Search Results for “Problems with Constant Compound Interest” – Page 2

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 12

Posted on 3 November 2011 by David Merkel

This portion goes from November 2009 to January 2010.

Yes, I was one of the eight bloggers that made it to the first meeting with the US Treasury:

My Visit to the US Treasury, Part 1

My Visit to the US Treasury, Part 2

My Visit to the US Treasury, Part 3

My Visit to the US Treasury, Part 4

My Visit to the US Treasury, Part 5

My Visit to the US Treasury, Part 6

My Visit to the US Treasury, Part 7 (Final) (if you have to read only one of these, read this one)

How to Regulate the Banks, and other Financials

It comes down to diversification, leverage, and liquidity.

Notes from Recent Travels

Commentary on the health care bill, and also the AIG Bailout, and the Fed’s reprehensible actions.

Problems with Constant Compound Interest (4) (and more)

Retells my story interacting with the Federal Reserve bank of Richmond, and makes the application to commodity investing.

Post 1100 ? On Thanksgiving

Points out where we need to be thankful.? Even amid crisis, we have many things going well.

The Right Reform for the Fed

Criticizes a lame editorial that Ben Bernanke wrote in the Wall Street Journal.

On Sovereign and Quasi-Sovereign Risks

Talks about the relative riskiness of foreign debts, and the value of being able to tax.

Where the Rubber Meets the Road at Home

Explains how I teach my children about economics and other matters.

Uncharted Waters

Laments the low return on equity culture the US Government creates by trying to keep interest rates low.? (Sound familiar?)

My TIPS, Treasuries, and Inflation Model

An amazing model that describes the forward inflation and real yield curves.

On Contrarianism

“With markets, it doesn?t matter what people say.? What matters is what they rely upon.”

Not so Cheap Trills

One of a number of pieces that I wrote to fight the concept of trills, a form of debt more dangerous than any other I have seen

One Dozen or so Books on Economics

Many clever books on economics that major on history, and minor on theory.

Yield = Poison (2)

The perils of reaching for yield.

Fat Fed Profits Do Not Create a Healthy Economy

Large Seniorage profits for the Fed are not a positive for the economy as a whole.

R Bonds R Bad 4 U

A veiled attempt to raid pension assets to fund the US Government by those aligned with the Obama Administration.

Rationality versus Time Horizons

To come back to the beginning of this article, the fetish of rationality exists in economics because the math doesn?t work without it.? Many tests of rationality have failed, yet the profession does not give up, because their skills are useless if man is not economically rational.

Cram and Jam

There are many distortions of accounting data, and this gives you two of them.

Double Down Institutional Investing

Deals with the asset-liability mismatch in much of endowment investing.

Fear the Boom and Bust ? an Economics Lesson

My commentary on the Keynes vs Hayek videos up to that point.

In Defense of Home Bias

It is very rational to invest closer to home and this article explains why.

The Forever Fund

One of my best pieces ever, where I defend Buffett’s purchase of Burlington Northern, because it is irreplaceable.? This helps to explain how Buffett manages for the very long term, and does well at it.

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 10

Posted on 14 September 2011 by David Merkel

This era encompasses May through July 2009, as the market rallied.? As usual, I sold too soon, and did not benefit from the continuing rally.

Farewell to John Davidson

This is my only short story at my blog, about an honest insurance executive in the credit crisis.? I know many insurance executives like his adversary, but few like him.

Choose Two: Principal Protection, Liquidity, and Above-Market Returns

The main idea is simple: you can get two out of three at best.

The Zero Short

Shorting is a tactical discipline and not a structural discipline.? Don’t try to short stock to zero, or near it.

The First Priority of Risk Control

Can you assure liquidity under all reasonable possible futures, and a few unreasonable futures?

?Just Gimme the Answer, Will Ya??

Do you want to understand the situation fully, or do you want a soundbite answer to your question?

Problems with Constant Compound Interest

Problems with Constant Compound Interest (2)

Problems with Constant Compound Interest (3)

No tree grows to the sky.? Nothing can grow at above average growth rates forever.

Do you Want to be Proud, or do you Want to Make Money?

Humility is a core asset for investment managers.

Loss Severity Leverage

Structured securities have a higher probability of “losing it all.”? Also, the medium-sized insurer mentioned did not go insolvent, but did have to get a cash infusion from some other insurers that had joined with them into a greater entity.

Fruits and Vegetables Versus Assets in Demand (2)

Fresh produce is what it is, a perishable commodity, where quantity and quality are positively correlated, and pricing is negatively correlated.? Financial assets don?t perish rapidly, quantity and quality are negatively correlated, and pricing is often positively correlated to the quantity of assets issued, since the demand for assets varies more than the supply.? Whereas, with fresh produce, the supply varies more than the demand.

The Benefits of Dumb Regulation

In short, why regulators have to have some spine, and just say no to fancy ideas.? Implied in this is that state regulation of insurance, dumb as it is, is more effective than Federal regulation of banks.

It Takes Two to Tango

Why simple explanations of market phenomena are frequently wrong.

Sorry, Doctor Shiller, not Everything can be Hedged

“The concept that everything can be hedged assumes deep markets everywhere, which is not the case.”

Toward a New Concept of Asset Allocation

An attempt to flesh out what a better concept on asset allocation would look like.

To Control Bubbles, the Fed Must First Control Itself

Why the Fed should be the systemic risk regulator.

The Equity Premium is No Longer a Puzzle

Why stocks are slightly better than bonds in the long, long run.

Central Bank Independence is Overrated

If the independence of the Central Bank is never used to resist that desires of the politicians to goose, then that is not independence, but a sham.

Perceived Versus Real Risk Tolerance

Posted on 8 July 201712 July 2017 by David Merkel

Picture Credit: Denise Krebs || What RFK said is not applicable to investing. ?Safety First! ?Don’t lose money!

=======

Investment entities, both people and institutions, often say one thing and mean another with respect to risk. ?They can keep a straight face with respect to minor market gyrations. ?But major market changes leading to the possible or actual questioning of whether they will have enough money to meet stated goals is what really matters to them.

