Stocks – Page 124 – The Aleph Blog

Post 800

Posted on 8 August 2008 by David Merkel

Every 100 posts, as WordPress counts, I take a moment out to reflect on my life , my blog, the markets, and more.? My blog is usually a reflection of me as an investor and businessman, but it is not a reflection of me, the whole person.? This is my chance to speak my mind more broadly.? (By the way, it is amusing to be doing post 800 on 08/08/08.)

Hasn’t the market been volatile lately?? I feel like a yo-yo.? Ordinarily my sector rotation methods help my portfolio to be less volatile than the market, but at present my “beta” feels like 1.3.? Now, on the plus side, I am underweight energy for the first time in six years, starting in mid-July, and my energy exposure has a large refining component through Valero and ConocoPhilips. Beyond that, I am in the plus column again for 2008, though returns on Monday could reverse that with ease.

That’s the market.? Only invest what you can afford to lose.

Writing this blog interfaces with the print/online world in a variety of odd ways.? I talk to reporters fairly frequently, and give them a good amount of my time.? So, I want to thank my contacts at the CNN/Money, Fortune, Bloomberg, TheStreet.com, The Wall Street Journal, Business Week, and the Associated Press.? Other interested writers/reporters, e-mail me, and we can talk.

Ordinarily, when I write these posts, I cite those who have driven traffic my way, but right now, my internet connectivity is not cooperating with me.? Instead, I will mention the blogs that are not on my blogroll that I admire: World Beta, Felix Salmon, Information Arbitrage, and Interfluidity.

I remain most grateful to my readers.? I can’t respond to every e-mail, but I do read all of them.? Thanks for taking the time to read my writings.? I enjoy doing it because it gives something back to the broader investment community; retail investors don’t have many friends.

I leave you all with this.? I know my blog is eclectic; I cover a number of issues, and less well than some blogs that are more focused on single issues.? If you have ideas that you want me to write about, please e-mail me.

May the Lord bless you in your endeavors, and grant all of us wisdom in what I expect to be turbulent times in the markets.

Full disclosure: long VLO COP

The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms

Posted on 7 August 200820 June 2017 by David Merkel

A large-ish number of people have asked me to write this piece.? For those with access to RealMoney, I did an article called The Fundamentals of Market Tops.? For those without access, Barry Ritholtz put a large portion of it at his blog.? (I was honored .) When I wrote the piece, some people who were friends complained, because they thought that I was too bullish.? I don?t know, liking the market from 2004-2006 was a pretty good idea in hindsight.

I then wrote another piece applying the framework to residential housing in mid-2005, and I came to a different conclusion? ? yes, residential real estate was near its top.? My friends, being bearish, and grizzly housing bears, heartily approved.

So, a number of people came to me and asked if I would write ?The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms.?? Believe me, I have wanted to do so, but some of my pieces at RealMoney were ?labor of love? pieces.? They took time to write, and my editor Gretchen would love them to death.? By the way, if I may say so publicly, the editors at RealMoney (particularly Gretchen) are some of their hidden treasures.? They really made my writing sing.? I like to think that I can write, but I am much better when I am edited.

Okay, before I start this piece, I have to deal with the issue of why equity market tops and bottoms are different.? Tops and bottoms are different primarily because of debt and options investors.? At market tops, typically credit spreads are tight, but they have been tight for several years, while seemingly cheap leverage builds up.? Option investors get greedy on calls near tops, and give up on or short puts.? Implied volatility is low and stays low.? There is a sense of invincibility for the equity market, and the bond and option markets reflect that.

Bottoms are more jagged, the way corporate bond spreads are near equity market bottoms.? They spike multiple times before the bottom arrives.? Investors similarly grab for puts multiple times before the bottom arrives.? Implied volatility is high and jumpy.

As a friend of mine once said, ?To make a stock go to zero, it has to have a significant slug of debt.?? That is what differentiates tops from bottoms.? At tops, no one cares about debt or balance sheets.? The only insolvencies that happen then are due to fraud.? But at bottoms, the only thing that investors care about is debt or balance sheets.? In many cases, the corporate debt behaves like equity, and the equity is as jumpy as an at-the-money warrant.

I equate bond spreads and option volatility because contingent claims theory views corporate bondholders as having sold a put option to the equityholders.? In other words, the bondholders receive a company when in default, but the equityholders hang onto it in good times.? I described this in greater measure in Changes in Corporate Bonds, Part 1, and Changes in Corporate Bonds, Part 2.

Though this piece is about bottoms, not tops, I am going to use an old CC post of mine on tops to illustrate a point.

