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The Rules, Part LXX

Picture Credit: Infoletta Hambach || I suppose Euros are manna from somewhere, though not Heaven. After all, they appear out of nowhere [ECB], and there is no guarantee that any government will receive them in the long run.

“The lure of free money brings out the worst economic behavior in people.”

David Merkel, often said at Aleph Blog

Where is there “free” or at least “inexpensive” money?

  • Jobs that are overly compensated compared to the skills needed.
  • Demanding that the government give free money to people.
  • Constraining interest rates to be low.
  • Various “one decision” investment ideas.
  • The prices of houses only go up.
  • The government bails out bad investments.
  • Various investments involving derivatives where one is implicitly short volatility

I started writing this two weeks ago, and then the idea for “Welcome to our Country Club!” came into my head, partially stimulated by a young friend of mine becoming a lifeguard at a swanky country club. It made me think back on my time as a youth being a caddy at a similar club. (And being one of the smallest guys there, I had to learn to defend myself, but that is another story.)

A number of parties have directly and indirectly mused about what I what analogizing in “Welcome to our Country Club!” Real Clear Markets put up a Bitcoin logo. I commented there:

Well, you made explicit what I left implicit. Good job, but you can also throw in penny stocks, meme stocks, some SPACs, etc. Thanks for mentioning me.

Me

In the bullet point above, I listed seven classes of cases where there is free money, or at least subsidized money. I’ll take them in order.

Jobs that are overly compensated compared to the skills needed

There’s always some of that naturally, but it tends to adjust over time unless the government does something to achieve a social goal. That can be unions with a closed shop as an example, or restricting the ability to enter into a simple business, if licensing is too tight. There are corrective mechanisms for both, but they take a long time. Technology can reduce the need for labor in certain types of simple jobs. Or, it can create a competitor to those in a regulated industry (think of Uber, Lyft, Airbnb). In some cases businesses move to non-union venues whether a different part of the US, or another country.

Demanding that the government give free money to people

I’m not in favor of Universal Basic Income. I’m fine with non-subsidized unemployment insurance (though I never tapped it the three times I was out of work — desperation is a good thing).

Many quotes are attributed to Ben Franklin than he actually said. Here’s an alleged one that is interesting:

However, when McHenry made the story public in the 15 July 1803 Republican, or Anti-Democrat newspaper, it had evolved. Now the exchange was:

Powel: Well, Doctor, what have we got?

Franklin: A republic, Madam, if you can keep it.

Powel: And why not keep it?

Franklin: Because the people, on tasting the dish, are always disposed to eat more of it than does them good.

How Dr. McHenry Operated on His Anecdote

If the quote is accurate, it fleshes out the ideas that Republics have to be limited in scope to survive, and that once people that they can use the republic for their self-interests. Even in the recent mini-crisis, knew of a lot of organizations that got PPP loans that didn’t really need them — they profited from the free money. They were organized, with clever accountants, and milked Uncle Sugar while he was throwing money around. (Here’s a particularly notable case.) But there are other places where this happens as well — corporations have gotten very good at slipping ta preferences into the tax code. Even if the US Government wants to encourage a certain behavior, if they are generous, they get overused. This applies to many mass programs as well such as Crop Insurance and Flood Insurance, both of which are subsidized.

The list goes on and on, whether for the upper classes, who benefit the most from this, and the lower classes, who get enough to blunt desperation.

Constraining interest rates to be low

With the Fed following a theory close to Modern Monetary Theory Banana Republic Monetary Theory, it has inflamed three areas of the bond market — Treasuries, Conforming Mortgage Backed Securities, and Junk Corporates. This has pushed housing prices higher, and facilitated high government budget deficits (and the unrealistic spending goals of many), and aided malinvestment by firms that have access to cheap capital, when they should have gone broke.

As Cramer would say, it’s time for me to ‘fess up. I was wrong on my piece Hertz Donut. Cheap capital and the end of the C19 crisis gave equity holders a big win. I know I will sound like the Grandpa from Peter and the Wolf, “What if Peter had not caught the wolf? What then?” To those who didn’t listen to me and won, congratulations. To those who listened to me and lost, I’m sorry. I gave orthodox advice that worked 99% of the time over the prior 60 years. I will give the same advice next time, because you can’t rely on the capital markets to do a favor for you.

When the history books are written 30 years from now, the historians will point at the easy monetary policy of the Fed from Greenspan to date as the major reason US markets overshot and crashed in real terms, along with underfunded promises made by the US and State governments.

Various “one decision” investment ideas

This was the main point of “Welcome to our Country Club!” This can apply to the FANGMAN stocks, promoted stocks whether penny or meme stocks, private equity, cryptocurrencies, etc. There are no permanently good ideas in the markets. Every sustainable competitive advantage is eventually temporary. You don’t own a right to superior returns, at most you can temporarily rent it. Even the idea of buying and holding an S&P 500 index fund means that you will have to endure 50-70% drawdowns once or twice every twenty years or so.

Few truly have “diamond hands.” Perhaps Buffett could have them, but even he makes changes to his portfolio. Let me give a practical example: few people wanted to default on their mortgages during the 2007-2012 crisis, but many were forced to sell at an inopportune time because of unemployment, death, disease, disability, divorce, etc. And far more panicked. There are very few people (and institutions) that are willing to buy the whole way down, and concentrate their holdings into their best ones during a crisis. It hurts too much emotionally to do so, and looks stupid in the short run.

Don’t deceive yourself. Keeping some measure of slack capital (“dry powder”) helps keep you sane. You will look stupid at times like now, but over the long haul you will persevere.

