Month: June 2016

Brexit Boogeyman Bellows “Boo!”

Brexit Boogeyman Bellows “Boo!”

Picture Credit: Peanuts Reloaded || Perhaps today Brexit; Monday an exit from Italy or Spain; [then] Europe dismantles
Picture Credit: Peanuts Reloaded || Roughly: “Perhaps today Brexit;?Monday an exit from Italy or Spain; [then]?Europe dismantles”
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At a time like this, when the Brexit Boogeyman goes “Boo!” it’s time to take stock of the situation amid panic.

Though the UK will face some political unrest as the Prime Minister resigns, and article 50 is likely but not certainly invoked, the nature of political discourse hasn’t shifted in full. ?Though an important question, it is only one question, and more things will remain stable than change.

At least that is most likely. ?If you think of “real options” theory, you could say, “Okay, a door opened today that was previously locked. ?What new doors beyond that one could be opened?” ?Other countries could leave the EU and/or?Eurozone [EZ]. ?The EU/EZ could dissolve. ?The odds of other countries leaving isn’t that high. ?For the EU or EZ to dissolve would take a lot of doing, and the odds of that happening is very low, though higher than the odds yesterday.

As I said a week ago:

Governments are smaller than markets; markets are smaller than cultures.

What I am saying is that almost everything affecting the needs of people will get done when there is sufficient freedom. ?If Brexit occurs, the UK will negotiate some agreement that is mutually beneficial to the UK and the EU, and most things will go on as they do today. ?Even with a subpar agreement,?perfidious Albion is very effective at getting what they need completed. ?This is especially true of their very effective and creative financial sector in the City of London without which most effective international secrecy, taxation avoidance and regulatory avoidance business could not be done.

Whatever happens, it will happen slowly. ?Leaving a complex multinational group like the EU takes two years at least. ?How it all works out in detail is not predictable.

I can say that human systems tend toward stability. ?People act to preserve the things that they like. ?Only under severe conditions does that cease to be true, and even then typically only for short periods of time.

I can also say something a little more controversial. ?Wealth, assets, and money [WAM] act like they are alive and have more votes than people do under most conditions. ?Why am I saying this?

Governments come in, and go out, but for the most part, the same things get done. ?Those thinking that radical change will come are usually deeply disappointed. ?WAM tend to maintain the status quo, not because their owners bribe politicians and suborn regulators pay political action contributions, ?but because people want the streams of goods and services that help make WAM valuable. ?Only a genuine crisis at least as large as?the Great Depression or the Civil War can create truly radical change that reshapes the basic desires of most of the people in a nation.

Capitalist democracies that respect the rule of law (e.g., the government is also governed by?a higher law) are usually pretty stable; systems that don’t have significant capitalism or democracy may last a couple generations, but tend to fall apart.

All that said, there is significant economic pressure to do two things after the Brexit:

  • Rethink the single currency and common laws
  • Maintain a free-ish trade zone in goods and services

The Eurozone does not allow for the necessary economic adjustments across nations in a fiat?monetary system. ?Nations need their own currencies, central banks, etc. ?They also need to govern themselves via their local culture, not someplace far away with misguided idealists who think they know what’s best for all.

Free-ish trade maintains most of what is needed?for human needs. ?The European Union is a political construct meant to prevent war from ever recurring in Europe. ?The best way to do that is through trade. ?Severe wars rare start between nations that rely on each other and interact through commerce.

My view is that ten years from now, the goods and services that people want will get delivered, regardless of the governmental structures in Europe. ?I will invest accordingly.

Practical Implications

Things will be rocky in the short run, and there will be more bumps along the road as the Brexit negotiations go on. ?I will be resisting panic and euphoria in modest ways. ?This isn’t the sum total of my strategies, but I expect that profitable business will continue, and that people and nations will pursue generally intelligent long-term self-interest as events unfold.

When I say modest, I tweak my portfolios at the edges. ?Brexit does not comprise more than 5% of what I would do with assets. ?As with any investment idea, spread your bets, diversify, don’t bet the farm.

And, I would say the same even to governments — if you don’t have contingency plans for the possibility of the EU shrinking or even disappearing, you are not truly prepared for all contingencies. ?As Warren Buffett once said (something like) “We’re paid to think about the things that ‘can’t happen.'”

In closing, many thought that Brexit could not happen. ?Now, what else “can’t happen?” 😉

The Collapse of FOMC Expectations

The Collapse of FOMC Expectations

When do you admit that you are wrong? ?Do you do it publicly? ?Do you hide it?

Do you hide it plain sight?

When I look at the graph for Fed funds for 2017 and later, I think the FOMC is admitting that they were wrong for a long time, and now hide that in plain sight.

They don’t admit that they were wrong. ?They don’t admit that the economy has proven to be a lot weaker than they ever expected, and that they now expect that to persist for a while.