		David Merkel
		Housing Bubblettes, Redux
		10/27/2005 4:43 PM EDT

From my piece, ?Real Estate?s Top Looms?:

Bubbles are primarily a financing phenomenon. Bubbles pop when financing proves insufficient to finance the assets in question. Or, as I said in another forum: a Ponzi scheme needs an ever-increasing flow of money to survive. The same is true for a market bubble. When the flow?s growth begins to slow, the bubble will wobble. When it stops, it will pop. When it goes negative, it is too late.

As I wrote in the column on market tops: Valuation is rarely a sufficient reason to be long or short a market. Absurdity is like infinity. Twice infinity is still infinity. Twice absurd is still absurd. Absurd valuations, whether high or low, can become even more absurd if the expectations of market participants become momentum-based. Momentum investors do not care about valuation; they buy what is going up, and sell what is going down.

I?m not pounding the table for anyone to short anything here, but I want to point out that the argument for a bubble does not rely on the amount of the price rise, but on the amount and nature of the financing involved. That financing is more extreme today on a balance sheet basis than at any point in modern times. The average maturity of that debt to repricing date is shorter than at any point in modern times.

That?s why I think the hot coastal markets are bubblettes. My position hasn?t changed since I wrote my original piece.

Position: none

I had a shorter way of saying it: Bubbles pop when cash flow is insufficient to finance them.? But what of market bottoms?? What is financing like at market bottoms?

The Investor Base Becomes Fundamentally-Driven

1) Now, by fundamentally-driven, I don?t mean that you are just going to read lots of articles telling how cheap certain companies are. There will be a lot of articles telling you to stay away from all stocks because of the negative macroeconomic environment, and, they will be shrill.

2) Fundamental investors are quiet, and valuation-oriented.? They start quietly buying shares when prices fall beneath their threshold levels, coming up to full positions at prices that they think are bargains for any environment.

3) But at the bottom, even long-term fundamental investors are questioning their sanity.? Investors with short time horizons have long since left the scene, and investor with intermediate time horizons are selling.? In one sense investors with short time horizons tend to predominate at tops, and investors with long time horizons dominate at bottoms.

4) The market pays a lot of attention to shorts, attributing to them powers far beyond the capital that they control.

5) Managers that ignored credit quality have gotten killed, or at least, their asset under management are much reduced.

6) At bottoms, you can take a lot of well financed companies private, and make a lot of money in the process, but no one will offer financing then.? M&A volumes are small.

7) Long-term fundamental investors who have the freedom to go to cash begin deploying cash into equities, at least, those few that haven?t morphed into permabears.

8 ) Value managers tend to outperform growth managers at bottoms, though in today?s context, where financials are doing so badly, I would expect growth managers to do better than value managers.

9) On CNBC, and other media outlets, you tend to hear from the ?adults? more often.? By adults, I mean those who say ?You should have seen this coming.? Our nation has been irresponsible, yada, yada, yada.?? When you get used to seeing the faces of David Tice and James Grant, we are likely near a bottom.? The ?chrome dome count? shows more older investors on the tube is another sign of a bottom.

10) Defined benefit plans are net buyers of stock, as they rebalance to their target weights for equities.

11) Value investors find no lack of promising ideas, only a lack of capital.

12) Well-capitalized investors that rarely borrow, do so to take advantage of bargains.? They also buy sectors that rarely attractive to them, but figure that if they buy and hold for ten years, they will end up with something better.

13) Neophyte investors leave the game, alleging the the stock market is rigged, and put their money in something that they understand that is presently hot ? e.g. money market funds, collectibles, gold, real estate ? they chase the next trend in search of easy money.

14) Short interest reaches high levels; interest in hedged strategies reaches manic levels.

Changes in Corporate Behavior

1) Primary IPOs don?t get done, and what few that get done are only the highest quality. Secondary IPOs get done to reflate damaged balance sheets, but the degree of dilution is poisonous to the stock prices.

2) Private equity holds onto their deals longer, because the IPO exit door is shut.? Raising new money is hard; returns are low.

3) There are more earnings disappointments, and guidance goes lower for the future.? The bottom is close when disappointments hit, and the stock barely reacts, as if the market were saying ?So what else is new??

4) Leverage reduces, and companies begin talking about how strong their balance sheets are.? Weaker companies talk about how they will make it, and that their banks are on board, committing credit, waiving covenants, etc.? The weakest die.? Default rates spike during a market bottom, and only when prescient investors note that the amount of companies with questionable credit has declined to an amount that no longer poses systemic risk, does the market as a whole start to rally.

