The Aleph Blog – Page 24 – Helping Institutions and Ordinary People Invest Better by Focusing on Risk Control

Redacted Version of the September 2017 FOMC Statement

Posted on 20 September 2017 by David Merkel

Comments

Labor conditions can?t get much better. GDP is meandering.
The yield curve is flattening, with short rates rising more than long rates.
Stocks, bonds and gold fall a little. Though the statement doesn?t say it, many conclude that tightening will continue.
I think the Fed is too optimistic about the economy. I also think that they won?t get far into letting securities mature before they resume reinvestment.

Book Review: University of Berkshire Hathaway

Posted on 8 September 2017 by David Merkel

I feel like the skunk at the party here. I have no argument with the authors, per se. They came up with their concept and executed it adequately. No one else that I know of has done a book of their notes from Berkshire Hathaway annual meetings, in this case extending over 30 years.

But the bar for writing Buffett books is low, because they sell so well. ?Many marginal concepts get written about that aren’t as good as simply reading the writings of Buffett and Munger themselves. ?This is true of this volume in two ways. 1) It is notes, not a transcript. ?Notes aren’t as good; if I want Buffett, I want him unfiltered, unless the person has a significant interpretation of an aspect of Buffett that is consistent with what Buffett has said, but brings a lot more to the table. ?This doesn’t bring much more to the table.

2) Buffett and Munger are at their best when they are prepared. ?What I found interesting going through the book was how many things Buffett and Munger got wrong hazarding guesses on the future. ?Some were in areas of expertise, most weren’t. ?The annual meeting is a lot less valuable than the things that Buffett and Munger have prepared for people to read or hear.

So, I got partway through the book, found it tedious, and scanned the rest to see if it was similar. ?It was, so I set the book aside.

Thus, I fault the publisher for this book. ?You are much better off reading Buffett and Munger directly, and you can do it for free.

Quibbles

Already stated. ?Again, I don’t fault the authors.

Summary / Who Would Benefit from this Book

You are much better off reading Buffett and Munger directly, and you can do it for free. ?If you want a feel for the annual Berkshire Hathaway meetings over time, it might be worth purchasing, but I don’t think that is a desirable goal. ?If you still want to buy it, you can buy it here: University of Berkshire Hathaway.

Full disclosure:?The publisher kind of pushed a free copy on me, after I commented that there are too many marginal Buffett books out there.

If you enter Amazon through my site, and you buy anything, including books, I get a small commission. This is my main source of blog revenue. I prefer this to a ?tip jar? because I want you to get something you want, rather than merely giving me a tip. Book reviews take time, particularly with the reading, which most book reviewers don?t do in full, and I typically do. (When I don?t, I mention that I scanned the book. Also, I never use the data that the PR flacks send out.)

Most people buying at Amazon do not enter via a referring website. Thus Amazon builds an extra 1-3% into the prices to all buyers to compensate for the commissions given to the minority that come through referring sites. Whether you buy at Amazon directly or enter via my site, your prices don?t change.

Full disclosure: long BRK-B

Book Review: Big Money Thinks Small

Posted on 6 September 2017 by David Merkel

Joel Tillinghast, one of the best mutual fund managers, runs the money in Fidelity’s Low-Priced Stock Fund. ?It has one of the best long-term records among stock funds over the 28 years that he has managed it.

The author gives you a recipe for how to pick good stocks, but he doesn’t give you a machine that produces them. ?In a style that is clever and discursive, he summarizes his main ideas at the beginning and end of the book, and explains the ideas in the middle of the book. ?The ideas are simple, but learning to apply them will take a lifetime.

Here are the five ideas as written in the beginning (page 3):

Make decisions rationally
Invest in what we know (did I mention Peter Lynch wrote the foreword to the book?)
Worth with honest and trustworthy managers
Avoid businesses prone to obsolescence and financial ruin, and?
Value stocks properly

At this point, some will say “You haven’t really given us anything! ?These ideas are too big to be useful!” ?I was surprised, though, to see that the same five points at the end of the book said more (page 276). ?Ready?