There are six factors that go into any true risk analysis (I will handle them in order):

Net Wealth Relative to Liabilities
Time
Liquidity
Flexibility
Investment-specific Factors
Character of the Entity’s Decision-makers and their Incentives

Net Wealth Relative to Liabilities

The larger the surplus of assets over liabilities, the more relaxed and long-term focused an entity can be. ?For the individual, that attempts to measure the amount needed to meet future obligations where future investment earnings are calculated at a conservative level — my initial rule of thumb is no more than 1% above the 10-year Treasury yield.

That said, for entities with well defined liabilities, like a defined benefit pension plan, a bank, or an insurance company, using 1% above the yield curve should be a maximum for investment earnings, even for existing fixed income assets. ?Risk premiums will get taken into net wealth as they are earned. ?They should not be planned as if they are guaranteed to occur.

Time

The longer it is before payments need to be made, the more aggressive the investment posture can be. ?Now, that can swing two ways — with a larger surplus, or more time before payments need to be made, there is more freedom to tactically overweight or underweight?risky assets versus your normal investment posture.

That means that someone like Buffett is almost unconstrained, aside from paying off insurance claims and indebtedness. ?Not so for most investment entities, which often learn that their estimates of when they need the money are overestimates, and in a crisis, may need liquidity sooner than they ever thought.

Liquidity

High quality assets that can easily be turned into spendable cash helps make net wealth more secure. ?Unexpected cash outflows happen, and how do you meet those needs, particularly in a crisis? ?If you’ve got more than enough cash-like assets, the rest of the portfolio can be more aggressive. ?Remember, Buffett view cash as an option, because of what he can buy with it during a crisis. ?The question is whether the low returns from holding cash will get more than compensated for by capital gains and income on the rest of the portfolio across a full market cycle. ?Do the opportunistic purchases get made when the crisis comes? ?Do they pay off?

Also, if net new assets are coming in, aggressiveness can increase somewhat, but it matters whether the assets have promises attached to them, or are additional surplus. ?The former money must be invested coservatively, while surplus can be invested aggressively.

Flexibility

Some liabilities, or spending needs, can be deferred, at some level of cost or discomfort. ?As an example, if retirement assets are not sufficient, then maybe discretionary expenses can be reduced. ?Dreams often have to give way to reality.

Even in corporate situations, some payments can be stretched out with some increase in the cost of financing. ?One has to be careful here, because the time you are forced to conserve liquidity is often the same time that everyone else must do it as well, which means the cost of doing so could be high. ?That said, projects can be put on hold, realizing that growth will suffer; this can be a “choose your poison” type of situation, because it might cause the stock price to fall, with unpredictable second order effects.

Investment-specific Factors

Making good long term investments will enable a higher return over time, but concentration of ideas can in the short-run lead to underperformance. ?So long as you don’t need cash soon, or you have a large surplus of net assets, such a posture can be maintained over the long haul.

The same thing applies to the need for income from investments. ?investments can shoot less for income and more for capital gains if the need for spendable cash is low. ?Or, less liquid investments can be purchased if they offer a significant return for giving up the liquidity.

Character of the Entity’s Decision-makers and their Incentives

The last issue, which many take first, but I think is last, is how skilled the investors are in dealing with panic/greed situations. ?What is your subjective “risk tolerance?” ?The reason I put this last, is that if you have done your job right, and properly sized the first five factors above, there will be enough surplus and liquidity that does not easily run away in a crisis. ?When portfolios are constructed so that they are prepared for crises and manias, the subjective reactions are minimized because the call on cash during a crisis never gets great enough to force them to move.

A: “Are we adequate?”

B: “More than adequate. ?We might even be able to take advantage of the crisis…”

The only “trouble” comes when almost everyone is prepared. ?Then no significant crises come. ?That theoretical problem is very high quality, but I don’t think the nature of mankind ever changes that much.

Closing

Pay attention to the risk factors of investing relative to your spending needs (or, liabilities). ?Then you will be prepared for the inevitable storms that will come.

The Doubling Rule

Posted on 21 June 2017 by David Merkel

Picture Credit: Vincent Brown || Einstein never said this, either…

=======================

If you are famous and dead, many people will attribute clever sayings to you that you never said. ?As Yogi Berra said:

I really didn?t say everything I said.

Except that Yogi did say that.? Now, if Einstein didn’t do enough for us, he supposedly made many statements praising compound interest, but the articles I have seen haven’t been able to trace it back to an original source. ?Personally, I think compound interest is overrated, because business processes can’t forever compound wealth at a steady rate.

But some also have tried to credit Einstein with the Rule of 72. ?You know, the rule that says the time it takes to double your money in years is equal to 72 divded by the annual compound interest rate expressed as as an integer. ?E.g., at 8% your money doubles in 9 years. ?At 9% you money doubles in 8 years.

Pretty nice, and easy to remember. ?It is an approximation though. ?If Einstein ever did look at the rule of 72, he would have noticed that the approximation is pretty good between 3% and 13%. ?Outside that it gets further away.

One advantage of the rule of 72 is that it is simple. ?The second one is that 72 = 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2. ?That makes it divide more intuitively by many integral interest rates, e.g., 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12 — allowing for some intuitive interpolation to aid it.

There is a more complex version of the doubling rule though:

The doubling constant starts (in the limit) at 100 times the natural logarithm of 2 [69.3147], and increases almost linearly from there. ?If you estimate a “best linear fit” line on the observations where the interest rate is between 0 and 30, the R-squared will be over 99.98%. ?The equation would be:

K = 69.3856 + 0.3313 * interest rate ?[Linear Fit K]

To make it a little more memorable rule, it can be turned into:

K = 70 + (interest rate – 2)/3 ?[Rule K]

Thus at 2% the doubling constant would be 70 — money doubles in 35 years. ?At 5%, 71, money doubles in 14.2 years. ?8% is the rule of 72 — nine years to double. ?At 11%, 73, 6.6 years to double. ?At 14%, 74, 5.3 years to double. 17%, 75, 4.4 years to double. 20%, 76, 3.8 years to double. ?I did those in my head.