The prices of houses only go up

At least we know from recent memory that residential housing prices can decline across the nation as a whole. On the bright side, current financing terms are not as liberal as they were in 2004-2008. Loan quality is reasonable. But the recent run-up in prices is considerable, in real terms higher than the financial crisis. If we have a significant recession, will there be another crisis?

The government bails out bad investments

One of the failures of the financial crisis was to protect industries that were larger than what was needed. Too many banks, too many houses, too many auto companies, etc. The government, including the Fed, could have protected depositors, but let those who speculated on the continual rise in housing prices fail. They bailed them out with two negative impacts: 1) unproductive investments continue, rather than bein liquidated, which slows growth, and 2) moral hazard — firms take more risk because they know there is a decent chance they will be bailed out in a crisis.

I feel the same way about the recent mini-crisis. We should not have bailed out anyone. The Fed should not have provided excess liquidity. If you don’t let recessions clean out those who have been taking too many chances, you end up with a lot of underperforming junk-rated companies that are non-dead zombies. Over the last 30 years, this is why GDP growth has slowed, we don’t let recessions eliminate subpar uses of capital.

Various investments involving derivatives where one is implicitly short volatility

This was the portion of Where Money Goes to Die that was right in the short-run. During bull markets, many short volatility strategies will make seemingly risk-free steady profits. There are other strategies like it that do well in bull and placid markets, but get killed in a bear market, even a mini-version like early 2018.

Avoid complexity in investing, and stick to simple investments like stocks, bonds, and cash. Stick to things where custody of the assets is almost certain. Cryptocurrencies and derivative strategies typically have weaknesses in custodial matters, such that there are sometimes losses from misappropriation.

Summary

Good investing and good work result from taking moderate risks on a consistent basis. Avoid situations where other are running after what is seemingly free or subsidized money — those situations often come to a bitter end.

And against the advocates for Modern Monetary Theory Banana Republic Monetary Theory, I will tell you that eventually all of the borrowing and spending will come to an end. As in the Great Depression, the rich will ask to have their claims honored at par, while the rest of the nation suffers. Whether the government goes with the rich or not is an open question. But one should not assume that inflation will be the way out… after all, that route could have been taken in greater degree in the Great Depression, but it wasn’t.

On Research Sources and Trading Rules

On Research Sources and Trading Rules

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On a letter from a reader:

In your Industry Ranks August 2014 post you mentioned that you use Value Line analytic tools.

If it is not a secret, what other third-party research and analysis do you use, especially for company analysis (MorningStar, Zacks…)?

Do you rely/subscribed on Interactive Brokers “IBIS Research Essentials?” If yes, do you find it valuable?

In addition, if you do not mind, you said that you make adjustments to your portfolio once in a quarter. Does it mean that you do not look at market quotes during the day at all and, hence, you are not subscribed to IB real-time data (NYSE, Nasdaq, US Bond quotes?)

I would greatly appreciate your answers.

Thank you very much!

I don’t like to spend money on aids for research. ?I can only think of two things that I pay for and actively use:

I do pay for quotes at Interactive Brokers, but because I don’t trade much, I don’t pay for the expensive packages. ?I have not subscribed to?Interactive Brokers “IBIS Research Essentials.”

But many of the best things in life are free. ?My local library offers free Morningstar and Value Line online… I don’t have to leave my home to use it, an it is open all the time. ?If I go two blocks to my library, there is a wealth of business data and books that I can draw upon.

That said, the Web offers a lot of free resources, and I make use of:

  • Yahoo Finance, which I think I have been using since 1996 — pretty close to its inception. ?There is no better place on the web to get business news tagged for each corporation. ?It has gotten better since removing some feeds that have questionable value. ?There’s a great range of information to be had in a wide number of areas.
  • FRED, which just keeps getting better… more data series, more ways to use them… and I have been using them since it was a “bulletin board” (remember those?) back in 1991 or so.
  • Bloomberg.com is excellent in the general and business news areas.
  • Beyond that, Reuters, Marketwatch, the New York Times, and the Financial Times (especially FT Alphaville) have excellent business news coverage. ?With the last two, NYT & FT, you have to decide if you want to pay for it, and I don’t pay for them.
  • When I do my stock research, I generally go to the SEC website and read the documents. ?Then I go to Yahoo Finance and the company’s own website for color.
  • For bonds, bond funds and ETFs, I go to the provider websites, Morningstar, and the Wall Street Journal’s Market Data section. ?I can visit FINRA Trace if I need to see how individual?bonds have been trading.
  • Finally there is a lot of wisdom in many bloggers out there, and I strongly recommend you get to know them. ?Some of the best are expertly curated each day at Abnormal Returns?by Tadas Viskanta.

Now as to your question as to whether I look at prices of assets in my portfolio: in general, I check them 3-5 times a day, usually at a point where I will be switching tasks. ?I sort my stocks two ways at that time:

  1. By absolute percentage change descending — all of the largest movers are at the top of the screen, and I can look for patterns and trends, which may make me check Yahoo Finance for news. ?But that doesn’t make me trade, unless it ends up revealing something that I think will get a lot better or worse, and the market hasn’t figured that out yet. ?(That doesn’t happen often.)
  2. By size of positions — if a position has gotten too large, I trim some back. ?If it has gotten too small, I stop and research why the price has fallen. ?If I am convinced that the stock offers significant returns, and low downside risk, I add a little to the position. ?(See?Portfolio Rule Seven?for more details.) ?In a rare number of cases, about once every two years, I will “double weight” the position that has fallen. ?So far, all of those have worked over the last 14 years. ?But if I realize that the company is unlikely to return anything comparable to the other stocks in my portfolio, I sell it.