5) Accounting tends to get cleaned up, and operating earnings become closer to net earnings.? As business ramps down, free cash flow begins to rise, and becomes a larger proportion of earnings.

6) Cash flow at stronger firms enables them to begin buying bargain assets of weaker and bankrupt firms.

7) Dividends stop getting cut on net, and begin to rise, and the same for buybacks.

8 ) High quality companies keep buying back stock, not aggresssively, but persistently.

Other Indicators

1) Implied volatility is high, as is actual volatility. Investors are pulling their hair, biting their tongues, and retreating from the market. The market gets scared easily, and it is not hard to make the market go up or down a lot.

2)The Fed adds liquidity to the system, and the response is sluggish at best.? By the time the bottom comes, the yield curve has a strong positive slope.

No Bottom Yet

There are some reasons for optimism in the present environment.? Shorts are feared.? Value investors are seeing more and more ideas that are intriguing.? Credit-sensitive names have been hurt.? The yield curve has a positive slope.? Short interest is pretty high.? But a bottom is not with us yet, for the following reasons:

Implied volatility is low.
Corporate defaults are not at crisis levels yet.
Housing prices still have further to fall.
Bear markets have duration, and this one has been pretty short so far.
Leverage hasn?t decreased much.? In particular, the investment banks need to de-lever, including the synthetic leverage in their swap books.
The Fed is not adding liquidity to the system.
I don?t sense true panic among investors yet.? Not enough neophytes have left the game.

Not all of the indicators that I put forth have to appear for there to be a market bottom. A preponderance of them appearing would make me consider the possibility, and that is not the case now.

Some of my indicators are vague and require subjective judgment. But they?re better than nothing, and kept me in the game in 2001-2002. I hope that I ? and you ? can achieve the same with them as we near the next bottom.

For the shorts, you have more time to play, but time is running out till we get back to more ordinary markets, where the shorts have it tough.? Exacerbating that will be all of the neophyte shorts that have piled on in this bear market.? This includes retail, but also institutional (130/30 strategies, market neutral hedge and mutual funds, credit hedge funds, and more).? There is a limit to how much shorting can go on before it becomes crowded, and technicals start dominating market fundamentals.? In most cases, (i.e. companies with moderately strong balance sheets) shorting has no impact on the ultimate outcome for the company ? it is just a side bet that will eventually wash out, following the fundamental prospects of the firm.

As for asset allocators, time to begin edging back into equities, but I would still be below target weight.

The current market environment is not as overvalued as it was a year ago, and there are some reasonably valued companies with seemingly clean accounting to buy at present.? That said, long investors must be willing to endure pain for a while longer, and take defensive measures in terms of the quality of companies that they buy, as well as the industries in question.? Long only investors must play defense here, and there will be a reward when the bottom comes.

The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms, Part 3 (Final)

Posted on 7 August 20087 August 2008 by David Merkel

12) Value investors find no lack of promising ideas, only a lack of capital.

13) Well-capitalized investors that rarely borrow, do so to take advantage of bargains.? They also buy sectors that rarely attractive to them, but figure that if they buy and hold for ten years, they will end up with something better.

14) Neophyte investors leave the game, alleging the the stock market is rigged, and put their money in something that they understand that is presently hot — e.g. money market funds, collectibles, gold, real estate — they chase the next trend in search of easy money.

15) Short interest reaches high levels; interest in hedged strategies reaches manic levels.

Changes in Corporate Behavior

1) Primary IPOs don’t get done, and what few that get done are only the highest quality. Secondary IPOs get done to reflate damaged balance sheets, but the degree of dilution is poisonous to the stock prices.

2) Private equity holds onto their deals longer, because the IPO exit door is shut.? Raising new money is hard; returns are low.

5) Accounting tends to get cleaned up, and operating earnings become closer to net earnings.? As business ramps down, free cash flow begins to rise, and becomes a larger proportion of earnings.

6) Cash flow at stronger firms enables them to begin buying bargain assets of weaker and bankrupt firms.

7) Dividends stop getting cut on net, and begin to rise, and the same for buybacks.

Other Indicators

2)The Fed adds liquidity to the system, and the response is sluggish at best.? By the time the bottom comes, the yield curve has a strong positive slope.

No Bottom Yet

Implied volatility is low.
Corporate defaults are not at crisis levels yet.
Housing prices still have further to fall.
Bear markets have duration, and this one has been pretty short so far.
Leverage hasn’t decreased much.? In particular, the investment banks need to de-lever, including the synthetic leverage in their swap books.
The Fed is not adding liquidity to the system.
I don’t sense true panic among investors yet.? Not enough neophytes have left the game.