As you can see from the graph above, the actual doubling constant and its two approximations lie on top of each other. ?Not that I hope we see ultrahigh interest rates, but Rule K does quite well over a long span of rates. ?Here’s how small the deviations are:

Now, almost no one will use “Rule K” because the two advantages of the Rule of 72 are huge, and if interest rates get really high, someone could create an easy smartphone app to calculate the doubling period. (and constant if they wanted)

This is interesting for me, because I ran across what I call the “Rule of K” earlier in my career, and I was able to reproduce it on my own after reading the WSJ article that I cited above. ?Who knows, maybe Einstein took the doubling rule and did a first order Taylor expansion around 2% — that would have produced something very close to the “Rule of K” back when regressions were hard to do.

That’s all, and if you made it this far, thanks for bearing with me.

One Dozen Thoughts on Dealing with Risk in Investing for Retirement

Posted on 31 October 2015 by David Merkel

Photo Credit: Ian Sane || Many ways to supplement retirement income... — Photo Credit: Ian Sane || One of many ways to supplement retirement income…

Investing is difficult. That said, it can be harder still. Let people with little to no training to try to do it for themselves. Sadly, many people get caught in the fear/greed cycle, and show up at the wrong time to buy and/or sell. They get there late, and then their emotions trick them into action. A rational investor would say, ?Okay, I missed that move. Where are opportunities now, if there are any at all??

Investing can be made even more difficult. ?Investing reaches its most challenging level when one relies on his investing to meet an anticipated and repeated need for cash outflows.

Institutional investors will say that portfolio decisions are almost always easier when there is more cash flowing in than flowing out. ?It means that there is one dominant mode of thought: where to invest?new money? ?Some attention will be given to managing existing assets ? pruning away assets with less potential, but the need won?t be as pressing.

What?s tough is trying to meet a?cash withdrawal?rate that is materially higher than what can safely be achieved over time, and earning enough?consistently to do so. ?Doing so as an amateur managing a retirement portfolio is a particularly hard version of this problem. ?Let me point out some of the areas where it will be hard:

1) The retiree doesn?t know how long he, his spouse, and anyone else relying on him will live. ?Averages can be calculated, but particularly with two people, the odds are that at least one will outlive an average life expectancy. ?Can they be conservative enough in their withdrawals that they won?t outlive their assets?

It?s tempting to overspend, and the temptation will get greater when bad events happen that break the budget, whether those are healthcare or other needs. ?It is incredibly difficult to?avoid paying for an immediate pressing need, when the soft cost?is harming your future. ?There is every incentive to say, ?We?ll figure it out later.? ?The odds on that being true will be low.

2) One conservative estimate of what the safe withdrawal rate is on a perpetuity is the yield on the 10-year Treasury Note plus around 1%. ?That additional 1% can be higher after the market has gone through a bear market, and valuations are cheap, and as low as zero near the end of a bull market.

That said, most?people people with discipline want a simple spending rule, and so those that are moderately conservative choose that they can spend 4%/year of their assets. ?At present, if interest rates don?t go lower still, that will likely (60-80% likelihood) work. ?But if income needs are greater than that, the odds of obtaining those yields over the long haul go down dramatically.

3) How does a retiree deal with bear markets, particularly ones that occur early in retirement? ?Can?he and?will he reduce his expenses to reflect the losses? ?On the other side, during bull markets, will he build up a buffer, and not get incautious during seemingly good times?

This is an easy prediction to make, but after the next bear market, look for a scad of ?Our retirement is ruined articles.? ?Look for there to be hearings in Congress that don?t amount to much ? and if they?do amount to much, watch them make things worse by?creating R Bonds, or some similarly bad idea.

Academic risk models typically used by financial planners typically don?t do path-dependent analyses.? The odds of a ruinous situation is far higher than most models estimate because of the need for withdrawals and the autocorrelated nature of returns ? good returns begets good, and bad returns beget bad in the intermediate term.? The odds of at least one large bad streak of returns on risky assets during retirement is high, and few retirees will build up a buffer of slack assets to prepare for that.

4)?Retirees should avoid investing in too many income vehicles; the easiest temptation to give into is to stretch for yield ? it?is the oldest scam in the books. ?This applies to dividend paying common stocks, and stock-like investments like REITs, MLPs, BDCs, etc. ?They have no guaranteed return of principal. ?On the plus side, they may give capital gains if bought at the right time, when they are out of favor, and reducing exposure when everyone is buying them.? Negatively, all junior debt tends to return worse on average than senior debts.? It is the same for equity-like investments used for income investing.

Another easy prediction to make is that junk bonds and non-bond income vehicles will be a large contributor to the shortfall in asset return in the next bear market, because many people are buying them as if they are magic. ?The naive buyers think: all they do is provide a higher income, and there is no increased risk of capital loss.

5) Leaving retirement behind for a moment, consider the asset accumulation process.? Compounding is trickier than it may seem. ?Assets must be selected that will grow their value including dividend payments over a reasonable time horizon, corresponding to a market cycle or so (4-8 years). ?Growth in value should be in excess of that from expanding stock market multiples or falling interest rates, because you want to compound in the future, and low interest rates and high stock market multiples imply that future compounding opportunities are lower.

Thus, in one sense, there is no benefit much from a general rise in values from the stock or bond markets. ?The value of a portfolio may have risen, but at the cost of lower future opportunities. ?This is more ironclad in the bond market, where the cash flow streams are fixed. ?With stocks and other risky investments, there may be some ways to do better.

Retirees should be aware that the actions taken by one member of a large cohort of retirees will be taken by many of them.? This makes risk control more difficult, because many of the assets and services that one would like to buy get bid up because they are scarce.? Often it may be that those that act earliest will do best, and those arriving last will do worst, but that is common to investing in many circumstances.? As Buffett has said, ?What a?wise man?does in the beginning a?fool?does in the?end.?

6) Retirement investors should avoid taking too much?or too little risk. It?s psychologically difficult to buy risk assets when things seem horrible, or sell when everyone else is carefree. ?If a person can do that successfully, he is rare.

What is achievable by many is to maintain a constant risk posture. ?Don?t panic; don?t get greedy ? stick to a moderate asset allocation through the cycles of the markets.