Portfolio Rule Seven?trades maybe amount to 3-12 small trades per quarter. ?More trades come when the market is trending, fewer when it is choppy. ?Portfolio Rule Eight?is where I do the big trades once per quarter, comparing each stock in my portfolio against a group of potential replacements. ?I usually sell 2-4 companies, and then buy a similar number of replacements. ?That has my portfolio turn over at a 30%/year rate. ?More details available in the article?Portfolio Rule Eight.

In general, it is wise for both amateur and pro investors to trade by rule. ?Take as much emotion out of the process as possible, and avoid greed and panic. ?It is genuinely rare that decisions have to be made quickly, so take your time, do your analysis, and try to find assets with good long-term prospects.

Classic: Investing Is About the Whole Portfolio

Classic: Investing Is About the Whole Portfolio

I wrote the following article for RealMoney in August 2005. ?I don’t like handing out individual stock ideas. ?I would rather teach people how to think about stocks and other assets, because my individual ideas will be wrong 30% of the time, and I will garner a lot of complaints from them. ?I will get few thanks from the 70% I got right. ?The ratio corresponds to that which Jesus had healing the lepers.

That said, those that invested in this portfolio for two years did well. ?Okay, read on:

==-=-==-=–=-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=–=-=-===-=-=-=-=-=-=-

I’m not crazy about giving individual stock ideas on?RealMoney?because all investing is best viewed in a portfolio context. Individual stock ideas are important, but I believe portfolio construction and management are more important.

Too many investors are looking for the next hot company when they should really be looking for a consistent theory of how to produce reliable returns while minimizing downside risk.

In my column?Evolution of an Investment Style, I tried to describe how I achieve above-average returns while trying to squeeze out risk. This is not an easy process, but it is achievable if you think about investing in the same way an intelligent businessman thinks about his own firm.

That’s what my seven rules from that column are all about.

One of the first things you’ll notice is that there doesn’t seem to be any rhyme or reason to the order in which the stocks are listed. There is a logic here, but the order is based on the timing of initial purchases. Stocks that I have held the longest are on top, and stocks that I have bought for the first time most recently are at the bottom.

This helps me see on a day-to-day and week-to-week basis, which group of ideas are doing well. If my newest are doing well, there may be some mean-reversion happening in valuations.

If my oldest are doing well, there may be a bit of momentum happening for those that have already reverted to the mean. Because I tend to make shifts to the portfolio quarterly in groups of four or so stocks, I can see themes working out as I look at performance in the order that stocks were purchased.

The Current Portfolio

Listed below are the stocks in my portfolio. They are roughly equal-weighted.

 

Value With a Twist
David Merkel’s current holdings
Name Aug. 10 Close P/E Yield Market Cap P/E (This Year) P/B P/S
Cemex (CX:NYSE) 46.94 6.99 2.51 16.80 8.98 1.83 1.45
Dycom (DY:NYSE) 23.50 21.08 1.15 20.98 2.01 1.13
Cytec (CYT:NYSE) 48.25 14.87 0.83 2.22 14.26 1.81 1.18
Ameron (AMN:NYSE) 37.25 21.08 2.14 0.32 10.35 1.14 0.49
Allstate (ALL:NYSE) 58.04 11.62 2.04 38.79 9.33 1.74 1.13
Unilever PLC (UL:NYSE) 41.19 19.40 3.51 66.36 13.18 6.90 1.32
Liz Claiborne (LIZ:NYSE) 41.80 14.18 0.54 4.57 13.71 2.43 0.94
Fresh Del Monte (FDP:NYSE) 25.46 10.80 3.91 1.47 10.97 1.37 0.46
Montpelier (MRH:NYSE) 34.27 11.12 4.08 2.17 7.53 1.49 2.36
PartnerRe (PRE:NYSE) 62.92 7.43 2.26 3.47 8.84 1.00 0.84
ConocoPhillips (COP:NYSE) 65.64 9.66 2.07 91.39 8.42 2.00 0.71
SPX Corp. (SPW:NYSE) 45.36 3.75 2.22 3.41 17.43 1.21 0.76
Canadian National Railway (CNI:NYSE) 67.44 16.43 1.26 18.57 15.36 2.44 3.23
Petro Canada (PCZ:NYSE) 79.42 18.95 0.74 20.83 12.13 2.78 1.67
Stone Energy (SGY:NYSE) 53.71 9.63 1.44 7.86 1.51 2.34
Barclays PLC (BCS:NYSE ADR) 42.39 12.67 4.22 68.39 11.54 2.20 2.85
Valero Energy (VLO:NYSE) 90.77 10.74 0.49 23.30 10.14 2.92 0.37
Toyota (TM:NYSE ADS) 78.42 11.93 1.24 128.10 11.12 1.53 0.75
Sappi (SPP:NYSE ADS) 10.88 51.92 2.78 2.46 90.00 1.13 0.50
Apache (APA:NYSE) 71.93 11.09 0.46 23.61 9.46 2.48 3.60
Premcor (PCO:NYSE) 81.05 9.80 0.08 7.24 9.91 2.75 0.38
Ryerson Tull (RT:NYSE) 19.37 6.05 1.28 0.49 5.13 1.05 0.10
Jones Apparel (JNY:NYSE) 29.03 13.14 1.79 3.44 12.10 1.31 0.70
Neenah Paper (NP:NYSE) 31.45 20.09 0.93 0.46 20.09 2.40 0.63
Johnson Controls (JCI:NYSE) 57.46 12.39 1.70 11.03 12.83 1.91 0.39
Japan Smaller Capitalization Fund (JOF:NYSE) 11.81 5.20 0.19 50.00 0.98 108.19
Pfizer (PFE:NYSE) 26.39 20.04 3.43 196.20 13.39 2.92 3.70
Sara Lee (SLE:NYSE) 20.02 13.31 3.83 15.76 13.51 4.61 0.80
Repsol (REP:NYSE) 29.61 14.95 2.19 36.15 8.98 2.00 0.80
Premium Standard (PORK:Nasdaq) 14.76 6.70 0.41 0.46 9.07 1.10 0.40
Anglo American (AAUK:Nasdaq ADR) 26.72 11.68 2.62 39.62 10.32 1.59 1.53
ABN AMRO (ABN:NYSE) 24.73 11.54 7.52 41.28 10.25 1.78 1.61
Gold Kist (GKIS:Nasdaq) 18.93 8.60 0.97 7.86 2.46 0.90
Dana (DCN:NYSE) 15.01 11.73 3.12 2.26 12.92 0.98 0.24
SABESP (SBS:NYSE) 17.14 8.00 4.52 1.95 10.05 0.54 0.98
11.68 2.04 4.57 10.97 1.81 0.90
Source: David Merkel, Yahoo!

