading at a premium, because their inflation factors are close to 1 because they are young securities.? The inflation factors can’t go below 1, but older securities can see more past inflation erased, should we get a period of sustained deflation.? I don’t see that coming over the intermediate-term, but in the short-term we could see that.? Eventually the Fed will have to monetize many of the promises that it is making.

7) Perhaps we need another means of calculating how bad it is for non-guaranteed areas of the market, like A2/P2 CP.? That is a true horror.? I remember criticizing those investing in levered nonprime CP back when I was writing for RealMoney, but most of those investors are dead or gone now.? My measure of credit stress, the 2-year Treasury less A2/P2 yields, is at a new record.

8 ) It is no surprise here that GM is scrambling, as are the other automakers.? Let them try to get debtors to compromise.?? They will try to get the PBGC to take on the pension liabilities in foreclosure, though that may not be so easy.? They have refused to accept some liabilities in the past.

9) I was an early critic of reverse auctions organized by the US Treasury, largely because of the complexity involved.? I guess it took Paulson longer to realize the immensity of setting up those auctions.? It’s not as if the problem is unsolvable, but it would take a lot of work, and the payoff at the end is uncertain.

10) Is anyone else concerned that the Yuan is falling relative to the US Dollar? This graph gives the history since they “floated” the Yuan.? (Note the dirty float free market-like movements. 😉 )

Granted, it is a large-ish 2-day blip, but for the global economy to heal, we need China to begin to use the large surpluses that they have built up, buy abroad, and build up their domestic markets.

It would be a simple matter of fairness as well.? As it is, the surpluses in the government’s hands fuel a bloated financial system and inflation, which could be partially solved by importing more goods for their citizens to buy.

11) It’s my view that the economics profession comes out of this crisis with a black eye or two.? There is a lot of room for humility here.? Neoclassical economics does a lousy job of understanding how the real economy (goods and services) interacts with the financial economy (stocks, bonds, etc.).? That is a strength of the Austrian school, though.

Even on a microeconomic basis, periods of stress like this can make one question some of the theorems of Modigliani and Miller.? The way that assets are financed does make a difference when there is financial stress, and even more in insolvency.? Also, the financing windows are not always open.? Theories that rely on markets remaining open and liquid, such as many arbitrage-type arguments are not valid except when the market has “fair weather.”

12) There is no shortage of liquidity for the US Treasury, which takes that liquidity, gives T-bills to the Fed, which uses them to replace bail out specific lending markets, and downgrade the quality of their balance sheet buy up securities where liquidity is temporarily in short supply.? Personally, I don’t think it will work.? It is much easier to get into a market than to get out, particularly if you are a large player with no profit motive.? Three last semi-related articles that I found interesting:

T-bills are in high demand, perhaps the government should take advantage of it and issue a lot of them.? There are some dangers though:

a) This could be what finally does in the dollar.
b) The US debt maturity structure has been shortening of late — I wouldn’t want it to get too short, or we could face rollover risk, as Mexico did in 1994.

It might be better for the US Government to lock in long funding rates while they are available.? Who thought the 10-year or 30-year could be so low?

The Citi was Asleep, is Asleep, and I Hope They Don’t Cause Us to Sleep

The Citi was Asleep, is Asleep, and I Hope They Don’t Cause Us to Sleep

Time moves fast in a crisis.? It surprises me that it was only seven weeks ago that I wrote, What A Fine Mess You Have Gotten Us Into, where I commented:

  • What the FDIC did with WaMu affects other banks like Wachovia.? Bidders will let the holding company fail, and bid for the operating bank subsidiary assets.? Holders of holding company securities get hit, as their likelihood of getting reasonable recoveries disappears.
  • We are putting a lot of faith in the health of Citigroup, Bank of America, and JP Morgan.? If one of them fails, the game is over.? Given their complexity, and the recent takeovers, the odds of there being a significant mistake are high.? Consider further that they are counterparties for more than 50% of all derivative transactions, so the synthetic leverage is high as well.

What I meant by “the game is over” is that the idea that you can keep laying off risk on increasingly large and complex banks would be over as a strategy.? Also, the ability of the US Government to continue to bail out every decrepit entity would be tested, and possibly found wanting.