7) With asset allocation, retirees should overweight out-of-favor asset classes that offer above average cashflow yields. ?Estimates on these can be found at GMO or?Research Affiliates. ?They should rebalance into new asset classes when they become cheap.

Another way retirees can succeed would be investing in growth at a reasonable price ? stocks that offer capital growth opportunities at an inexpensive price and a margin of safety. ?These companies or assets need to have large opportunities in front of them that they can reinvest their free cash flow into. ?This is harder to do than it looks. ?More companies look promising and do not perform well than those that do perform well.

Yet another way to enhance returns is value investing: find undervalued companies with a margin of safety that have potential to recover when conditions normalize, or find companies that can convert their resources to a better use that have the willingness to do that. ?After the companies do well, reinvest in new possibilities that have better appreciation potential.

8 ) Many say that the first rule of markets is to avoid losses. ?Here are some methods to remember:

Always seek a margin of safety. ?Look for valuable assets well in excess of debts, governed by the rule of law, and purchased at a bargain price.
For assets that have fallen in price, don?t try to time the bottom ? buy the asset when it rises above its 200-day moving average. This can limit risk, potentially buying when the worst is truly past.
Conservative investors avoid the areas where the hot money is buying and own assets being acquired by patient investors.

9) As assets shrink, what should be liquidated? ?Asset allocation is more difficult than it is described in the textbooks, or in the syllabuses for the CFA Institute or for CFPs.? It is a blend of two things ? when does the investor need the money, and what asset classes offer decent risk adjusted returns looking forward?? The best strategy is forward-looking, and liquidates what has the lowest risk-adjusted future return. ?What is easy is selling assets off from everything proportionally, taking account of tax issues where needed.

Here?s another strategy that?s gotten a little attention lately: stocks are longer assets than bonds, so use bonds to pay for your spending in the early years of your retirement, and initially don?t sell the stocks.? Once the bonds run out, then start selling stocks if the dividend income isn?t enough to live on.

This idea is weak.? If a person followed this in 1997 with a 10-year horizon, their stocks would be worth less in 2008-9, even if they rocket back out to 2014.

Remember again:

You don?t benefit much from a general rise in values from the stock or bond markets. ?The value of your portfolio may have risen, but at the cost of lower future opportunities.

That goes double in the distribution phase. The objective is to convert assets into a stream of income. ?If interest rates are low, as they are now, safe income will be low. ?The same applies to stocks (and things like them) trading at high multiples regardless of what dividends they pay.

Don?t look at current income. ?Look instead at the underlying economics of the business, and how it grows value. ?It is far better to have a growing income stream than a high income stream with low growth potential.

Deciding what to sell is an exercise in asset-liability management.? Keep the assets that offer the best return over the period that they are there to fund future expenses.

10) Will Social Security take a hit out around 2026? ?One interpretation of the law says that once the trust fund gets down to one year?s worth of?payments, future payments may get reduced to the level?sustainable by expected future contributions, which is 73% of expected levels. ?Expect a political firestorm if this becomes a live issue, say for the 2024 Presidential election. ?There will be a bloc of voters to oppose leaving benefits unchanged by increasing Social Security taxes.

Even if benefits last at projected levels longer than 2026, the risk remains that there will be some compromise in the future that might reduce benefits because taxes will not be raised.? This is not as secure as a government bond.

11) Be wary of inflation, but don?t overdo it. ?The retirement of so many people may be deflationary ? after all, look at Japan and Europe so far. ?Economies also work better when there is net growth in the number of workers. ?It will be tempting for policymakers to shrink what liabilities they can shrink through inflation, but there will also be a bloc of voters to oppose that.

Also consider other risks, and how assets may fare. ?Retirees should analyze what exposure they have to:

Deflation and a credit crisis
Expropriation
Regulatory change
Trade wars
Changes in taxes
Asset illiquidity
Reductions in reimbursement from government programs like Medicare, Medicaid, etc.
And more?

12) Retirees need a defender of two against slick guys who will try to cheat them when they are older. ?Those who have assets are a prime target for scams. ?Most of these come dressed in suits: brokers and other investment salesmen with plausible ways to make assets stretch further. ?But there are other scams as well ? retirees should run everything significant past a smart younger person who is skeptical, and knows how to say no when it is necessary.

Conclusion

Some will think this is unduly dour, but this?is realistic. ?There are not enough resources to give all of the Baby Boomers a lush retirement, without unduly harming younger age cohorts, and this is true over most of the developed world, not just the US.

Even with skilled advisers helping, retirees need to be ready for the hard choices that will come up. They should think through them earlier rather than later, and take some actions that will lower future risks.

The basic idea of retirement investing is how to convert present excess income into a robust income stream in retirement. ?Managing a pile of assets for income to live off of is a challenge, and one that most people?are not geared up for, because poor planning and emotional decisions lead to subpar results.

Retirees should?aim for the best future investment opportunities with a margin of safety, and let the retirement income take care of itself. ?After all, they can?t rely on the markets or the policymakers to make income opportunities easy.

Book Review: Win by not Losing

Posted on 2 November 2013 by David Merkel

Just follow my methods and you will make money. Yes, it is another one of *those* books.? Most of them are not worth your money.? This one might be worth it, but let me give you my misgivings.

The book warms up slowly, because it spends most of its early time destroying other ideas, without introducing their main ideas.? For example, it spends time destroying:

Gains in the market come slowly and steadily.? Correct, that’s wrong.? As my readers should know, market returns are lumpy. [Note to readers at Amazon, there are links at my blog that explain these concepts in greater detail.]
Modern Portfolio Theory.? Again, no argument here, it is not a good explanation as to how the market works.
Volatility isn’t risk; risk is the potential to lose.? Again right.
Diversification among risky assets does not provide much risk reduction.? Again right.
Most mutual funds miss out on the ability to limit risk, because they forbid market timing.? Here I differ.? Aside from funds that aim to time the markets, the asset allocation decision is not in the hands of the managers, but the shareholders, who must them selves decide how much stocks to hold.

This leads to their main hypothesis, that people have been duped into buy & hold investing, when they could make a lot more money if they only invested when conditions are favorable.