Be clear about your motives, and don’t allow emotions to guide your financial decisions
Recognize that some things can’t be understood and that you don’t understand others. ?Focus on those that you understand best.
Invest with people who are honest and trustworthy, and are doing something unique and valuable.
Favor businesses that will not be destroyed by changing times, commoditization, or excessive debt.
Above all, always look for investments that are worth a great deal more than you are paying for them.

That says more, and I think the reason they are different is that when you read through the five sections of the book, he unpacks his initial statements and becomes more definite.

Much of the book can be summarized under the idea of “margin of safety.” ?This is a type of value investing. ?When he analyzes value, it is like a simplified version of reverse discounted cash flows. ?He tries to figure out in a broad way what an investment might return in terms price paid for the investment and what “owner earnings,” that is, free cash flow, it will generate on a conservative basis.

One aspect of the conservatism that I found insightful is that he assumes that the terminal value of an investment is zero. (page 150) ?In my opinion, that is very smart, because that is the area where most discounted cash flow analyses go wrong. ?When the difference between the weighted average growth rate of free cash flow and the discount rate is small, the terminal value gets really big relative to the value of the cash lows prior to the terminal value. ?In short, assumptions like that say that the distant future is all that matters. ?That’s a tough assumption in a world where companies and industries can become obsolete.

Even though I described aspects of a mathematical calculation here, what I did was very much like the book. ?There are no equations; everything is described verbally, even the math. ?Note: that is a good exercise to see whether you understand what the math really means. ?(If more people on Wall Street did that, we might not have had the financial crisis. ?Just sayin’.)

One more fun thing about the book is that he goes trough his own experiences with a wide variety of controversial stocks from the past and his experiences with them. ?His conservatism kept him a great number of errors that tripped up other celebrated managers.

I learned a lot from this book, and I enjoyed the writing style as well. ?He clearly put a lot of effort into it; many people will benefit from his insights.

Quibbles

His methods are a lot like mine, and he clearly put a lot of thought into this book. ?That said, he doesn’t understand insurance companies as well as he thinks (I’m an actuary by training). ?There are a number of small errors there, but not enough to ruin a really good book.

Summary / Who Would Benefit from this Book

I highly recommend this book. ?This is a book that will benefit investors with moderate to high experience most. For those with less experience, it may help you, but some of the concepts require background knowledge. ?If you want to buy it, you can buy it here: Big Money Thinks Small: Biases, Blind Spots, and Smarter Investing.

Full disclosure:?The publisher asked me if I wanted a free copy and I assented.

Where Money Goes to Die

Posted on 5 September 2017 by David Merkel

==============

It is often a wise thing to look around and see where people are doing that is nuts. ?Often it is obvious in advance. ?In the past, the two most obvious were the dot-com bubble and the housing bubble. ?Today, we have two unrelated pockets of nuttiness, neither of which is as big: cryptocurrencies and shorting volatility.

I have often said that that lure of free money brings out the worst economic behavior in people. ?That goes double when people see others who they deem less competent than themselves seemingly making lots of money when they are not.

I’ve written about Bitcoin before. ?It has three main weaknesses:

No intrinsic value –?can?t be used of themselves to produce something else.
Cannot be used to settle all debts, public and private
Less secure than insured bank deposits

In an economic world where everything is relative in a sense — things only have value because people want them, some might argue that cryptocurrencies have value because some people want them. ?That’s fine, sort of. ?But how many people, and are there alternative uses that transcend exchange? ?Even in exchange, how legally broad is the economic net for required exchangability? ?Only legal tender satisfies that.

That there may be some scarcity value for some cryptocurrencies puts them in the same class as some Beanie Babies. ?At least the Beanie Babies have the alternative use for kids to play with, even though it ruins the collectibility. ?(We actually had a moderately rare one, but didn’t know it and our kids happily played with it. ?Isn’t that wonderful? ?How much is the happiness of a kid worth?)

I commented in my Bitcoin article that it was like Penny Stocks, and that’s even more true with all of the promoters touting their own little cryptocurrencies. ?The promoters get the benefit, and those who speculate early in the boom, and the losers are those fools who get there late.