Or, as I noted on Friday, in my piece Broken?:

There are still more oddities to the current bond market, most of which involve parties that can?t take certain risks any more.? We can expand that to banks, and toss in Citi.? Citi is trading like it is going out of business.? Now, Citi is one of the ?too big to fail? [TBTF] banks, along with JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.? If they are in trouble, I?m not sure who can buy them; they would probably be too much for even a coalition of the other TBTF banks to handle.? Is there a foreign bank that wants them?? I doubt it.? This would be another area where a new TBTF chapter of the bankruptcy code would be useful.

So now we have a bailout of Citi by the US Treasury and FDIC.? At present the rescue of Citi is a plus to the markets, because it takes a short-term problem off the table, leaving behind a more ill-defined long-term problem: how much can the US Government borrow/guarantee?? Also, what of their derivative exposures, and the state of the other TBTF banks?? It’s difficult to get that big in a credit boom without absorbing the seeds of the credit bust.

So, I am selling a little into the euphoria.? We will see where all of this leads, but my guess is that it is just one more step on the road to credit failure for the US Government.

Book Review: The Only Guide to Alternative Investments You’ll Ever Need

Book Review: The Only Guide to Alternative Investments You’ll Ever Need

I’m taking a brief break from “all crisis, all the time” writing.? I’m backlogged on book reviews, and it is time to write some.

When I get a book on asset allocation, I suck in my gut and say, “Oh no, not another book that falls into the common traps of only relying on past history, and doesn’t consider structural factors….”? I was surprised this time, and I have a book on asset allocation that I can wholeheartedly endorse.

Messrs. Swedroe and Kizer have distinguished between asset classes in sophisticated ways.? With annuities they classify immediate annuities as good, variable annuities as bad, and equity indexed annuities as ugly.? I could not have said it better.

They identify real traps for the retail investor: avoiding the structured product that Wall Street tries to feed retail investors.? They always find new ways to cheat you, encouraging you to sell options that seem cheap, but are quite valuable.

They also describe areas of the asset markets that are less correlated with domestic stocks and bonds — Real Estate, TIPS, Stable Value (I would note the over a long period stable value and bonds do equally well), Commodities, International Stocks, and Immediate Annuities.

Assets that are hybrid between equity and debt tend not to offer much diversification to a balanced core portfolio, so junk bonds, convertible bonds, and preferred stock do not offer much of a diversification advantage.? Similarly, Private Equity is highly correlated with public equity returns over a intermediate-to-long time horizon.? (I would note that any of those assets classes may present relative valuation advantages at certain points in time, and that expert managers can add value, if you can find them.? As for now, high yield is attractive, and there is value in busted convertibles trading for their fixed income value only.)

Hedge funds are difficult to consider as an asset class.? Their is much variability across hedge fund types, and within each type of hedge fund.? There are a lot of difficulties with survivorship bias in analyzing the effectiveness of hedge funds as a group.

The book has several strengths:

  • How do the costs of an asset class affect performance? (e.g. Variable Annuities)
  • How do taxes affect performance? (e.g. covered calls)
  • How does complexity affect performance? (e.g. Structured products)
  • How do personal factors like age and risk averseness affect what products might work well?
  • How does inflation affect performance?

Now, this is only indirectly a book on asset allocation.? It is not going to give you a set of procedures to tell you how to analyze your personal situation, the relative attractiveness of various classes at present, and the macroeconomic environment, and calculate a reasonable asset allocation for yourself, your DB plan, or endowment.? But it will give you the necessary building blocks to see how each alternative asset class fits into an overall asset allocation.

If you want to, you can buy it here: The Only Guide to Alternative Investments You’ll Ever Need: The Good, the Flawed, the Bad, and the Ugly

PS — Remember, I don’t have a tip jar, but I do do book reviews.? If you enter Amazon through a link on my site and buy things from them, I get a small commission, and you don’t pay anything extra.? Such a deal if you wanted to get it anyway…

GE Does Not Bring Good Things For Your Life

GE Does Not Bring Good Things For Your Life

When is a stock safe enough to buy when it becomes difficult for corporations to find financing?? We can answer the question two ways: 1) Why should we buy stocks when the financial markets are choking?? Better to sit on cash.? 2) We can’t tell when the turn is coming, so if we buy companies that are cheap with strong balance sheets and free cash flow, we should do okay over the intermediate-to-long run.