 

This Portfolio Is Weird

Even though I manage this portfolio the same way that a “long-only” mutual fund manager would, because my portfolio is diversified by country and capitalization, it doesn’t fit any of the neat classifications common to mutual funds. I’m not running a mutual fund for which I’m anxious to gather assets, so this doesn’t bother me. Given that, I will now describe the way the portfolio breaks down by country, capitalization, sector and industry.

 

Sector Mix
The makeup of this portfolio defies easy categorization
Source: David Merkel

A notable characteristic of the portfolio is that 34% of it is non-U.S. Even adding back the two Bermuda reinsurers (which only trade in the U.S.), the percentage foreign is 29%. This is high enough that it would be hard to call this a domestic fund, but low enough that it can’t be an international or global fund. Why do it this way? Because I believe it offers the best returns to a U.S. investor. I try to buy stocks that operate in stable parts of the world, with reasonable legal systems. I consider information, war and expropriation risks. When something outside the U.S. seems too cheap, I buy it, but I don’t force myself to stay inside or outside of the U.S.

My approach to market capitalization is not as idiosyncratic. I am “all capitalization,” which is done by a number of mutual funds. I am probably more large-cap now than I have been in years. Small-caps generally don’t offer the valuation discount that I like to see when buying something off of the beaten path. Mid-caps I normally like best, because they typically have the stability of large-caps, but still have enough potential to grow, like some small-caps do. At present, many large-caps seem quite cheap, so I have more of them than normal.

The most important thing to look for in market capitalization is rule No. 4 from the column I mentioned above: “Purchase companies appropriately sized to serve their market niches.” Some businesses need scale in order to be profitable. Other businesses favor the entrance of smaller competitors following a niche strategy. “Is the business the right size in order to prosper?” is a question that intelligent investors ask.

Sector/Industry Mix

Looking at both the sector and industry mix, Jim Cramer would probably gong me in his radio show’s “Am I Diversified?” segment. Well, no, I’m not diversified, at least not by sector and industry. I can hear the comments: Where’s the tech and telecom??Pfizer?is not enough for health care. Only one utility, and that one’s in an emerging market? You’re too overweight in materials and energy. Agriculture has been a loser for years. You’re joking, right?

I’ve always run an undiversified portfolio, because intelligent sector rotation can add value. Industries tend to trend in the short run and revert to the mean over the intermediate term. I try to analyze where the pricing power of industries is as I evaluate companies for investment. There are two things that get me primed for purchase:

  • Things are abysmal and no one wants to invest there. (Think of auto parts.)
  • Or, stock prices have not caught up to the industry pricing cycle. (Think of energy.)

That’s how I view it. I want to be in industries that are underrated, whether that’s due to a bruising bear market in an industry, or because of an abundance of skepticism in the face of improving fundamentals.

Valuation Parameters

The summary statistics of my portfolio are shown in the table below.

 

The Numbers at a Glance
Category Median Value
P/E last year 11.7x
P/E this year 11.0x
P/E next year 10.4x
P/Book 1.8x
P/Sales 0.9x
Yield 2.00%
Range 72%
ROE 18%
Source: David Merkel

You can tell that my portfolio broadly fits into the “traditional value” style. I like my modified form of Graham and Dodd, with tweaks from Marty Whitman and a number of other notable value investors. That said, it’s my unique synthesis, and it has paid off for me in performance. Buying them cheap is critical to both good performance and risk control.

You might adopt my style or you might not; it takes some effort to do well with it. But the important thing is thinking through your portfolio management process to make sure that it’s fundamentally sound, businesslike, intelligently contrarian and something that fits into the way you live your life. Life is broader than investing, and management techniques must be small enough in time use for them to be a part of a broader, well-balanced life. You have my best wishes as you work out your own investment management style.

 

Full disclosure: still long VLO, IBA, JOF

The Rules, Part LXI (The End… of the Past)

The Rules, Part LXI (The End… of the Past)

Rule: every rule has exceptions, including this one

In the long-run, and with hindsight, most actions of the market make sense. ?Sadly, we live in the short run, and our lives may only see one to 1.5 full macro-cycles of the market in our lives. ?We live in a haze, and wonder what useful economic and financial rules are persistently valid?

We live in a tension between imitation and thought, between momentum and valuation, between crowds and lonely reasoning, between short-term thinking and long-term thinking.