That’s what the graphs for Fed funds and GDP say.

central tendency_GDP

But what does the FOMC say in its statement? ?It expresses confidence in future GDP robust growth, even though their expectations have collapsed to 2% real growth as far as they care to opine.

Look at the above graph, and see how it has all converged to 2%.

central tendency_PCE

PCE Inflation? They assume it will be 2% before the year starts, and then they adapt to incoming data.

There’s no model here, just a disappointed ideology that says they wish to ?produce a 2% PCE inflation rate, dubious as that goal is.

The only thing more dubious there is their ability to achieve their ideology.

central tendency_Unemp

Remember after the financial crisis? There were those who said unemployment would never return to 5% — that the natural rate of unemployment was permanently higher.

I may have been among them.

Well, now the FOMC has a new consensus. ?Unemployment below 5%?as far as they care to opine.

When I look at these graphs, particularly the ones for Fed funds and GDP growth, I see a paradigm shift where Bayesian priors have been dragged kicking and screaming by the data to No Man’s Land.

Grudgingly they acknowledge the data in the graphs, but they don’t have a theory to go along with it, so their statements and minutes sound the same.

Nothing is changed. ?Soon our policies will restore robust real GDP growth, produce inflation and then we will tighten policy and restore normalcy.

Well, that’s what their minutes and statements say.

But who are you going to believe? ?The FOMC and their words, or your lying eyes looking at their graphs?

PS — modified to reflect Bullard’s lack of a vote on long-term Fed funds rate.

Redacted Version of the June 2016 FOMC Statement

Redacted Version of the June 2016 FOMC Statement

Photo Credit: Norman Maddeaux
Photo Credit: Norman Maddeaux

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April 2016 June 2016 Comments
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March indicates that labor market conditions have improved further even as growth in economic activity appears to have slowed. Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in April indicates that the pace of improvement in the labor market has slowed while growth in economic activity appears to have picked up. FOMC shades GDP up and employment down, which is the opposite of last time.
  Although the unemployment rate has declined, job gains have diminished. Sentence moved up in the statement.? Expresses less confidence in the labor market.
Growth in household spending has moderated, although households’ real income has risen at a solid rate and consumer sentiment remains high. Growth in household spending has strengthened. Shades up household spending.
Since the beginning of the year, the housing sector has improved further but business fixed investment and net exports have been soft. Since the beginning of the year, the housing sector has continued to improve and the drag from net exports appears to have lessened, but business fixed investment has been soft. Shades up net exports.
A range of recent indicators, including strong job gains, points to additional strengthening of the labor market. ? Sentence moved up in the statement.
Inflation has continued to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run objective, partly reflecting earlier declines in energy prices and falling prices of non-energy imports. Inflation has continued to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run objective, partly reflecting earlier declines in energy prices and in prices of non-energy imports. No change.
Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance, in recent months. Market-based measures of inflation compensation declined; most survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance, in recent months. No change.? TIPS are showing higher inflation expectations since the last meeting. 5y forward 5y inflation implied from TIPS is near 1.48%, down 0.25% from March.? Undid the significant move from earlier in 2016.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. No change. Any time they mention the ?statutory mandate,? it is to excuse bad policy.
The Committee currently expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market indicators will continue to strengthen. The Committee currently expects that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace and labor market indicators will strengthen. No change.
Inflation is expected to remain low in the near term, in part because of earlier declines in energy prices, but to rise to 2 percent over the medium term as the transitory effects of declines in energy and import prices dissipate and the labor market strengthens further. Inflation is expected to remain low in the near term, in part because of earlier declines in energy prices, but to rise to 2 percent over the medium term as the transitory effects of past declines in energy and import prices dissipate and the labor market strengthens further. No change. CPI is at +1.1% now, yoy.
The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments. The Committee continues to closely monitor inflation indicators and global economic and financial developments. No change.
Against this backdrop, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1/4 to 1/2 percent. Against this backdrop, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1/4 to 1/2 percent. No change.
The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting further improvement in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation. The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting further improvement in labor market conditions and a return to 2 percent inflation. No change.? They don?t get that policy direction, not position, is what makes policy accommodative or restrictive.? Think of monetary policy as a drug for which a tolerance gets built up.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. No change.
This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments. No change.? Gives the FOMC flexibility in decision-making, because they really don?t know what matters, and whether they can truly do anything with monetary policy.
In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data. In light of the current shortfall of inflation from 2 percent, the Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward its inflation goal. The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run. However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data. No change.? Says that they will go slowly, and react to new data.? Big surprises, those.
The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction, and it anticipates doing so until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way. This policy, by keeping the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities at sizable levels, should help maintain accommodative financial conditions. No change.? Says it will keep reinvesting maturing proceeds of agency debt and MBS, which blunts any tightening.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Stanley Fischer; Loretta J. Mester; Jerome H. Powell; Eric Rosengren; and Daniel K. Tarullo. Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; James Bullard; Stanley Fischer; Esther L. George; Loretta J. Mester; Jerome H. Powell; Eric Rosengren; and Daniel K. Tarullo. Back to unanimity in the monoculture of neoclassical economics.
Voting against the action was Esther L. George, who preferred at this meeting to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1/2 to 3/4 percent. ? Say bye to the small dissent.