I’m going to illustrate this with a single stock tonight: General Electric.? Why GE?? Here’s something I haven’t mentioned recently about how I source stock ideas.? I read widely, and when some one tells me a stock is cheap, I write it down for later analysis.? My initial cursory analysis during this time of credit stress looks like this:

Let’s look at earnings estimates:

Yeah, is does look cheap.? How has it done recently relative to expectations?

Mmmm…. not so good.? Looks like they are still working off all of the bad accruals from the Jack Welch era.

Now, let’s look at the balance sheet:

Mmmm… there are a lot of intangibles on the balance sheet.? Taqngible book value is light.? Perhaps the intangibles have real economic value.? If so, I would expect to see additional earnings over operating cash flow, and the is not there. Let’s look at debt maturities, could there be a call on cash?

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That doesn’t look good.? What if we look at only the holding company?

Okay, not so bad.? Most of the debt is from the finance subsidiary that I have argued for years should spun off.? In a pinch, what are the odds that they would send GE Capital into insolvency?? Very low, so I worry about the refinance risk.? Will GE Capital get attractive financing terms over the next several years?

On to cash flows.? Here are the cash flow screens:

Okay, free cash flow is positive, and congruent with earnings over the last five years.? That’s a good sign.? What else is there to look at?

holding-company-only.gif

Okay, Price-to-sales indicates that GE could be cheap versus their long history, but it could get cheaper.

Let’s look at summary statistics:

From all of the above, as I look at GE, there is a refinancing problem.? Many debts come due over the next 5-10 years, probably matched by debt repaqyments over the same horizon.? The effect of default from these repayments could be significant.? I doubt that GE would be willing to send its finance subsidiary into insolvency.

In conclusion, even at the low levels that GE stock price has reached, I’m not comfortable with it.? GE will have to refinance a lot of its debt over the next five years, unless they sell or default on GE Capital.? The debt load outweighs the seeming cheapness.

Full disclosure: no position

What is a Depression?

What is a Depression?

Before I try to explain what a Depression is, let me explain what a bubble is.? A bubble is a self-reinforcing boom in the price of an asset class, typically caused by cheap financing,? with the term of liabilities usually shorter than the lifespan of the asset class.

But, before I go any further, consider what I wrote in this vintage CC post:


David Merkel
Bubbling Over
1/21/05 4:38 PM?ET
In light of Jim Altucher’s and Cody Willard’s pieces on bubbles, I would like to offer up my own definition of a bubble, for what it is worth.A bubble is a large increase in investment in a new industry that eventually produces a negative internal rate of return for the sector as a whole by the time the new industry hits maturity. By investment I mean the creation of new companies, and new capital-raising by established companies in a new industry.This is a hard calculation to run, with the following problems:

1) Lack of data on private transactions.
2) Lack of divisional data in corporations with multiple divisions.
3) Lack of data on the soft investment done by stakeholders who accept equity in lieu of wages, supplies, rents, etc.
4) Lack of data on corporations as they get dissolved or merged into other operations.
5) Survivorship bias.
6) Benefits to complementary industries can get blurred in a conglomerate. I.e., melding “media content” with “media delivery systems.” Assuming there is any synergy, how does it get divided?

This makes it difficult to come to an answer on “bubbles,” unless the boundaries are well-defined. With the South Sea Bubble, The Great Crash, and the Nikkei in the 90s, we can get a reasonably sharp answer — bubbles. But with industries like railroads, canals, electronics, the Internet it’s harder to come to an answer because it isn’t easy to get the data together. It is also difficult to separate out the benefits between related industries. Even if there has been a bubble, there is still likely to be profitable industries left over after the bubble has popped, but they will be smaller than what the aggregate investment in the industry would have justified.

To give a small example of this, Priceline is a profitable business. But it is worth considerably less today than all the capital that was pumped into it from the public equity markets, not even counting the private capital they employed. This would fit my bubble description well.

Personally, I lean toward the ideas embedded in Manias, Panics, and Crashes by Charles Kindleberger, and Devil take the Hindmost by Edward Chancellor. From that, I would argue that if you see a lot of capital chasing an industry at a price that makes it compelling to start businesses, there is a good probability of it being a bubble. Also, the behavior of people during speculative periods can be another clue.