It would be nice to be like Buffett, who has no constraint on his time horizon, managing to the infinite horizon, because he has so much that setbacks would mean little to him. ?But most of us have retirements to fund, college expenses, a mortgage, and many other things that make us far more subject to risk.

Does valuation matter? ?You bet it does. ?When will it matter next? ?Uh, we can’t answer that. ?When we come up with a good measure of that, people begin using it, and the system changes.

My personal asset allocation for most of my life has been 75% risk assets/25% cash. ?Especially now, when bond yields are so low, I don’t see a lot of reason to extend the maturities of my bond portfolio, aside from a small position in ultra-long Treasuries, which is a hedge against deflation.

Investment reasoning is a struggle between the short-term and the long-term. ?The short-term gets the news day-by-day. ?The long term silently gains value.

If you invest long enough, you will have more than your share of situations where you say, “I don’t get this.” ?It can happen on the bull or bear sides of the market, and you may eventually be proved right, but how did you do while you were waiting?

Thus, uncertainty.

Is there a permanent return premium to investing in equities? ?I think so, but it is smaller than most imagine, particularly if compared against BBB/Baa bonds.

I’m not saying there are no rules. ?Far from it, why did I write this series?! ?What I am saying is that we have to have a firm understanding of the time horizon over which the “rules” will work, and an understanding of market valuations, sensing when valuations are high amid a surging market, and when valuations are low amid a plunging market. ?There are times to resist the trends, and times to embrace the trends.

The rules that I embrace and write about are useful. ?They reduce risk and enhance return. ?I once said to Jim Cramer before I started writing at RealMoney that the rules work 65% of the time, they don’t work 30% of the time, and 5% of the time, the opposite of the rules works. ?This is important to grasp, because any set of tools used to analyze the market will be limited — there is no perfect set of rules that can anticipate everything. ?You should expect disappointment, and even embarrassment with some degree of frequency. ?That’s the way of the market even for the best of us.

Hey, Buffett bought investment banks, textiles, shoes and airlines at the wrong times. ?But we remember the baseball players who had seasons that were better than .400, and Buffett is an example of that. ?In general, he made errors, but he rarely compounded them. ?His successes he compounded, and then some.

The rule I stated above is meant to be a paradox. ?In general, I am a long-term oriented, valuation-driven investor who seeks to maximize total return over the long haul, with significant efforts to avoid risk. ?Do I always succeed? ?No. ?Do I make significant mistakes? ?Yes. ?Have my winners more than paid for my losers over the 20+ years I have been an active investor? Yes, yes, and then some.

But this isn’t about me. ?Every investor will have days where they will have their head in their hands, like I did managing the huge corporate bond portfolio in September 2002, where I said to the high yield manager one evening as we were leaving work, “This can’t keep going on like like this, right? ?We’re close to this burning out, no?

He was a great aid to my learning, an optimist who embraced risk when it paid to do so. ?At the time, he agreed with me, but told me that you can never tell how bad it could get.

As it was, that was near the bottom, and the pains that we felt were those of the market shaking out the crud to reveal what had long lasting value. ?Or at least, value for a time, because?the modus operandi of the Fed became inflating a financial/housing bubble. ?That would not work in the long run, but it would work for a time. ?After that, I worked at a place that assumed that it would fail very soon, and was shocked at how far the financial excesses would eventually run. ?I was the one reluctant semi-bull in a bear shop that would eventually be right, but we had to survive through 4+ years of increasing leverage, waiting for the moment when the leverage had gone too far, and then some.

Being a moderate risk-taker who respects risk is a good way to approach the markets. ?I have learned from such men, and that is what I aim for in my investing. ?That means I lag when things are crazy, and that is fine with me. ?I don’t play for the last nickel — that nickel may cost many bucks. ?Respect the markets, and realize that they aren’t here to serve you; they exist to allocate capital to the wise over the long run. ?In the process, some will try to profit via imitation — it’s a simple strategy, and time honored, but when too many people imitate, rather than think, bad things happen.

The End, for Now

This post is the end of a long series, and I thank those who have read me through the series. ?I think there is a lot of wisdom here, but markets play havoc ?with wisdom in the short run, even if it wins in the long run. ?If I find something particularly profound, I will add to this series, but aside from one or two posts, all of the “rules” were generated prior to 2003. ?Thus, this is the end of the series.

The Rules, Part LX

The Rules, Part LX

Rapid upward moves in volatility almost always presage a bounce rally.

Again, I am scraping the bottom of the barrel, but this is a common aspect of markets. ?When things get tough, scaredy-cats buy put options. ?That pushes up option implied volatilities. ?The same doesn’t happen when prices are rising, because that happens slower. ?Prices fall twice as fast as they rise in the stock market.

Emotions play a big role with options, and many do not use them rationally. ?Rather than using them when the market is rising in order to hedge, more commonly they hedge after the market has fallen.

As implied volatility rises, the ability to make money from hedging falls, as the cost of insurance goes up. ?As a result, hedging peters out, and the market will be receptive to positive news, given that most who want to hedge have hedged. ?Their pseudo-selling is over, and a bounce rally will happen.

Volatility tends to mean-revert, and as the reversion from high levels of volatility happens, the value of stocks rise. ?People buy equities as fears dissipate.

Volatility, both actual and implied, are tools to have in your arsenal to help you understand when markets might be overvalued (low volatility) or undervalued (very high volatility). ?Use this knowledge to guide your portfolio positioning. ?At present, it is more reliable then many other measures of the market.

Next time, I end this series. ?Till then.