Comments

  • The FOMC meets too frequently. Often the economic signals at one meeting get reversed at the next meeting, as was true this time.? Rather than hyper-interpreting every wiggle, maybe the FOMC should meet every six months, with the proviso that the chairman could call an interim meeting if the situation demanded it.
  • That this is true regarding economic aggregates has been known since the ?50s. For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to distinguish signal from noise over periods of less than a year.
  • Then again, maybe the FOMC meets to make it look like they are doing something. 😉
  • This statement was a nothing-burger.
  • Policy continues to stall, as the economy muddles along.
  • But policy should be tighter. Savers deserve returns, and that would be good for the economy.
  • The changes for the FOMC?s view are that labor indicators are weaker, and GDP and household spending are stronger.
  • Equities fall and bonds rise a little. Commodity prices rise and the dollar falls.
  • The FOMC says that any future change to policy is contingent on almost everything.
  • The key variables on Fed Policy are capacity utilization, labor market indicators, inflation trends, and inflation expectations. As a result, the FOMC ain?t moving rates up much, absent much higher inflation, or a US Dollar crisis.
Brexit Boogeyman

Brexit Boogeyman

Photo Credit: Gwydion M Williams
Photo Credit: Gwydion M Williams?|| They do the Hokey Pokey 😉

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Investors need things to scare them, or they don’t have a normal life. ?This is kind of like the bachelor uncle who tells little?nieces and nephews about scary things that lurk under their beds, and only come out at night for mischief and mayhem. ?(Then the parents pick up the pieces later, when they wonder why William or Elizabeth no longer sleep well at night.)

That’s the way I feel about US & international market reactions to the possibility of UK/Britain exiting the EU, otherwise called “Brexit.” ?It’s overblown. ?Quoting from an older article of mine:

Governments are smaller than markets; markets are smaller than cultures.

What I am saying is that almost everything affecting the needs of people will get done when there is sufficient freedom. ?If Brexit occurs, the UK will negotiate some agreement that is mutually beneficial to the UK and the EU, and most things will go on as they do today. ?Even with a subpar agreement, perfidious Albion is very effective at getting what they need completed. ?This is especially true of their very effective and creative financial sector in the City of London without which most effective international secrecy, taxation avoidance and regulatory avoidance business could not be done.

There are other reasons not to worry as well if you live outside the UK. ?The biggest reason is that the UK is only a small part of the global economy, and the economic effects on non-EU trade and finance are smaller still. ?And unlike the idea was small but “contained,” in this case, large second order effects aren’t there. ?Yes, someday other nations may wise up and decide to leave the EU, but?no major countries are likely to do that over the next decade, absent some crisis. ?(Crises in the EU? Those aren’t allowed to happen; ask any Eurocrat, they’ll tell ya.)

A second reason not to worry is that leaving the EU ends a second level of regulation of UK economic activity. ?This will enable better growth in the longer term. ?Are there things that the UK will lose? ?Sure, they won’t have as good of a trade deal with the EU, but they will have the ability to try to craft better deals elsewhere, like a Transatlantic Free Trade Area.

The Economist had a decent summary of the good and bad for the UK over leaving the EU. ?Here’s their summary table:

Looking over this, the UK already depends less on the EU than most member states, making the exit less of a big deal for the UK and the EU.

My view is this: leaving the EU won’t be a big thing in the long run for the UK. ?In the short-run, there will be some uncertainty and volatility as things get worked out. ?For the rest of the world, it will be a big fat zero, so ignore this, and focus on something with more meaning, like bizarre monetary policy, and the twisting effects it is having on our world, or the global entitlements crisis — too many people retiring, too few to support them, especially medically.

So, be willing to take some additional risk if people mindlessly panic if the UK/Britain exits the EU.

Estimating Future Stock Returns, March 2016 Update

Estimating Future Stock Returns, March 2016 Update

ecphilosopher data 2015 revision_21058_image001

You might remember my post?Estimating Future Stock Returns, and its follow-up piece. ?If not they are good reads, and you can get the data on one file here.

The Z.1 report came out yesterday, giving an important new data point to the analysis. ?After all, the most recent point gives the best read into current conditions. ?As of March 31st, 2016 the best estimate of 10-year returns on the S&P 500 is 6.74%/year.