Not all of the indicators that I put forth have to appear for there to be a market bottom. A preponderance of them appearing would make me consider the possibility, and that is not the case now.

Some of my indicators are vague and require subjective judgment. But they’re better than nothing, and kept me in the game in 2001-2002. I hope that I — and you — can achieve the same with them as we near the next bottom.

For the shorts, you have more time to play, but time is running out till we get back to more ordinary markets, where the shorts have it tough.? Exacerbating that will be all of the neophyte shorts that have piled on in this bear market.? This includes retail, but also institutional (130/30 strategies, market neutral hedge and mutual funds, credit hedge funds, and more).? There is a limit to how much shorting can go on before it becomes crowded, and technicals start dominating market fundamentals.? In most cases, (i.e. companies with moderately strong balance sheets) shorting has no impact on the ultimate outcome for the company — it is just a side bet that will eventually wash out, following the fundamental prospects of the firm.

As for asset allocators, time to begin edging back into equities, but I would still be below target weight.

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=-=-=

That’s all for this post.? After comments are in, I will reformat the piece as one post and republish it.

The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms, Part 2

Posted on 5 August 2008 by David Merkel

Before I get started for the evening, here is a copy of the Fed statements compared in PDF format, in case you couldn’t read it well on RSS.

Though this piece is about bottoms, not tops, I am going to use an old CC post of mine on tops to illustrate a point.

		David Merkel
		Housing Bubblettes, Redux
		10/27/2005 4:43 PM EDT

From my piece, “Real Estate’s Top Looms“:

Bubbles are primarily a financing phenomenon. Bubbles pop when financing proves insufficient to finance the assets in question. Or, as I said in another forum: a Ponzi scheme needs an ever-increasing flow of money to survive. The same is true for a market bubble. When the flow’s growth begins to slow, the bubble will wobble. When it stops, it will pop. When it goes negative, it is too late.

I’m not pounding the table for anyone to short anything here, but I want to point out that the argument for a bubble does not rely on the amount of the price rise, but on the amount and nature of the financing involved. That financing is more extreme today on a balance sheet basis than at any point in modern times. The average maturity of that debt to repricing date is shorter than at any point in modern times.

That’s why I think the hot coastal markets are bubblettes. My position hasn’t changed since I wrote my original piece.

Position: none

I had a shorter way of saying it: Bubbles pop when cash flow is insufficient to finance them.? But what of market bottoms?? What is financing like at market bottoms?

The Investor Base Becomes Fundamentally-Driven

1) Now, by fundamentally-driven, I don’t mean that you are just going to read lots of articles telling how cheap certain companies are. There will be a lot of articles telling you to stay away from all stocks because of the negative macroeconomic environment, and, they will be shrill.

4) The market pays a lot of attention to shorts, attributing to them powers far beyond the capital that they control.

5) Managers that ignored credit quality have gotten killed, or at least, their asset under management are much reduced.

6) At bottoms, you can take a lot of well financed companies private, and make a lot of money in the process, but no one will offer financing then.? M&A volumes are small.

7) Long-term fundamental investors who have the freedom to go to cash begin deploying cash into equities, at least, those few that haven’t morphed into permabears.

8) Value managers tend to outperform growth managers at bottoms, though in today’s context, where financials are doing so badly, I would expect growth managers to do better than value managers.

9) On CNBC, and other media outlets, you tend to hear from the “adults” more often.? By adults, I mean those who say “You should have seen this coming.? Our nation has been irresponsible, yada, yada, yada.”? When you get used to seeing the faces of David Tice and James Grant, we are likely near a bottom.? The “chrome dome count” shows more older investors on the tube is another sign of a bottom.

10) High quality companies keep buying back stock, not aggresssively, but persistently.

11) Defined benefit plans are net buyers of stock, as they rebalance to their target weights for equities.

I will try to complete this piece this week.? There should be one more part, and I will publish it all as one unit.

Analyzing Growth in Firm Value

Posted on 2 August 20082 August 2008 by David Merkel

We’re nearing the end of second quarter earnings season, and I have have had my share of hits and misses, compared to the estimates that the sell side publishes.? What is the sell side?? The sell side is the analysts working for broker-dealers who publish research on companies, often estimating what they think they should earn in a quarter or year.? There is a buy side as well, which are analysts working for mutual funds, asset managers, etc., who analyze companies for their employers.