The Rules, Part LVI

The Rules, Part LVI

Leverage and risk eventually transfer to the least regulated

I’m coming near the end of this series. ?It will either end at LX or LXI. ?To refresh, I started a file in 1999 of insights before I started writing at RealMoney or Aleph Blog. ?I ended it in 2003, near the time I started writing for RealMoney. ?I threw a few of the insights away, but not many — there may have been near 70 when I was done. ?These ideas stemmed for all of the new ideas I ran into as I transitioned from being an investment actuary to being a portfolio manager. ?Onto tonight’s idea!

After the recent crisis, tonight’s insight may seem rather banal, but I saw it as an actuary many times as onshore insurers would shed reserves using reinsurance treaties to Bermuda companies and other domiciles with weak reserving, capital or tax rules. ?It was reinforced to me when I blew it badly regarding Scottish Re. ?It was only in the midst of their crisis, that I finally saw a full diagram of their corporate structure. ?It was a hodgepodge of all of the weak insurance domiciles, with many lines going this way and that.

A picture is worth a thousand words, and as I have often said, complexity within financial companies is rarely rewarded. ?That diagram focused my research, and changed my view of what was going on. ?After having bought into the decline, we sold into an incredible one day rally when some positive news was released, while my view had shifted that cash could not make it to the holding company, and the common would go out at zero.

What a mess, and the best thing I can say was that selling into the rally was the right thing to do, as the common did go out at zero.

But in the recent crisis:

  • How many weakly capitalized investment banks died or were acquired?
  • How many REITs, particularly mortgage REITs died or were acquired?
  • How much of the mortgage insurance industry died?
  • How much of the financial guaranty industry died?
  • How many significant GSEs died?
  • And with all of these, how many barely survived?

These all had weak financial models, taking on too much credit risk, with weak, backward-looking models for risk. ?It is no surprise that the bad credit risks found the fools that assumed that housing prices could only go up, and incurred considerable leverage to make their bets.

All of these were weakly regulated. ?There was more than a bit of the “this is free money” attitude to many of these businesses — it was an era that rewarded yield hogs for a time.

Thus, when you see financial firms with weak balance sheets taking on significant credit risks, be wary, it is often a sign that the credit cycle is about to turn.

Classic: How to Size Your Portfolio to Fit

Classic: How to Size Your Portfolio to Fit

I wrote the following at RealMoney on 4/10/2007

I’ve written two columns already about “spring cleaning” a portfolio, walking you first through the criteria I use when reshaping my holdings and then through the stocks and decisions those criteria pointed to. But there’s one aspect I didn’t cover: What’s the best way to size positions for a long-only equity portfolio?

In order to answer this question, I use the Kelly criterion (popularized in the excellent book Fortune’s Formula), which says that a position size should be equal to (edge/odds). Edge is the excess return that you expect to earn on average. Odds describes the likelihood of winning. A 50/50 bet makes odds equal to 1.

There is added complexity in applying this to stocks, because in gambling, each game is (mostly) uncorrelated with the last one. In investing, if you have a number of investments going at the same time, they are to some degree correlated with one another.

That’s particularly true for me, because I concentrate sectors. I believe that my portfolio acts more like a portfolio with half the number of positions because of the correlatedness of the various names in the portfolio. Thus, the 35 names in my portfolio behave more like 18 uncorrelated names.

The Kelly criterion applied to stock investing would recommend a fixed-weight portfolio. Optimally, you would rebalance daily to those fixed weights. But two factors interfere: First, there are costs to trading, and second, momentum tends to persist in the short run.

To me, those realities mean that you can have fixed weights, but that you set a band around those fixed weights for rebalancing. I use a 20% band, but the more I think about it, the band should be smaller, maybe 10%. My portfolio has gotten bigger over the past few years, and trading costs are a smaller-percentage cost factor. I’ll stick with 20% for now. It has served me well, but I will re-evaluate this.

I firmly believe that my eight rules tilt the odds in my favor. What are they?

  1. Industries are under-analyzed relative to the market on the whole and relative to individual companies. Spend time trying to find good companies with strong balance sheets in industries with lousy pricing power, and cheap companies in good industries where the trends are not fully discounted.
  2. Purchase equities that are cheap relative to other names in the industry. Depending on the industry, this can mean a low price-to-earnings ratio, low price-to-book value ratio, low price-to-sales ratio, low price-to-cash flow from operating activities, low price-to-free cash flow or low enterprise value-to-EBITDA.
  3. Stick with higher-quality companies for a given industry.
  4. Purchase companies appropriately sized to serve their market niches.
  5. Analyze financial statements to avoid companies that misuse generally accepted accounting principles and overstate earnings.
  6. Analyze the use of cash flow by management to avoid companies that invest or buy back their stock when it dilutes value, and purchase those that enhance value through intelligent buybacks and investment.
  7. Rebalance the portfolio whenever a stock gets more than 20% away from its target weight. Run a largely equal-weighted portfolio because it is genuinely difficult to tell what idea is the best. Keep about 30-40 names for diversification purposes.
  8. Make changes to the portfolio three or four times per year. Evaluate the replacement candidates as a group against the current portfolio. New additions must be better than the median idea currently in the portfolio. Companies leaving the portfolio must be below the median idea currently in the portfolio.

I need to calculate what I think my edge is. My procedure will be messy and somewhat ad hoc, but I would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong. How much is each rule worth?

The offensive rules are 1, 2, 7 and 8. Each of those generates roughly 2% of alpha annually. The defensive rules are 3, 4, 5 and 6. Each of those generates roughly 0.5% of alpha annually. Now, that would be an alpha of 10% annually for a portfolio that followed all those rules perfectly. My alpha over the last six years and seven months has been greater than that, but I will chalk up the overage to happenstance. Maybe more should go to happenstance, but I will discuss that below.