It leaves me for now on the side that though the Internet boom created some valuable businesses, but in aggregate, the Internet era was a bubble. Most of the benefits seem to have gone to users of the internet, rather than the creators of the internet, which is similar to what happened with the railroads and canals. Users benefited, but builders/operators did not always benefit.

none

Bubbles are primarily financing phenomena.? The financing is cheap, and often reprices or requires refinancing before the lifespan of the asset.? What’s the life span of an asset?? Usually quite long:

  • Stocks: forever
  • Preferred stocks: maturity date, if there is one.
  • Bonds: maturity date, unless there is an extension provision.
  • Private equity: forever — one must look to the underlying business, rather than when the sponsor thinks he can make an exit.
  • Real Estate: practically forever, with maintenance.
  • Commodities: storage life — look to the underlying, because you can’t tell what financing will be like at the expiry of futures.

Financing terms are typically not locked in for a long amount of time, and if they are, they are more expensive than financing short via short maturity or floating rate debt.? The temptation is to choose short-dated financing, in order to make more profits due to the cheap rates, and momentum in asset prices.

But was this always so?? Let’s go back through history:

2003-2006: Housing bubble, Investment Bank bubble, Hedge fund bubble.? There was a tendency for more homeowners to finance short.? Investment banks rely on short dated “repo” finance.? Hedge funds typically finance short through their brokers.

1998-2000: Tech/Internet bubble.? Where’s the financing?? Vendor terms were typically short.? Those who took equity in place of rent, wages, goods or services typically did so without long dated financing to make up for the loss of cash flow.? Also, equity capital was very easy to obtain for speculative ventures.

1998: Emerging Asia/Russia/LTCM.? LTCM financed through brokers, which is short-dated.? Emerging markets usually can’t float a lot of long term debt, particularly not in their own currencies.? Debts in US Dollars, or other hard currencies are as bad as floating rate debt,? because in a crisis, it is costly to source hard currencies.

1994: Residential mortgages/Mexico: Mexico financed using Cetes (t-bills paying interest in dollars).? Mortgages?? As the Fed funds rates screamed higher, leveraged players were forced to bolt.? Self-reinforcing negative cycle ensues.

I could add in the early 80s, 1984, 1987, and 1989, where rising short rates cratered LDC debt, Continental Illinois, the bond and stock markets, and banks and commerical real estate, respectively. That’s how the Fed bursts bubbles by raising short rates.? Consider this piece from the CC:


David Merkel
Gradualism
1/31/2006 1:38 PM EST

One more note: I believe gradualism is almost required in Fed tightening cycles in the present environment — a lot more lending, financing, and derivatives trading gears off of short rates like three-month LIBOR, which correlates tightly with fed funds. To move the rate rapidly invites dislocating the markets, which the FOMC has shown itself capable of in the past. For example:

  • 2000 — Nasdaq
  • 1997-98 — Asia/Russia/LTCM, though that was a small move for the Fed
  • 1994 — Mortgages/Mexico
  • 1989 — Banks/Commercial Real Estate
  • 1987 — Stock Market
  • 1984 — Continental Illinois
  • Early ’80s — LDC debt crisis
  • So it moves in baby steps, wondering if the next straw will break some camel’s back where lending has been going on terms that were too favorable. The odds of this 1/4% move creating such a nonlinear change is small, but not zero.

    But on the bright side, the odds of a 50 basis point tightening at any point in the next year are even smaller. The markets can’t afford it.

    Position: None

    Bubbles end when the costs of financing are too high to continue to prop up the inflated value of the assets.? Then a negative self-reinforcing cycle ensues, in which many things are tried in order to reflate the assets, but none succeed, because financing terms change.? Yield spreads widen dramatically, and often financing cannot be obtained at all.? If a bubble is a type of “boom phase,” then its demise is a type of bust phase.

    Often a bubble becomes a dominant part of economic activity for an economy, so the “bust phase” may involve the Central bank loosening rates to aid the economy as a whole.? As I have explained before, the Fed loosening monetary policy only stimulates parts of the economy that can absorb more debt.? Those parts with high yield spreads because of the bust do not get any benefit.

    But what if there are few or no areas of the economy that can absorb more debt, including the financial sector?? That is a depression.? At such a point, conventional monetary policy of lowering the central rate (in the US, the Fed funds rate) will do nothing.? It is like providing electrical shocks to a dead person, or trying to wake someone who is in a coma. In short: A depression is the negative self-reinforcing cycle that follows a economy-wide bubble.