There are two problems with this: 1) how can you tell when times are favorable or not?? I use the credit cycle, and estimates of what various asset classes are likely to return if they were private businesses, but not everyone can follow that.? They give their simplified version, which is a moving average crossover method.? Buy when stocks are above the moving average.? Sell when they are below.? Simple, huh?

Yes, simple, and that brings up problem 2.? If a lot of people began managing money in a way like this, the market would become more volatile.? At moving average crossovers, people would rush to buy and sell as groups.? Some would shorten their moving average formula to get a jump on others.? Any risk control method, if used by many will cease to work well.

Other Difficulties

Though it is not a major aspect of their book, and it comes toward the end, part of the goal of the book is to interest people in purchasing their newsletter and/or money management services.
At times, buy and hold investing is the optimal way to go for an era.? Also, not holding assets for a long time limits the ability to limit taxes, and compound really large gains.? My mother and my father-in-law, amateur investors both, limited their taxes on their investing largely through buying and holding quality stocks over decades.? (The authors do advise that their strategy is best done in a tax-deferred account.)
At one point the book insists that the Capital Asset Pricing Model [CAPM] implies that the equity risk premium is constant.? Sorry, but that’s not true.? Many financial planners act as if it is true.? What is true is that it is challenging to estimate the varying equity risk premium.? Value investors have their own way of doing it, but it boils down to: “I’m not seeing many attractive opportunities to deploy capital.”
On page 116, they make too much out of how households have too much money in cash as a fraction of their assets near market bottoms.? The amount of cash may vary some — in general at market bottoms, institutions hold relatively more stock, but the main reason for the increased percentage invested in cash is simply the fall in prices for risky assets.? Aside from IPOs, mergers for cash, acquisitions for cash, money doesn’t enter & exit the market.? Market prices reflect the willing of marginal buyers and sellers to trade cash for stock, and vice-versa.? In aggregate, nothing changes except the price.
They criticize the Facebook IPO as one where sellers knew things would get worse, and so they sold, delivering losses to buyers.? But Facebook stock is considerably higher now than the IPO price.? Those that took the losses from the IPO didn’t wait long enough.
Page 150 — it took a longer time after 1980 before 401(k)s began replacing Defined Benefit pensions plans in any major way.? Congress passed several pieces of legislation in the late 80s which made sponsoring a DB plan less attractive; that’s when the changes started in earnest.
Page 171 — there were many in the insurance industry that remembered being burned on Collateralized Debt Obligations [CDOs] 1998-2002.? It was a common insight that CDOs were weak assets, and underpriced among insurers.? A new class of buyers got skinned in 2008, particularly banks and hedge funds.
Page 180 — there were many firms that anticipated the fall in subprime lending.? I worked for one of them.? I wrote an article about it for RealMoney.com in late 2006.? It took a lot of courage to take action on the “Big Short,” and not many did.
The book dabbles on many topics, showing a superficial understanding of many ideas/events in order to show they one should not buy & hold.? The book plods for 80%+ of its pages developing what fails, and spends less than 20% of its time giving what one ought to do.? Their strategy takes up ~40 pages of a ~240 page book.

All that said, is the strategy a reasonable one?? Probably yes, but not if a lot of people adopt it.? Advanced amateur investors could implement the ideas of the book easily, those with less experience would need help to do it, and the authors offer that help, much of it free, and more for a fee.

Quibbles

Already expressed.? I’ll stick with value investing; I’d rather have a lumpy 15% than a smooth 12%.? This book could have been better if it focused on its positive strategy, fleshed it out more, so that average amateurs would have had a clearer direction on what to do.

Who would benefit from this book: If you don’t have an investing strategy and you want one, this book may benefit you.? I have read far worse strategies in many books.? If you want to, you can buy it here: Win By Not Losing: A Disciplined Approach to Building and Protecting Your Wealth in the Stock Market by Managing Your Risk.

Full disclosure: The publisher sent me the book after asking me if I wanted it.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, I get a small commission.? This is my main source of blog revenue.? I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip.? Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book.? Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website.? Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites.? Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Catching up on Blog Comments

Posted on 18 December 2009 by David Merkel

Before I start, I would like to toss out the idea of an Aleph Blog Lunch to be hosted sometime in January 2010 @ 1PM, somewhere between DC and Baltimore.? Everyone pays for their own lunch, but I would bring along the review copies of many of the books that I have reviewed for attendees to take home, first come, first served.? Maybe Eddy at Crossing Wall Street would like to join in, or Accrued Interest. If you are an active economic/financial blogger in the DC/Baltimore Area, who knows, maybe we could have a panel discussion, or something else.?? Just tossing out the idea, but if you think you would like to come, send me an e-mail.

Onto the comments.? I try to keep up with comments and e-mails, but I am forever falling behind.? Here is a sampling of comments that I wanted to give responses on.? Sorry if I did not pick yours.

=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=–==-=–==-

Blog comments are in italics, my comments are in regular type.

http://alephblog.com/2009/12/16/notes-on-fed-policy-and-financial-regulation/#comments

Spot on David. I often think about the path of the exits strategy the fed may take. In order, how may it look? What comes first what comes last? Clearly this world is addicted to guarantees on everything, zirp, and fed QE policy which is building a very dangerous US dollar carry trade.

Back to the original point, I would think the order of exit may look something like:

1. First they will slowly remove emergency credit facilities, starting with those of least interest, which were aggressively used to curb the debt deflationary crisis on our banking system. The added liquidity kept our system afloat and avoided systemic collapse that would have brought a much more painful shock to the global financial system. Lehman Brothers was a mini-atom bomb test that showed the fed and gov?t would could happen ? seeing that result all but solidified the ?too big to fail? mantra.

2. Second, they will be forced to raise rates ? that?s right folks, 0% ? 0.25% fed funds rates is getting closer and closer to being a hindsight policy. However, I still think rates stay low until early 2010 or unemployment proves to be stabilizing. As rates rise, watch gold for a move up on perceived future inflationary pressures.