The sharp-eyed reader will say, “Wait a minute! ?That’s higher than last time, and the market is higher also! ?What happened?!” ?Good question.

First, the market isn’t higher from 12/31/2015 to 3/31/2016 — it’s down about a percent, with dividends. ?But that would be enough to move the estimate on the return up maybe 0.10%. ?It moved up 0.64%, so where did the 0.54% come from?

The market climbs a wall of worry, and?the private sector has been holding less stock as a percentage of assets than before — the percentage?went from 37.6% to 37.1%, and the absolute amount fell by about $250 billion. ?Some stock gets eliminated by M&A for cash, some by buybacks, etc. ?The amount has been falling over?the last twelve months, while the amount in bonds, cash, and other assets keeps rising.

If you think that return on assets doesn’t vary that much over time, you would?conclude that having a smaller amount of stock owning the assets would lead to a higher rate of return on the stock. ?One year ago, the percentage the private sector held in stocks was 39.6%. ?A move down of 2.5% is pretty large, and moved the estimate for 10-year future returns from 4.98% to 6.74%.

Summary

As a result, I am a little less bearish. ?The valuations are above average, but they aren’t at levels that would lead to a severe crash. ?Take note, Palindrome.

Bear markets are always possible, but a big one is not likely here. ?Yes, this is the ordinarily bearish David Merkel writing. ?I’m not really a bull here, but I’m not changing my asset allocation which is 75% in risk assets.

Postscript for Nerds

One other thing affecting this calculation is the Federal Reserve revising estimates of assets other than stocks up prior to 1961. ?There are little adjustments in the last few years, but in percentage terms the adjustments prior to 1961 are huge, and drop the R-squared of the regression from 90% to 86%, which also is huge. ?I don’t know what the Fed’s statisticians are doing here, but I?am going to look into it, because it is?troubling to wonder if your data series is sound or not.

That said, the R-squared on this model is better than any alternative. ?Next time, if I get a chance, I will try to put a confidence interval on the estimate. ?Till then.

Saudi Arabia: Reading Tea Leaves

Saudi Arabia: Reading Tea Leaves

Photo Credit: Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Photo Credit: Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Let me mention four?posts that I did recently on energy issues:

There were four?main ideas that came out of those articles:

  • Saudi Arabia would allow the price of crude oil to fall to hurt competitors/rivals, particularly Iran.
  • The price of crude oil would stay near $50/barrel.
  • Lots of overlevered companies dependent on a high price for crude oil would go bankrupt.
  • But?bankruptcy would happen to fewer, and more slowly, because of all the private equity wanting to buy distressed assets.

All that said, my view has changed a little recently. ?I could be wrong, but I think that the ceiling price for crude oil may be $70/barrel for a few years, with the average remaining at $50. ?I believe this because I think the Saudis are more desperate for cash than most believe.

Here’s my reasoning:

  • First, you have them selling off a?5%?interest in Saudi Aramco. ?When you need?money, there is a tendency to sell high quality easily saleable assets, because they will sell for a high price, and with little fuss. ?Admittedly, they aren’t rushing to do it, which weakens my point. ?My view is that you would sell off lesser things that aren’t core, rather than complicate life by selling off a portion of a top quality asset.
  • Second, they are seeking loans, and considering selling bonds.
  • Third, they are considering decreasing the subsidies that they give to their people. ?I think this will be very difficult to achieve politically.
  • Fourth, when the amount of Saudi holdings of US Treasury bonds was announced, it was lower than many expected, at $120+ billion, which only covers a little more than a year of their budget deficits, which was $98 billion last year.
  • Fifth, and most speculatively, I wonder if many of the US Treasury holdings have been pledged to cover other debts. ?No proof here, but it’s not uncommon to use highly liquid assets as collateral for privately contracted debts. ?That may explain the musing by some that there had to be more US Treasuries ?there… but where are they?

What this implies to me is that Saudi Arabia is now little different than most of their associates in OPEC. ?Their financial situation is tight enough that they must pump crude oil without respect?to the strategy of holding crude oil off the markets to get better prices. ?It’s not just punishing US shale oil production and Iranian crude production — the Saudis need the money.

If the Saudis need the money, and must pump, then OPEC lacks any significant coalition to raise prices. ?Prices will rise with growth in demand, and cheap resource depletion… but as for right now, there are enough barrels to come out of the ground below $70.

The Saudi need for money is a much simpler explanation than trying to knock out US shale oil, or gouge the Iranians, because it has the Saudis acting directly in their own interests, and it fits the price series for crude oil better.

PS — One more note: this is mildly bearish for the US Dollar as the US does not have the same dedicated buyer of US Dollar assets as it once did. ?I say mildly bearish, because most of the damage is already past.

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