As investors, we are pelted with terms for corporate performance:

Comprehensive income — increase in net worth (approximately)
EBITDA? (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) — what monies are the assets of the company generating in cash terms
Operating income — Net income, excluding one-time charges.
Net income — An attempt to show the repeatable increase in the value of the business, excluding the adjustments that operating income makes.? It also excludes “temporary differences” that are expected to reverse, which go into Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income on the balance sheet, and not through income.? An example would be unrealized capital losses on unimpaired credit instruments.

Which of these measurements should an investor use?

In takeovers, EBITDA is the most relevant, because it shows the cash generating capacity of the assets.
Operating income is the most relevant each quarter for companies that are going concerns.? It excludes “one time” events.
Over the long haul, accumulated net or comprehensive income is the most relevant, because all of the “one time” adjustments are aggregated.

In the short run, the adjustments that come from one-time events (mostly negative) can be tolerated.? But managements are supposed to try to control the factors that generate one-time events in the long run.? That part of their job.? If you have enough track record on a management team, you can sit down and calculate accumulated operating income less accumulated net income.? For good managements, that number is negative to a small positive.? For bad managements, it is a big positive.? I’ve seen estimates over a long-ish period of time, and the average difference between the two is around +5% — +10%.? That much typically goes up in smoke from operating earnings, never to reappear.

Now, some have toyed with adjusted dividend yield formulas, where they add back buybacks, and they use that as a type of true earnings yield.? After all, that reflects cash out the door for the benefit of shareholders.? True as far as it goes, but other uses of retained earnings aside from buybacks are valuable as well.

Buy/create a new technology, plant or equipment
Buy/create a new product line
Buy a competitor, or, a new firm that offers synergies
Buy/create a new marketing channel

In the hands of a good management team, these actions have value.? In the hands of bad management teams, little value to negative value.? So, I prefer earnings to these new measures based off dividends and buybacks for good management teams.? With a bad management team you want them to not have much spare capital for bad decisions, but would you trust the safety of the dividend and commitment to the buyback to a bad management team?? So, in general I prefer earnings, or, if calculable, free cash flow, to dividend/buyback metrics.

What is free cash flow?? The free cash flow of a business is not the same as its earnings. Free cash flow is the amount of money that can be removed from a company at the end of an accounting period and still leave it as capable of generating profits as it was at the beginning of the accounting period. Sometimes this is approximated by cash flow from operations less maintenance capital expenditures, but maintenance capex is not a disclosed item, and changes in working capital can reflect a need to invest in inventories in order to grow the business, not merely maintain it.

Ideally, free cash flow generation is what we shoot for, but it is difficult to estimate in practice.? When I took the CFA exams, the accounting text suggested that the goal of earnings was to reflect free cash flow to the greatest extent possible.? I’m not holding my breath here; I don’t think that goal is achieved or achievable.? To do that, we would have to have managers expense maintenance capex, and we would have to reflect the capital requirements of financial regulators as a cost of doing business for financial companies, and there are many more adjustments like those.

So, I like accumulated net income in the long run and operating earnings in the short run for measuring financial performance.? I’ll give you one more measure to consider which might be better.? From a not-so-recent CC post (point 2, rest snipped for relevance sake):


		David Merkel
		Notes Before I Leave for ANother Series of Conferences
		11/9/04 5:44 PM?ET
1. Be sure and read Howard’s piece “Hurricanes and the Limits of Rebuilding .” He comments more extensively on something I touched on when Frances was threatening Florida. Recovery from disasters often makes GDP look better afterward, because the destruction is not captured in the GDP statistics as a loss, save for the reduction in insurance profits, whereas the work of rebuilding does get fully captured. 2. The same idea can be applied to equity investing. This is why I pay attention to growth in book value per share, ex accumulated other comprehensive income, plus dividends, rather than earnings. Nonrecurring writedowns, charges for changes in accounting principles, and other adjustments, if they happen often enough, it makes a statement about the way a company handles accounting. Companies that are liberal in their accounting may have good looking earnings, but growth in book value per share can be quite poor. I trust the latter measure.

Growth in fully diluted tangible book value (ex-AOCI) is a good measure of firm performance, if you add back dividends, and subtract out net equity issuance/buyback measured not at cost, but at the current market price. Why the current market price?? Some managements buy back stock indiscriminately, not caring about the price at purchase.? That’s rarely a good idea.? Good management teams wait until their shares are near or below their estimate of fair value before they buy back.

Good management teams are also sparing/judicious with share and option grants.? Measuring the cost of the issuance/grants/dilution at the current market price penalizes the financial performance appropriately for what they have given away from shareholders equity per share all too cheaply.

So, that’s my preferred measure for how much has the underlying value of the firm increased: growth in fully diluted tangible book value (ex-AOCI), adding back dividends, and subtract out net equity issuance/buyback measured not at cost, but at the current market price.