3. Third, they can sell securities to primary dealers via POMO at the NY Fed, thereby draining liquidity from excess reserves. I think this will be a solid part of their exit strategy down the road ? perhaps later in 2010 or early 2011. As of now, some $760Bln is being hoarded in excess reserves by depository institutions. That number will likely come way down once this process starts. The question is, will banks rush to lend money that was hoarded rather then be drained of freshly minted dollars from the debt monetization experiment. For now, this money is being hoarded to absorb future loan losses, cushion capital ratios and take advantage of the fed?s paid interest on excess reserves ? the banks choose to hoard rather then aggressively lend to a deteriorating quality of consumer/business amid a rising unemployment environment. This is a good move by the banks as the political cries for more lending grow louder. The last thing we need is for banks to willy-nilly lend to struggling borrowers that will only prolong the pain by later on.

4. And finally, as a final and more aggressive measure, we could see capital or reserve requirements tightened on banks to hold back aggressive lending that may cause inflationary pressures and money velocity to surge. Right now, banks must retain 10% of deposits as reserves and maintain capital ratios set by regulators. Either can be tweaked to curb lending and prevent $700bln+ from entering the economy and being multiplied by our fractional reserve system.

I think we are starting to see #1 now, in some form, and will start to see the rest around the middle of 2010 and into 2011. The last item might not come until end of 2011 or even 2012 when economy is proven to be on right track and unemployment is clearly declining as companies rehire.

Thoughts????

UD, I think you have the Fed’s Order of Battle right.? The questions will come from:

1) how much of the quantitative easing can be withdrawn without negatively affecting banks, or mortgage yields.

2) How much they can raise Fed Funds without something blowing up.? Bank profits have become very reliant on low short term funding.? I wonder who else relies on short-term finance to hold speculative positions today?

3) Finance reform to me would include bank capital reform, including changes to reflect securitization and derivatives, both of which should require capital at least as great as doing the equivalent transaction through non-derivative instruments.

http://alephblog.com/2009/12/15/book-reviews-of-two-very-different-books/#comments

David,
A few years back you mentioned to me in an e-mail that Fabozzi was a good source for understanding bonds (thank you for that advice by the way, he is a very accessible author for what can be very complex material.)? In the review of Domash’s book you mention that he does not do a good job with financials. I was wondering, is there an author who is as accessible and clear as Fabozzi, when it comes to financials, who you would recommend.

Regards,
TDL

TDL, no, I have not run across a good book for analyzing financial stocks.? Most of the specialist shops like KBW, Sandler O?Neill and Hovde have their own proprietary ways of analyzing financials.? I have summarized the main ideas in this article here.

http://alephblog.com/2007/04/28/why-financial-stocks-are-harder-to-analyze/

http://alephblog.com/2009/12/05/the-return-of-my-money-not-the-return-on-my-money/#comments

Sorry to be a bit late to this post, but I really like this thread (bond investing with particular regard to sovereign risk). One thing I’m trying to figure out is the set of tools an individual investor needs to invest in bonds globally. In comparison to the US equities market, for which there are countless platforms, data feeds, blogs, etc., I am having trouble finding good sources of analysis, pricing, and access to product for international bonds, so here is my vote for a primer on selecting, pricing, and purchasing international bonds.

K1, there aren?t many choices to the average investor, which I why I have a post in the works on foreign and global bond funds.? There aren?t a lot of good choices that are cheap.? It is expensive to diversify out of the US dollar and maintain significant liquidity.

A couple of suggested topics that I think you could do a job with:? 1) Quantitative view of how to evaluate closed end funds trading at a discount to NAV with a given NAV and discount history, fee/cost structure, and dividend history;?? 2) How to evaluate the fundamentals of the return of capital distributions from MLPs – e.g. what fraction of them is true dividend and what fraction is true return of capital and how should one arrive at a reasonable profile of the future to put a DCF value on it?

Josh, I think I can do #1, but I don?t understand enough about #2.? I?m adding #1 to my list.

http://alephblog.com/2009/12/05/book-review-the-ten-roads-to-riches/#comments

I see that Fisher’s list reveals his blind spot–how about being born the child of wealthy parents. . .

BWDIK, Fisher is talking about ?roads? to riches.? None of us can get on that ?road? unless a wealthy person decided to adopt one of us.? And, that is his road #3, attach yourself to a wealthy person and do his bidding.

I am not a Ken Fisher fan, but I am a David merkel fan—so what was the advice he gave you in 2000?

Jay, what he told me was to throw away all of my models, including the CFA Syllabus, and strike out on my own, analyzing companies in ways that other people do not.? Find my competitive advantage and pursue it.

That led me to analyzing industries first, buying quality companies in industries in a cyclical slump, and the rest of my eight rules.

http://alephblog.com/2009/11/28/the-right-reform-for-the-fed/#comments

“The Fed has been anything but independent.? An independent Fed would have said that they have to preserve the value of the dollar, and refused to do any bailouts.”

This seems completely wrong to me.? First, the Fed’s mandate is not to preserve the value of the dollar, but to “”to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”? I don’t see that bailouts are antithetical to those goals. Second, I don’t see how the Fed’s actions in 2008-2009 have particularly hurt the value of the dollar, at least not in terms of purchasing power.? Perhaps they will in the future, but it is a bit early to assert that, I think.

Matt, even in their mandates for full employment and stable prices, the Fed should have no mandate to do bailouts, and sacrifice the credit of the nation for special interests.? No one should have special privileges, whether the seeming effect of purchasing power has diminished or not.? It is monetary and credit inflation, even if it does not result in price inflation.

?Make the Fed tighten policy when Debt/GDP goes above 200%.? We?re over 350% on that ratio now.? We need to save to bring down debt.?

David, I fully agree (as with your other points).
However, I do not see it happening.

Why would we save when others electronically ?print? money to buy our debt?

See todays Bloomberg News:
?Indirect bidders, a group of investors that includes foreign central banks, purchased 45 percent of the $1.917 trillion in U.S. notes and bonds sold this year through Nov. 25, compared with 29 percent a year ago, according to Fed auction data compiled by Bloomberg News.?

Please note that last year the amount auctioned was much lower (so foreign central banks bought a much lower percentage of a much lower total).