There’s a decent public policy argument for delisting penny stocks with no real business behind them; things that are worth nothing are the easiest things to spin tales about. ?Remember that absurd is like infinity. ?If any positive value is absurd, so is the value at two, five, ten, and one hundred times that level.

The same idea applies to cryptocurrencies; a good argument could be made that they all should be made illegal. ?(Give China a little credit for starting to limit them.) ?It’s almost like we let any promoter set up his own Madoff-like scheme, and sell them to speculators. ?Remember, Madoff never raked off that much… but it was a negative-sum game. ?Those that exited early did well at the expense of those that bought in later.

Ultimately, most of the cryptocurrencies will go out at zero. ?Don’t say I didn’t warn you.

Shorting Volatility

This one is not as bad, at least if you don’t apply leverage. ?Many people don’t get volatility, both applied and actual. ?It spikes during panics, and reverts to a low level when things are calm. ?It seems to mean-revert, but the mean is unknown, and varies considerably across different time periods.

It is like the credit cycle in many ways. ?There are two ways to get killed playing credit. ?One is to speculate that defaults are going to happen and overdo going short credit during the bull phase. ?The other is to be a foolish yield-seeker going into the bear phase.

So it is for people waiting for volatility to spike — they die the death of one thousand cuts. ?Then there are those that are short volatility because it pays off when volatility is low. ?When the spike happens, many will skinned; most won’t recover what they put in.

It is tough to time the market, whether it is equity, equity volatility, or credit. ?Doesn’t matter much if you are a professional or amateur. ?That said, it is far better to play with simpler and cleaner investments, and adjust your risk posture between 0-100% equities, rather than cross-hedge with equity volatility products.

Again, this is one where people are very used to selling every spike in volatility. ?It has been a winning strategy so far. ?Remember that when enough people do that, the system changes, and it means in a real crisis, volatility will go higher than ever before, and stay higher longer. ?The markets abhor free riders, and disasters tend to occur in such a way that the most dumb money gets gored.

Again, when the big volatility spike hits, remember, I warned you. ?Also, for those playing long on volatility and buying protection on credit default — this has been a long credit cycle, and may go longer. ?Do you have enough wherewithal to survive a longer bull phase?

To all, I wish you well in investing. ?Just remember that new asset classes that have never been through a “failure cycle” tend to produce the greatest amounts of panic when they finally fail. ?And, all asset classes eventually go through failure.

The Crisis at the Tipping Point

Posted on 9 August 20179 August 2017 by David Merkel

Photo Credit: Fabio Tinelli Roncalli || Alas, there were so many signs that the avalanche was coming…

==================

Ten years ago, things were mostly quiet. ?The crisis was staring us in the face, with a little more than a year before the effects of growing leverage and sloppy credit underwriting would hit in full. ?But when there is a boom, almost no one wants to spoil the party. ?Yes a few bears and financial writers may do so, but they get ignored by the broader media, the politicians, the regulators, the bulls, etc.

It’s not as if there weren’t some hints before this. ?There were losses from subprime mortgages at HSBC. ?New Century was bankrupt. ?Two hedge funds at Bear Stearns, filled with some of the worst exposures to CDOs and subprime lending were wiped out.

And, for those watching the subprime lending markets the losses had been rising since late 2006. ?I was following it for a firm that was considering doing the “big short” but could not figure out an effective way to do it in a way consistent with the culture and personnel of the firm. ?We had discussions with a number of investment banks, and it seemed obvious that those on the short side of the trade would eventually win. ?I even wrote an article on it at RealMoney in November 2006, but it is lost in the bowels of theStreet.com’s file system.