There are things that this measure does not capture, though.? Look for places where assets are misstated on the balance sheet. E.g., property may be worth more or less than the carrying value.? Plant and equipment may be worth more or less than the carrying value.? Having a feel for the appreciation/depreciation in value, however slow, can be an aid to estimating the true change in value for a firm.

Estimating the true value of a firm’s earnings is challenging.? There is no one good measure; it depends on the question that you are trying to answer.? But knowing the outlines of of the problem helps in analyzing the earnings releases as they pelt us each quarter.

PS — I know I have excluded EVA, NOPAT, and other measures here.? Perhaps another day…

The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms, Part 1

Posted on 25 July 2008 by David Merkel

A large-ish number of people have asked me to write this piece.? For those with access to RealMoney, I did an article called The Fundamentals of Market Tops.? For those without access, Barry Ritholtz put a large portion of it at his blog.? (I was honored 🙂 .) When I wrote the piece, some people who were friends complained, because they thought that I was too bullish.? I don’t know, liking the market from 2004-2006 was a pretty good idea in hindsight.

I then wrote another piece applying the framework to residential housing in mid-2005, and I came to a different conclusion? — yes, residential real estate was near its top.? My friends, being bearish, and grizzly housing bears, heartily approved.

So, a number of people came to me and asked if I would write “The Fundamentals of Market Bottoms.”? Believe me, I have wanted to do so, but some of my pieces at RealMoney were “labor of love” pieces.? They took time to write, and my editor Gretchen would love them to death.? By the way, if I may say so publicly, the editors at RealMoney (particularly Gretchen) are some of their hidden treasures.? They really made my writing sing.? I like to think that I can write, but I am much better when I am edited.

As a friend of mine once said, “To make a stock go to zero, it has to have a significant slug of debt.”? That is what differentiates tops from bottoms.? At tops, no one cares about debt or balance sheets.? The only insolvencies that happen then are due to fraud.? But at bottoms, the only thing that investors care about is debt or balance sheets.? In many cases, the corporate debt behaves like equity, and the equity is as jumpy as an at-the-money warrant.

Whew!? For an introduction to an article, that’s a long introduction.? Tomorrow, I will pick up on the topic and explain how one sees market bottoms from a fundamental perspective.

Ten Notes and Comments on the Current Market Fracas

Posted on 22 July 200822 July 2008 by David Merkel

1) How to control your emotions when the market is nuts?? Develop a checklist, or at least a strategy that makes you re-evaluate the fundamentals, rather than buying/selling indiscriminately.

2) What, one standard for revenue recognition?? Impossible! Great!? Revenue recognition is probably the most important issue in accounting, and whatever comes out of this will be important to investors.? (If the standard is bad, value investors that watch the quality of earnings will gain additional advantages.)

3) America is too big to fail?? You bet, at least to our larger creditors.? As it stands now, our economy is partly propped up by foreign creditors.? Remember, the mercantilists lost more than they gained.? The same will happen here.

4) Tom Graff is a bright guy, and I respect him.? He disagrees with my view on buying agency mortgage backed securities.? He is worth a read.

5) Dark supply.? There are many people who want to sell homes who have them off the market now waiting for better prices.? There are investors buying properties hoping to flip them.? These are reasons I don’t expect housing prices to come back quickly.

6) When I read this piece on Countrywide, I was not surprised by the existence of special deals, but only by their extent.

7) HEL and HELOC experience will continue to decline.? Face it, on most home equity loans in trouble, the losses will be 100%.? This will only burn out one year after the bottom in housing prices.

8) Fannie and Freddie have their concerns:

Their books are being reviewed again.
They are too big to fail, but they are in trouble.
The Government is pressing them to lend more, but their capital bases say the opposite.

9)? Loser rallies rarely persist, but that is what we have had recently.

10) Along with Barry, I do not believe that banks have bottomed yet.? There are more credit losses to be taken, particularly as housing prices fall another 10%.

Not All Financials are Poision

Posted on 22 July 2008 by David Merkel

I am overweight financials, but I don’t own any banks, or entities where the primary business is credit risk.? I own a bunch of insurers, because they are cheap.? The first one to report came Monday after the close, Reinsurance Group of America.? They beat handily on both earnings and revenues.? They are the only pure play life reinsurer remaining.? Competition is reduced because Scottish Re is for all practical purposes dead.? They make their money primarily off of mortality, charging more to reinsure lives than they expect to pay in death claims.

This is a nice niche business, and a quality competitor in the space — well-respected by all.? And, you can buy it for less than book value.? Well, at least you could prior to the close on Monday.