Please also note that all of a sudden, earlier this year, the definition of ?indirect bidders? was changed, making it more complicated to follow this stuff. What is clear however, is that almost half of the incredible amount of $ 2 trillion, i.e. $ 1000 billion (!!), is being ?purchased? by the printing presses of foreign central banks.

This could explain both the record amount of debt issued and the record low yields.

As the CBO has projected huge deficits PLUS huge debt roll-overs (average maturity down from 7 years to 4 years) up to at least 2019, do you think we could extend the ?printing? by foreign central banks? — CB?s ?buying? each others debt — for at least 10 more years?
That would free us from saving, enabling us to ?consume? our way to reflation of the economy (as is FEDs/Treasuries attempt imo).

I?d appreciate your, and other readers?, take on this.

Carol, you are right.? I don?t see a limitation on Debt to GDP happening.

As to nations rolling over each other?s debts for 10 more years, I find that unlikely.? There will be a reason at some point to game the system on the part of those that are worst off on a cash flow basis to default.

The rollover problem for the US Treasury will get pretty severe by the mid-2010s.

http://alephblog.com/2009/11/13/the-forever-fund/#comments

Any chance of you doing portfolio updates going forward? I?d be curious to see if you still like investment grade fixed incomes, given the rally.

Matt, I would be underweighting investment grade and high yield credit at present.

As for railroads, I own Canadian National ? unlike US railroads, it goes coast to coast, and slowly they are picking up more business in the US as well.

Long CNI

http://alephblog.com/2009/11/10/my-visit-to-the-us-treasury-part-7-final/#comments

Did none of the bloggers raise the question of the GSEs? I can understand Treasury not wishing to tip their hands as to their future, but I would have expected their status to be a hot topic among the bloggers.

I also don?t buy the idea that the sufferings of the middle class were inevitable. Over the past 15 or so years the financial sector has grown due to the vast amount of money that it has been able to extract. Where would we be if all of those bright hard working people and capital spending had gone to the real economy? I?m not suggesting a command economy, but senior policymakers decided to let leverage and risk run to dangerous levels. Your comment seem to indicate that this was simply the landscape of the world, but it seems more to be the product of a deliberate policy from the Federal government.

Chris, no, nothing on the GSEs.? There was a lot to talk about, and little time.

I believe there have been policy errors made by our government ? one the biggest being favoring debt finance over equity finance, but most bad policies of our government stem from a short-sighted culture that elects those that govern us.? That same short-sightedness has helped make us less competitive as a nation versus the rest of the world.? We rob the future to fund the present.

http://alephblog.com/2009/11/07/my-visit-to-the-us-treasury-part-6/#comments

it?s not clear from your writing whether the treasury officials talked to you about the GSEs or whether your comments (in the paragraph beginning with ?When I look at the bailouts,?) are your own. could you clarify?

q, That is my view of how the Treasury seems to be using the GSEs, based on what they are doing, not what they have said.

http://alephblog.com/2009/10/31/book-review-nerds-on-wall-street/

?There are a lot of losses to be taken by those who think they have discovered a statistical regularity in the financial markets.?
David, take a look at equilcurrency.com.

Jesse, I looked at it, it seems rather fanciful.

http://alephblog.com/2009/10/27/book-review-the-predictioneers-game/#comments

David,
Just wondering if there?s an omission in this line:

?The last will pay for the book on its own. I have used the technique twice before, and it works. That said, that I have used it twice before means it is not unique to the author.?

Did you mean to write ?that I have used it doesn?t mean it is not unique?.?

In the event it is, I?ll look it up in the book, which I intend to buy anyway.
Otherwise, may I request a post that details, a la your used car post,your approach to buying new cars?

Saloner, no omission.? I said what I meant.? I?ll try to put together a post on new car purchases.

http://alephblog.com/2009/10/22/book-review-the-bogleheads-guide-to-retirement-planning/

thanks for the book review. it sounds like something that i could use to get the conversation started with my wife as she is generally smart but has little tolerance for this sort of thing.

> unhedged foreign bonds are a core part of asset allocation

i agree in principle ? it would be really helpful though to have a roadmap for this. how can i know what is what?

I second that request for help in accessing unhedged foreign bonds ? Maybe a post topic?

JK, q, I?ll try to get a post out on this.

http://alephblog.com/2009/10/20/toward-a-new-theory-of-the-cost-of-equity-capital-part-2/#comments

to the point above, basically just an IRR right?

JRH, I don?t think it is the IRR.? The IRR is a measure of the return off of the assets, not a rate for the discount of the asset cash flows.

When I was an undergraduate (after already having been in business for a long time), I realized that M-M was erroneous, because of all the things they CP?d (ceteris paribus) away. For my own consumption, I went a long way to demonstrating that quantitatively, but children, work and family intervened, and who was I to argue with Nobel winners.

But time, experience and events convince me that I was right then and you are right now. As you?ve noted the market does not price risk well. In large part this is due to a fundamental misunderstanding of value. The professional appraisal community has a far better handle on this, exemplified by drawing the formal distinction between ?fair market value as a going concern?, ?investment value?, ?fair market value in a orderly liquidation?, ?fair market value in a forced liquidation? and so on. One corollary to the foregoing is one of those lessons that stick from sit-down education, that ?Book Value? is not a standard of value but rather a mathematical identity.

Without going into a long involved academic tome, the cost of capital (and from which results the mathematical determination of value per the income approach) has a shape more approaching that of a an asymmetric parabola (if one graphs return on the y axis and equity debt weight on the x.).

If I was coming up with a new theorem, risk would be an independent variable. So for example:

WAAC = wgt avg cost of equity + wgt avg cost of debt + risk premium

You?ll note the difference that in standard WAAC formulation risk is a component of the both the equity and debt variable ? and practically impossible to consistently and logically quantify. Yes, one can look to Ibbottson for historical risk premia, or leave one to the individual decision making of lenders, butt it complicates and obscures the analysis.

In the formulation above, cost of equity and cost of debt are very straightforward and can be drawn from readily available market metrics. But what does risk look like? Again if you plot risk as a % cost of capital on the y axis and on the x axis the increasing debt weight, on a absolute basis risk is lowest @ 100% equity. From there is upwards slopes. However, risk however is not linear, but rather follows a power law.