If my edge is 10% per year, what are my odds? I have long maintained that the idea I believe is best probably is as good as my 35th idea. Too many portfolio managers naively believe that they can identify their best ideas, when there are so many unknowns to an outside, passive, minority investor. My methods work on average, over the intermediate term. Most of my investments work if I give them two to three years to develop. Time is usually on my side with my methods. That would imply that my odds might be 50/50, or 1:1. That’s a coin flip, but one that, repeated often enough, leads to an extra 10% per year. Using the straight Kelly formula, that would mean I should have 10 positions; 10% divided by 1 is 10%, and for each position to be 10% of my portfolio, that would mean 10 positions. But I own 35 positions. What do I do?

As I mentioned above, because I concentrate industries, my 35 stocks behave more like 18. An equal-weight 18-stock portfolio has weights of 5.5%, and that’s still not 10%. Again, what do I do?

Good investing is based on humility, a willingness to accept that there are many things that you don’t know and that many successes may not be due to skill. Many who use the Kelly criterion decide to go “half Kelly” and cut position size in half because it also cuts volatility in half — but it also diminishes the expected returns by 25%. It’s a humble way to go.

Another way to think about it is that with quantitative investing, when you find a good strategy and have vetted it though back-testing, typically the alpha achieved when the strategy goes live is half of what the model would have predicted.? Though I have already given my edge a haircut, perhaps more of the success needs to be attributed to happenstance.

Whether due to happenstance or conservatism on my part, cutting the 5.5% in half leads to positions of 2.8% in size. How many equal-weighted positions is that? 36. That’s about what I have, and when conditions are bullish, I contract the number down to 30. When conditions are bearish, I hold up to 40 positions. Most of the time, I keep it at 35. That keeps me disciplined, which is a virtue that yields dividends in its own right.

That’s what I do. But what should you, my reader, do?

I encourage you to calculate your edge.

Look at your annualized returns over the past few years, and compare them with the index that you want to beat. Take the? excess (assuming there is one), and cut it in half. Some things went well for you that are not attributable to your skill.

I encourage you to calculate yours odds.

Look at your trading. Divide it into two categories, winners and losers. How often do you win (relative to the index)? When you win (vs. the index), how much do you win on average? When you lose (vs. the index), how much do you lose on average? (Make sure you use your annualized results for this exercise.)

If you consistently lose vs. the index, I’d buy the index instead of continuing to lose capital trying to do it myself. If you beat the index, then work out the calculation that I went through for my portfolio. Take into account your conservatism, but even if you are aggressive, I strongly discourage you from using portfolio weights higher than the full Kelly criterion; it’s too dangerous.

In general, I believe skilled investors with moderately sized portfolios are best served by diversification equal to what I use.? On the raw Kelly criterion, it’s equivalent to saying that one has an alpha between 2.5% and 3.3%. Hey, that’s hot stuff!? Most mutual fund managers would kill for those returns.

In summary, size your positions inversely to your expected alpha. To the extent that you are less certain of your skills, expand the number of your positions.

The Rules, Part LI

The Rules, Part LI

65% of the time, the rules work.? 30% of the time, the rules don’t work. 5% of the time, the opposite of the rules works.

When I wrote that to Cramer in 2003, his comment was that he loved it.? To me, this meta-rule about market rules in general expresses how markets work.? Re-expressing the three periods:

1) There are rules, and they work most of the time.? Value and Momentum strategies work on average.? So do many other strategies that work off accounting quality, distress, neglect, company quality, low volatility, etc.

2) But they don’t work all of the time.? Sometimes it seems that there is no discernible reward to a strategy, and performance is market-like.

3) But even valid strategies occasionally attract too many followers.? Too many foxes versus rabbits, means that foxes will die.? During those times, you think that the world is coming to an end, but these times are usually mercifully short.

In early 2000, a lot of great value investors got fired.? They had just suffered the worst period of relative performance in a decade, and investors were fed up.? Those firings were a sign that things were about to improve for value investing.? Near market troughs, qualitative signals occur to show that people are giving up because the rules have been reversed.

What does this mean for us regarding portfolio management?? The first and easiest solution is to stick to your discipline no matter what, and ride out the hard times.? After all, the rules work most of the time; you will get rewarded following them.

It is like what Max Heine said to Michael Price during Price’s younger days (extreme paraphrase from memory): If you follow this method, you will earn 15% per year on average.? One year out of ten, you will look like a genius.? One year out of ten, you will look like a loser.? Be mentally prepared for that.

And perhaps, that is the main message here.? Be prepared, like a good Boy Scout.? Be prepared for the days when your strategies, so strong in the past, go dead, or even become corrosive.? That is not a reason to abandon strategies that have a strong argument behind them, like momentum, value, etc.? It is a time to show courage, and buy the best stocks you can find.? Crises test investors, and the best stick to their guns and concentrate on the best opportunities.

The irregularity of the markets exists to shake out market players that cannot handle losses.? Those that cannot handle losses had unrealistic expectations.? Markets are perverse, and they suck in amateurs near peaks, and the amateurs leave near troughs.? They help provide the excess performance of the best.

The second message is to realize there are no strategies that work year-after-year, and that you have to accept years where your normally valid strategies? don’t work, or worse, become toxic. Don’t lose heart.

The third message is after a strategy has had a long run of success, don’t be afraid to lighten up.?? Eventually the evil days come, when the results of investing at high prices relative to value are punished.

Follow the rules, then, and be ready to absorb losses during the fleeting bad times.

The Rules, Part XLIX

The Rules, Part XLIX

In institutional portfolio management, the two hardest things to do are to buy higher than your last buy, and sell lower than your last sale.