Here are the financial stocks in my portfolio at present:

Safety Insurance? (Massachusetts personal lines)
Lincoln National (Life, Annuities, Investments)
Assurant (Niche lines — best run insurer in the US)
Hartford (Life, Annuities, Investments, Personal lines, Commercial Lines, Specialty Lines)
RGA (Life reinsurance)
Universal American Holdings (Senior Health Insurance — HMO, Medicare, etc.)
MetLife (Life, Annuities, Investments, Personal lines)
National Atlantic (waiting for the deal to close)

Now, I do have my worries here:

Even though asset portfolios are relatively high quality, they still take a decent amount of investment-grade credit risk, and even squeaky-clean portfolios like the one Safety has are exposed to Fannie and Freddie, unlikely as they are to default on senior obligations.
Those that are in the variable annuity and variable life businesses might have to take some writedowns if the market falls another 10% or so.? For those in investment businesses, fees from assets under management will decline.
Pricing is weak in most P&C lines.

Away from that, though, the companies are cheap, and I have a reasonable expectation of significant book value growth at all of them.? Also, a number of the names benefit from the drop in the dollar — Assurant, MetLife, Hartford, and RGA.

One final note before I close: diversification is important.? I have Charlotte Russe in the portfolio, and it got whacked 20%+ yesterday.? Yet, my portfolio was ahead of the S&P 500 in spite of it.? If Charlotte Russe falls another 5% or so, i will buy some more.? There is no debt, earnings are unlikely to drop much (young women will likely continue to buy trendy clothes), and there are significant assets here.? I don’t expect a quick snapback, but as with all of my assets, I expect to have something better 3 years from now, at least relative to the market.

Full disclosure: long SAFT LNC AIZ HIG RGA UAM MET NAHC CHIC

Thinking About Dividends

Posted on 20 July 200820 July 2008 by David Merkel

Dividends can be controversial.? Are they tax-efficient?? Not as good as compounding capital gains over a long period, and it will be worse when the Bush tax cuts expire.? There is no tax on buying back shares, but individuals get taxed on dividend payments.

Are they the best way to tilt value portfolios?? My guess is no.? There are many factors that drive the calculation of value, and dividends are one of them.? A multifactor model including dividends will probably beat a dividend yield only model.? It will definitely allow for a more diverse portfolio, rather than being just utilities, financials, LPs, etc.

Do dividend-yield tilted portfolios always do better than the indexes?? No, they don’t always do better.? Take the current period as an example.? These two notes from Bespoke are dated, but still instructive.? The total returns off of stocks with above average dividend yields has been poor recently.? Part of that is the current trouble in financials.? Part of it is the financial stress that is leading to cuts in dividends (again, mainly at financials).

Dividend paying stocks tend to lag when bond yields rise, also.? I remember an absolute yield manager who floundered in the early-to-mid ’90s when rates rose dramatically and bonds proved to be greater competition for the previously relatively high-yielding stocks.? They had a great time in the ’80s as yields fell but 1994 proved to be their undoing.

That said, dividends are an important part of total returns, probably one-third of all the money a diversified portfolio earns.? Also, on average, companies that pay dividends also tend to do better in the long run than companies that don’t pay dividends.? Why?

DIvidends have a signaling effect.? They teach management teams a number of salutary things:

Equity capital has a cash cost.
Be prudent risk takers, because we want to raise the dividend if possible, and avoid lowering it, except as a last resort.
Focus on free cash flow generation.? Be wary of projects that promise amazing returns, but will require continual investment.
Be efficient at using capital generated from free cash flow.? The dividend forces management teams to do only the most productive capital projects.? Increasing the dividend is alternative use of capital that must be considered.
Dividends keep management team honest in ways that buybacks don’t.? Buybacks can quietly be suspended, but in the American context, a dividend is a commitment.

Now, if you are going to use dividend yields as a part of your strategy, you need to pay attention to two things:

Payout ratios, and
Growth of the dividend is more important than its size

Is the company earning the dividend?? Do they have enough left over to pay for capital expenditures for maintenance and growth??? Be careful with companies that have high dividends.? My belief is that companies with middling dividends tend to offer value, but the really high dividends portend trouble.? High dividends tend to be cut during periods of financial stress, as we are seeing today.? This article on newspaper stock yields does not convince me.? I have been a bear on the industry for the last ten years.? You can’t maintain high dividends in a industry with significant competition from new entrants (Internet destroying ad revenue, classified ad revenue, and sales revenue).