The reason risk follows a power law is that while equity is prepared to lose 100%, debt is not. Also, debt weight increases IRR to equity (in the real world) contrary to MM. Again, debt is never priced well, because issuers don?t understand orderly and forced liquidation, whereby in ?orderly?, e.g. say Chapter 11,recoveries may be 80 cents on the dollar, and forced, e.g., Chapter 7, 10 cents on the dollar. One really doesn?t begin to understand the foregoing until you?ve been through it more than a few times.

So in the real world, as debt increases, equity is far more easily ?playing with house money.? A recent poster child for this phenomena is the Simmons Mattress story. In the most recent go round equity was pulling cash out (playing with house money) and the bankers were either (depending on one?s POV) incredibly stupid for letting equity do so, or incredibly smart, because they got their fees and left someone else holding the bag. I?m seen some commentators say that ?Oh it was OK because rates were so low, the debt service (the I component only) was manageable.? Poppycock; sometime it?s the dollar value and sometimes it?s the percentage weight and sometimes it is both.

But you?ve already said that: ?company specific risk is significant and varies a great deal.? I would also add that ? or amplify ? that in any appraisal assignment the first thing that must be set is the appraisal date. Everything drives off that and what is ?known or knowable? at the time.

Gaffer, thanks for your comments.? I appreciate the time and efforts you put into them.? This is an area where finance theory needs to change.

http://alephblog.com/2009/10/10/pension-apprehension/

I have a DB plan with Safeway Stores-UFCW, which I?ve been collecting for a few years. I?m cooked?

Craig, not necessarily.? Ask for the form 5500, and see how underfunded the firm is.? Safeway is a solid firm, in my opinion.

Long SWY

http://alephblog.com/2009/09/29/recent-portfolio-actions/#comments

David, I am curious about your rebalancing threshold. Do you calculate this 20% threshold using a formula like this:

= Target Size / Current Size ? 1

I have a small portfolio of twenty securities. A full position size in the portfolio is 8% (position size would be 1 for an 8% holding). The position size targets are based generally on .25 increments (so a position target of .25 is 2% of the portfolio and there are 12.5 slots ?available?). I used that formula above for a while, but I found that it was biased towards smaller positions.

Instead I began using this formula:

= (Target ? Current Size) / .25

So a .50 sized holding and a full sized holding may have both been 2% below the target (using the first formula), but using the second formula, they would be 8% and 16% below the target respectively. I found this showed me the true deviation from the portfolio target size and put my holdings on an equal footing for rebalancing.

I was curious how you calculated your threshold, or if it was less of an issue because you tended to have full sized positions. For me, I tend to start small and build positions over time. There are certain positions I hold that I know will stay in the .25-.50 range because they either carry more risk, they are funds/ETFs, or they are paired with a similar holding that together give me the weight I want in a particular sector.

Brian, you have my calculations right.? I originally backed into the figure because concentrated funds run with between 16-40 names.? Since I concentrate in industries, I have to run with more names for diversification.? I don?t scale, typically, though occasionally I have double weights, and rarely, triple weights.? The 20% band was borrowed from three asset managers that I admire.? After some thought, I did some work calculating the threshold in my Kelly criterion piece.

A fuller explanation of the rebalancing process is here in my smarter seller pieces.

http://alephblog.com/2009/09/04/tickers-for-the-latest-portfolio-reshaping/

Have you seen DEG instead of SWY?
Extremely able operator. Some currency diversification as well. I?d like to know your thougts.

MLS, I don?t have a strong idea about DEG ? I know that back earlier in the decade, they had their share of execution issues.? It does look cheaper than SWY, though.

Long SWY

http://alephblog.com/2009/06/11/problems-with-constant-compound-interest-2/

I like your post and want to comment on a couple of items.? You point to the peak of the 1980’s inflation rates and the associated interest rates.

Robert Samuelson wrote a book called The Great Inflation and it’s Aftermath.?? http://tiny.cc/z9H9V

Basically you can explain a great deal the US stock market history of the 40 years by the spike in interest/inflation until the mid 80’s and the subsequent decline.? Since you need an interest rate to value any cash flow, the decline in interest rates made all cash flows more valuable.

The thing that is odd and sort of ties this together is the last year.? After interest rates crossed the 4% level things started blowing up.? The amount of debt that can be financed at 3% to 4% is enormous.? That is, as everyone knows, on of the root causes of the housing bubble.? Anyway, starting last year, treasury interest rates continued to decline and all other rates went through the roof.

I was looking at this chart yesterday.? _ http://tiny.cc/eCZzF The interesting thing to me was that when the system blew up, treasury rates continued to decline and all non guaranteed debt rates went through the roof.

Most of this is obvious and everyone knows the reasons.? The one thing that seems novel is thinking of this as the continuation of a very long secular trend — or secular cycle.? I don’t want to get overly political, but the decrease in inflation/interest in the 90’s to the present was a function of productivity/technology and Foreign/Chinese imports.? Anyway, one effect of these policies was a huge rise in asset values, especially in the FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate) sector of the economy at the expense of our industrial and manufacturing sectors.? This was also a redistribution of wealth from the rust belt to the coasts.

It is much more complicated then the hand full of influences I mentioned, but the one thing i haven’t seen discussed a lot is the connection of the current catastrophe to the long term decline in inflation/interest rates since the mid/late 1980’s.? If you think about it, declining interest rates increase the value of financial assets and are an enormous tailwind for finance.? I suppose if you had just looked at the curve, it would have been obvious that the trend couldn’t continue.? Prior to the blowup, there were lots of people financing long term assets with short term, low interest rate liabilities. That was a big part of the basic playbook for structured finance, hedge funds, etc.

The reason that the yield spread exploded is well known.? Here is a snippet from Irving Fisher.? http://capitalvandalism.blogspot.com/2009/01/deflationary-spirals.html

CapVandal ? Great comment.? A lot to learn from here.? I hope you come back to blogging; you have some good things to say.? Fear and greed drive correlated human behavior.