    Because of the importance of residential and commercial real estate to the economy as a whole, and our financial system in particular, the busts there are so big, that the second-order effects on the financial system eliminate financing for almost everyone.

    How does this end?

    It ends when we get total debt as a fraction of GDP down to 150% or so.? World War II did not end the Great Depression, and most of the things that Hoover and FDR did made the Depression longer and worse.? It ended because enough debts were paid off or forgiven.? At that point, normal lending could resume.

    We face a challenge as great, or greater than that at the Great Depression, because the level of debt is higher, and our government has a much higher debt load as a fraction of GDP than back in 1929.? It is harder today for the Federal government to absorb private sector debts, because we are closer to the 150% of GDP ratio of government debts relative to GDP, which is where foreigners typically stop financing governments. (We are at 80-90% of GDP now.)

    We also have hidden liabilities through entitlement programs that are not reflected in the overall debt levels.? If I reflected those, the Debt to GDP ratio would be somewhere in the 6-7x GDP area. (With Government Debt to GDP in the 4x region.)

    We are in uncharted waters, held together only because the US Dollar is the global reserve currency, and there is nothing that can replace it for now.? In the short run, as carry trades collapse, there is additional demand for Yen and US Dollar obligations, particularly T-bills.

    But eventually this will pass, and foreign creditors will find something that is a better store of value than US Dollars.? The proper investment actions here depend on what Government policy will be.? Will they inflate away? the problem?? Raise taxes dramatically?? Default internally?? Externally?? Both?

    I don’t see a good way out, and that may mean that a good asset allocation contains both inflation sensitive and deflation sensitive assets.? One asset that has a little of both would be long-dated TIPS — with deflation, you get your money back, and inflation drives additional accretion of the bond’s principal.? But maybe gold and long nominal T-bonds is better.? Hard for me to say.? We are in uncharted waters, and most strategies do badly there.

    Last note: if you invest in stocks, emphasize the ability to self-finance.? Don’t buy companies that will need to raise capital for the next three years.

    Sell Stocks, Buy Corporate Bonds

    Sell Stocks, Buy Corporate Bonds

    I have lots of models, but I am only one person, so some of my models sit idle becuase I don’t have time to update them.? Well, today, as I was reading Barron’s, I ran across the “Current Yield” column, and read this:

    THE STOCK MARKET IS PRICED FOR a recession, but the bond market is priced for a depression. So says Rob Arnott, the brainiac who heads Research Affiliates, an institutional advisory.

    That’s not hyperbole. Corporate bonds rated Baa or triple-B, the low end of investment grade by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s designations, offer the biggest yield premium since the early 1930s, notes RBC Capital Markets.

    That’s a problem for pulling the economy out of the credit crisis, but an opportunity for investors. Indeed, investment-grade corporates with near-record premiums arguably offer better return potential than common stocks, especially relative to their risks. “I haven’t seen this many markets offering double-digit opportunities since 1989-90 or ever so briefly in 2002,” says Arnott.

    Part of it reflects the sheer weight of numbers. Corporates rated Baa yield about 550 basis points (5.5 percentage points) more than comparable Treasuries, nearly half again the spread in the 2002 post-WorldCom-Enron debacle and twice the average of post-war recessions.

    You have to go back to the early 1930s, when Baa corporates yielded 700 basis points over Treasuries, to find a comparable situation. And notwithstanding all the hyperventilation in the media that this is worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, there’s never been such a full-court response to the threat of debt deflation — the $700 billion TARP, the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the likelihood of trillion-dollar deficits and a doubling in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet in just over two months.

    I know things are bad in the corporate bond market, but I didn’t think it was that bad.? This made me ask, “Hmm… what about my stocks versus bonds model?”? That article is one of my better ones; a lot of time and effort got poured into that.? So, I sat down and re-engineered the model, since, embarrassingly, the original model was lost.

    The key question is whether the yield on BBB corporates is more than 3.9% higher than the earnings yield on the S&P 500.? The answer is yes, and that means we should sell stocks and buy corporate bonds.? But, here is the embarrassing thing for me.? The first recent signal to sell stocks and buy bonds came in mid-August, but since I didn’t track the model regularly, I missed that.? Since the original model worked off monthly data, even selling in early September would have preserved a lot of value.? It is not as if corporate bonds have done well since August, but they have done much better than the S&P 500.