REITs have decent dividend yields, but the companies with the best total returns had low dividend yields, but they grew them more rapidly.? In general, growing dividend yields where payout ratios are not deteriorating are usually good stocks to own.? Think of it this way, the dividend yield plus its growth rate will approximate the total return of the stock in the long run (for dividend paying stocks).

Two more notes before I end.? FIrst, special dividends usually not a good idea; they signal reduced prospects for the company to deploy capital productively; better to do a dutch tender and buy back shares.? When Microsoft did their special dividend four years ago, I made the following comment at RealMoney:

		David Merkel
		Note From Fed Chairman: Don’t Worry, Be Happy
		7/21/04 12:46 PM?ET
Alan Greenspan completed his testimony slightly after noon today. The Q&A went quicker than usual. No real news from the affair; Dr. Greenspan tells us that inflation is not a problem, growth is not a problem, there is no systemic risk, the carry trade is reduced, a measured pace of tightening won’t hurt anyone, etc.Very optimistic; I just don’t go for the Panglossian thesis that everything can be fine after holding the fed funds target so low for so long. Bubbles develop when credit is too easy.And as an aside, I’d like to toss out a dissenting question on Microsoft (MSFT:Nasdaq). I know that the software business is not capital intensive, but if Microsoft disgorges a large amount of its cash, doesn’t it imply that they don’t see a lot of profitable opportunities to invest in it? Buying back $30 billion of Microsoft stock is a statement that they see no better opportunities (that the government will allow them to do), than to concentrate on current organic opportunities. It implies that additional organic growth opportunities are limited, no? No positions in stocks mentioned

TSCM quoted me in two articles at the time of the special dividend.? I was ambivalent about the buyback, and Microsoft stock has done nothing since then.

I also wrote this article to talk about the value of excess cash flow to management teams.? My view continues to be that excellent management teams should be given free rein to add value, while poor management teams should pay out excess cash to shareholders.

Also, there is a rule in the reinsurance business: buy back shares when the price-to-book ratio is under 1.3; issue special dividends when the price-to-book is higher, and you have slack capital.? But be careful.? Slack capital can be valuable.? I remember Montpelier’s special dividend before the 2005 hurricanes.? Ill-advised in hindsight.? The stock was a disaster, and is the only time in my career that I have flipped from long to short on a stock, post-Katrina.

Finally, I don’t look for dividends.? It is a factor in my models, but not a big one.? That said, 20 of 36 of the stocks in my portfolio pay dividends, and I receive a 2% yield or so on the portfolio as a whole.? I would rather focus on free cash flow, but dividends follow along behind free cash flow.

Bringing this back to the present, be wary.? High dividend yields, particularly on financial stocks, may be cut.? Analyze the payout ratios on stocks you own.? In general, dividends are good, but analyze the situation to determine the sustainability of the dividend.

Musing Over Current Performance

Posted on 18 July 2008 by David Merkel

June was a good month for me, but in the middle of June, it felt like something was shifting in the markets, and it was showing up in my portfolio.? Then, July hit me like a ton of bricks.? The market was down, but I was way down.

Now, I have a number of disciplines that help me on average and over time as I manage equity money.? That doesn’t eliminate the “pit in the stomach” when nothing seems to be working.? It does give me something to do about it, though.? Evaluate poor performers (“what, down so much on no news!”), do some rebalancing trades (“ugh, cash is shrinking… will I have to move into concentration mode as I did in 2002?), and search for errors in my macro views (“why do I have so much cyclicality in the portfolio?”).

My performance versus the market as a whole tends to streak.? There are several reasons for that:

The portfolio has a value tilt.
Market capitalizations are smaller than the S&P 500.
I concentrate the industries that I invest in.
I turn over my portfolio more slowly than most investors.

But, as of Wednesday, as the market bounced back, my portfolio did even better.? I’m behind the S&P 500 by less than a percent now.? But this is what puzzles me here: ordinarily, I expect to outperform more in bear markets than in bull markets, but it seems to be flipped here.

I am overweighted in financials — though all of them are insurers, and none in the financial guarantee business.? Given all of the basket and ETF trading that goes on today, maybe my insurance names are getting dragged along with the banks.? In the short run, that can persist, but eventually industry performance emerges in stock prices.? That’s my best explanation for now.

Away from that, I did a rebalancing sale on YRC Worldwide today.? First rebalancing sale in a while.? Trucking is a volatile industry.? Then again, in cyclical industries, it is always a question of value over the cycle.? The stocks move more than the industry prospects do, so if you resist trends with companies strong enough to survive the cycle, you will make money in the long run.

Full disclosure: long YRCW, and many insurers? (full portfolio available at Stockpickr.com)