I’ll tell you about two former bosses that I had.? They are both good men, and I respect them both.? The first one taught me about bond management.? He had a difficulty though.? Typically, he did not like to trade.? When I stepped into his role, but with far less experience, I traded a lot more than he did.? Because I traded more, and liquidity in the bond market is sporadic, I came up with the rule listed above.

The boss had an interesting insight, though: he suggested when you get to large sizes, stocks and bonds are equally illiquid.? I tend to agree.? In my days, I have traded stocks and bonds where I was a disproportionate holder of them, more so with bonds than with stocks.? If you want to learn the microstructure of markets, there is no better training ground than with illiquid securities.? And if you hold a lot of any security, the position is illiquid.

Once you are big, it is hard to trade in and out of positions rapidly.? You have to scale in and scale out, and do it in such a way that you don’t tip your hand to the market, which would then move against you.? Now, it would be easy if you had a fixed estimate of value for the securities, so that you knew whether a proposed buy or sell made sense, but corporate bonds and stocks improve and deteriorate.

Imagine for a moment that you hold five percent of a company’s bonds, and to your surprise, the situation is deteriorating.? Bid prices are falling.? What do you do?? First question: are the bonds money good?? Will they pay off, with high likelihood?? If so, bide your time, and maybe add some more if you have room.? If not, the second question: so what are the bonds worth?? If less than the current price, start selling, but avoid the appearance that you are desperate.? You have a lot of bonds to sell.? For the market to absorb them all will be a challenge.? I would say to brokers, that I was willing to sell small amounts of bonds at the current market, but if someone wanted to buy my full position, I might be willing to compromise a little.? Then you can have negotiations.

More often, in a deteriorating situation, you sell in dribs and drabs as the price of the asset falls.? There is psychological pain as you sell lower, but a good manager dismisses it, forgetting the past and focusing on the future.

Then there was the other boss.? At the interview he asked me, “What is one of the hardest lessons you have learned?”? I said, “In institutional portfolio management, the two hardest things to do are to buy higher than your last buy, and sell lower than your last sale.”

He appreciated the answer, though he had a hard time applying it personally.? He had a tendency to look to the past more than me.? Over the years I have learned to be forward-looking and try to analyze what securities will do the best, regardless of my cost basis.

I got the largest allocation of the Prudential “C” bonds when the deal was done. but I bought an equal amount 10% higher in price terms when it was a great deal in relative terms.? It was tough to buy more at a higher price, but it was still a great yield on a misunderstood bond.

Regret is native to mankind, but you can’t change the past.? You can try to estimate the future.? Don’t think about your cost bases.? Rather, think about what an asset is truly worth, and its trajectory, and manage your buys and sells relative to that.

Forward-looking management wins.? Look forward, and avoid regret.

PS — On Scottish Re (spit, spit) we went through this process.? We bought and bought more as it went down.? I erred in my judgment.? Had I looked at the taxable income, I would have realized that a lot of the profits weren’t real.

Before the company announced its reorganization plan, we doubled our position at a very low price, but then sold the whole thing into an astounding rally when the company announced its plans.? That cut our losses considerably, and we didn’t buy it back.? Eventually, it was worth nothing.? Focus on the future; ignore the past.

The Rules, Part XLIV

The Rules, Part XLIV

Expectations are a part of the game.

As expectations change, so do the markets.? What could be simpler?? Markets are discounting mechanisms, so why aren’t expectations the whole game?

Expectations are the whole game for widely traded assets that are analyzed by many.? But there are complex assets and smaller assets for which expectations, should they exist, are not well-defined.? A large example would be Berkshire Hathaway.? When the stock of Berkshire Hathaway begins to care about making/missing earnings estimates, that will be a real change in the way the stock is viewed.

I have a number of other stocks in my portfolio that have no analyst coverage, so whatever expectation their is for the company is ill-defined.? Earnings shrink?? Stay flat? Rise a little, lot, or more?? Often the reactions are muted, because expectations are ill-defined.

With cheap stocks, I often view results in two ways:

  • Expectations mode: are they beating earnings expectations or not?
  • Book value mode: are they earning enough to justify the current market price?? (And are the earnings real?)

It’s hard to lose money on companies that trade below book and have a single-digit P/E.? The value accretes and eventually market prices follow.? You just have to be happy with firms that are boring, but profitable.

Cheap stocks with good balance sheets do not get killed when there are earnings disappointments.? With those stocks, we can sit back and wait for a better day.

All that said, earnings estimates provide a feedback mechanism for those stocks that have an adequate number of analysts following them.? Imperfect as it is, it guides the way we react to quarterly releases of adjusted earnings.? And when companies attempt to show adjusted earnings that are liberal, it is no surprise when the market rejects their presentation, and the stock goes down.

But this rule applies to policymakers as well.? Over the last 27 years, the Federal Reserve has placed a greater emphasis on communications.? I think that was a mistake, but the Fed made it a goal to shape the expectations of the market.? And they did so.

But once you sharpen the focus of the market to your promises, should it surprise you that when you give the least bit of equivocation, that the market reacts badly?? Hey, you made your bed, now sleep in it.? You trusted in your ability to communicate, and now you reap the result.

Even with no current change in policy, a change in expectations can have a huge effect on markets, particularly when novel policy tools are being used.? Ben Bernanke should not have been surprised by the reaction of the market to his comments to the press after the last FOMC meeting.? All of the efforts since that time to take it back have bolstered the stock market, but have not affected the bond market much.? Remember that the bond market is usually smarter than the stock market, thus I remain bearish.

 

 

Full disclosure: Long BRK/B

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