    Here’s a graph summarizing 2008 via my model:

    When the green line goes over 3.9%, it is time to buy corporate bonds. That is not a frequent occurrence; this model gives of signals only a few times per decade. Check out my original piece for more details.

    So, with that, I offer my conclusions:

    • It is still time to allocate money to corporate bonds versus equities.? Where I have flexibility with my own money, I am allocating money away from Equity and to BBB investment grade and high yield corporates.
    • Though there are a lot of reasons to worry, corporate yield spreads discount a lot of trouble.
    • The model indicates a fair value of the S&P 500 at around 700.? Uh, I’m not predicting that, but if we hang around at yield levels like this for long, yes, the equity market will adjust to the competition.? More likely is the equity market treads water while corporates rally.
    • A caveat I toss out is that all areas of the credit markets where the government is not meddling are disproportionately hurt, because investors are fleeing toward guaranteed areas.? Thus, corporates are hurting.
    • College endowments and other investors that hate to buy conventional assets should consider corporates now.? It is my bet that a portfolio of low investment grade and junk grade corporates will outperform a 60/40 portfolio of Stocks and T-Notes.
    • If you have the freedom to sell protection on a broad basket of corporates, this might be a good time to do it, when everyone else is scared to death.? Time to insure corporate credit, perhaps.
    • One more caveat before I am done.? The rule has only been tested on data since 1953.? It is not depression-proof.??? I hope to gather the data from that era and validate the formula, but that will be difficult.

    So, be careful out there, and remember that corporate bonds typically do better than stocks in a prolonged bear market for credit.? Yield levels like the present typically bode well for corporate bonds versus stocks.

    How Stocks Work, Sort of

    How Stocks Work, Sort of

    I enjoyed the pieces by Felix Salmon and James Surowiecki, and Eddy Elfenbein on how stocks work.? I have reproduced their arguments here, together with my thoughts.

    Felix Salmon: What’s the relationship, in theory, between a company’s return on equity, on the one hand, and its stock price, on the other? Does a high return on equity mean a rising stock price, or is it a rising return on equity which means a rising stock price? Or, to put it another way: if one company has an ROE which is (expected to be) flat at 4%, and another company has an ROE which is (expected to be) flat at 14%, would you expect the latter to rise more than the former, or indeed either of them to rise at all?

    Jim Surowiecki: Your first question, unfortunately, can’t really be answered in the abstract. It’s perfectly possible for a business with high returns on capital to still be overvalued – that is, for its stock price to overestimate the cash flows it will generate over time. In that case, the fact that a company is generating high returns on capital won’t translate into an increase in its stock price. Microsoft’s average return on invested capital, for instance, is consistently good – above 25% — but its stock is just about where it was a decade ago.

    This speaks to your second question, which is really about expectations. If the market is accurately forecasting the returns on capital of the low-ROIC company and the high-ROIC company, you wouldn’t expect the latter’s stock price to dramatically outperform the former. But assuming both are fairly valued, the high-ROIC company will have a much higher valuation, meaning it will generate more income for shareholders going forward (in the form of dividends, buybacks, etc.)

    That’s why, all things being equal, you want to own shares of companies that generate high returns on capital rather than those of companies that don’t. This is, in a way, self-evident. If you put money into a company, you want it to use that money to generate high returns, higher than you could get elsewhere. That’s what companies that have high returns on capital do: Microsoft earns an additional twenty-five cents for every dollar it invests. By contrast, companies with low returns on capital create less value, and companies that earn returns that are lower than their cost of capital (as was true of Japanese companies between 1990 and the early part of this century) actually destroy value for their shareholders.

    Eddy Elfenbein: A company?s share price is the net present value of all future cash flows. A company?s return-on-equity is a measure of profits for the next year relative to present equity, so the two are connected. However, a high ROE does not translate to a rising share price, but a rising ROE should. Regarding your question, I would assume that the market has discounted both stocks? net present value which incorporates ROE. Therefore, I would only expect the stocks to rise at the pace of the risk-free rate plus the equity risk premium.

    This may help: ROE can be broken down into three parts; profit margin, asset turnover and leverage. It goes like this:

    Profit margin is earnings divided by sales. Asset turnover is sales divided by assets. Leverage is assets divided by equity.

    Earnings……….Sales…………..Assets
    —————X—————-X————–
    Sales…………….Assets………..Equity

    Note that the sales and assets cancel each other out to give you Earnings divided by Equity.

    David Merkel: The question can be answered in the abstract, with some noise.? With a few assumptions/limitations as disclosed in this article, Quantitative Analysis is not Trivial ? The Case of PB-ROE.? In most mature industries where capital constrains growth, there is a linear relationship between price-to-book and and ROE.??? This is a result of the dividend discount model, given the assumptions of the article that I cited.

    There is the inherent assumption that net worth is the limiting factor in doing new business.? If that is not the case, then the model does not work.? If sales is the limiting factors the equation becomes price-to-sales as a function of profit margins.

    FS: What’s the relationship between stock price, ROE, and risk-free rate of return? Would one expect ROEs in a country with a zero risk-free rate to be lower than ROEs in a country with a higher risk-free rate? How does that feed in to stock prices, if at all?

    JS: You would expect returns on invested capital to be lower in countries with lower risk-free rates (like Japan). Two reasons suggest themselves for this: first, the low risk-free rate may be indicative of lower growth prospects for the economy as a whole. But also, when the risk-free rate is low, the hurdle rate for corporate investments is also lower (because investors’ expectations of what counts as a reasonable return are also lower.) That may make companies more likely to invest in low-return projects. Both factors have something to do with why Japanese firms have underperformed over the last twenty years (and in particular in that 1990-2002 stretch). But I think the most important factors explaining the low ROIC of Japanese firms were their indifference to shareholder value and their willingness to invest in value-destroying projects.

    EE: Again, a company?s share price is the net present value of all future cash flows. ROE is the best measure of the growth of future cash flows. How do we discount that? We discount it by the cost of capital which is risk-free rate plus an equity-risk premium. That?s why a lower risk-free rate tends to boost equity prices.

    According to the Gordon Model, it should look something like this:

    Price = Earnings/(Risk Free Rate + Equity Risk Premium – ROE)

    DM: The risk free rate often has little to do with where corporations can source funds.? Eddy talks about the equity risk premium, but that varies over time.? At present that risk premium is high.? If the country in question is in a liquidity trap, like Japan, equity risk premiums are high.? In general, equity risk premiums are a free market, and disconnected from the “risk free rate” represented by short government bonds

    FS: How can a company with a positive ROE destroy economic value for shareholders?

    JS: The key to understanding how a company with a positive ROE can nonetheless destroy economic value is simply recognizing that equity is not free. It has a cost, just like debt does, a cost that reflects the return that investors demand as compensation for the risks and opportunity costs that owning equities entail. We can debate how to calculate that cost of equity (risk-free rate + market risk premium is a simple solution). But the basic principle is, as I said above, that a company is only creating economic value for its shareholders if it’s earning more than its cost of capital. Again, this is intuitive: if you were the part owner of a company that, on a risk-adjusted basis, was earning less than the yield you could get on a 30-year T-bill, you probably wouldn’t keep your money in that company, because you would effectively be losing money with every day that passed. Shareholders feel the same way, so the share prices of companies that earn less than their cost of capital are unlikely to rise over time. According to a study by the Japanese government, Japanese companies’ return on capital was below their cost of capital for roughly the entire decade of the 1990s through 2002. If you want to know why Japanese stock prices fell precipitously during that period, that’s the biggest reason why: the companies weren’t creating any value for shareholders. And what made it worse was that, as a result of the bubble, expectations were already inordinately high.

    One thing I should say, though: Japanese companies have significantly improved their performance in the past five years, and there’s a strong case to be made that, as in the U.S., the recent sell-off of the Nikkei has been massively overdone. In fact, if you think that the transformation of Japanese firms in recent years will be long-lasting (I’m agnostic on the question), then the Nikkei looks very undervalued right now – or at least it did before it rose something like 15% in the last week and a half.

    EE: All companies in all industries are in phantom competition with the cost of equity capital. Even though you can?t see it, you?re struggling against it every day. So even if a company manages to squeak out positive ROE, capital will not flow your way if you keep losing to everybody else.

    DM: No disagreement here.? Companies must earn more than their cost of capital in order to add value.? This helps explain why low positive ROEs trade at a discount to book value.

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    That’s all, and spite of all the discussion here, I own shares of? Honda Motors and the SPDR Russell/Nomura Small Cap Japan ETF,

    Full disclosure: long JSC HMC

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