Some of the building blocks of the crisis were evident then:

European banks in search of any AAA-rated structured product bonds that had spreads over LIBOR. ?They were even engaged in a variety of leverage schemes including leveraged AAA CMBS, and CPDOs. ?When you don’t have to put up any capital against AAA assets, it is astounding the lengths that market players will go through to create and swallow such assets. ?The European bank yield hogs were a main facilitator of the crisis that was to come, followed by the investment banks, and bullish mortgage hedge funds. ?As Gary Gorton would later point out, real disasters happen when safe assets fail.
Speculation was rampant almost everywhere. (not just subprime)
Regulators were unwilling to clamp down on bad underwriting, and they had the power to do so, but were unwilling, as banks could choose their regulators, and the Fed didn’t care, and may have actively inhibited scrutiny.
Not only were subprime loans low in credit quality, but they had a second embedded risk in them, as they had a reset date where the interest rate would rise dramatically, that made the loans far shorter than the houses that they financed, meaning that the loans would disproportionately default near their reset dates.
The illiquidity of the securitized Subprime Residential Mortgage ABS highlighted the slowness of pricing signals, as matrix pricing was slow to pick up the decay in value, given the sparseness of trades.
By August 2007, it was obvious that residential real estate prices were falling across the US. ?(I flagged the peak at RealMoney in October 2005, but this also is lost…)
Amid all of this, the “big short” was not a sure thing as those that entered into it had to feed the trade before it succeeded. ?For many, if the crisis had delayed one more year, many taking on the “big short” would have lost.
A variety of levered market-neutral equity hedge funds were running into trouble in August 2007 as they all pursued similar Value plus Momentum strategies, and as some fund liquidated, a self reinforcing panic ensued.
Fannie and Freddie were too levered, and could not survive a continued fall in housing prices. ?Same for AIG, and most investment banks.
Jumbo lending, Alt-A lending and traditional mortgage lending had the same problems as subprime, just in a smaller way — but there was so much more of them.
Oh, and don’t forget hidden leverage at the banks through ABCP conduits that were off balance sheet.
Dare we mention the Fed inverting the yield curve?

So by the time that BNP Paribas announced that three of their funds that bought?Subprime Residential Mortgage ABS had pricing issues, and briefly closed off redemptions, and Countrywide announced that it had to “shore up its funding,” there were many things in play that would eventually lead to the crisis that happened.

Some of us saw it in part, and hoped that things would be better. ?Fewer of us saw a lot of it, and took modest actions for protection. ?I was in that bucket; I never thought it would be as large as it turned out. ?Almost no one saw the whole thing coming, and those that did could not dream of the response of the central banks that would take much of the losses out of the pockets of savers, leaving bad lending institutions intact.

All in all, the crisis had a lot of red lights flashing in advance of its occurrence. ?Though many things have been repaired, there are a lot of people whose lives were practically ruined by their own greed, and the greed of others. ?It’s a sad story, but one that will hopefully make us more careful in the future when private leverage rises, creating an asset bubble.

But if I know mankind, the lesson will not be learned.

PS — this is what I wrote one decade ago. ?You can see what I knew at the time — a lot of the above, but could not see how bad it would be.

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 33

Posted on 8 August 2017 by David Merkel

In my view, these were my best posts written between February 2015 and April 2015:

One Dozen Reasons Why the Average Person Underperforms In Investing, Part 1

One Dozen Reasons Why the Average Person Underperforms In Investing, Part 2

Most of this boils down to chasing past performance, neglecting fundamentals, and neglecting basic risk control.

Learning from the Past, Part 4

Learning from the Past, Part 5a [Institutional Bond Version]

In this series, I disclose my WORST investing mistakes ever. ?Personal errors: cellular auctions, mistiming small cap value, and small deal arbitrage. ?Professional error:?Manufactured Housing Asset Backed Securities ? Mezzanine and Subordinated Certificates.

Smell the burning money!

The ?Secret? of Berkshire Hathaway

You can’t imitate what they do, because you would have to tear up everything you are doing now.

One Potential Weakness of Berkshire Hathaway

Reserving is weakening, new places to find float are few, and if policy on asbsetos settlements changed, BRK could be in a world of hurt.

From Stream to Shining Stream

How a stream of excess income during working years becomes a stream of income in retirement years. ?It’s harder to do than you might expect. ?Includes a list of strategies and pitfalls.

2000 More Points To Go; Look Elsewhere!

Even today, the NASDAQ Composite still hasn’t hit an inflation adjusted high.

On Bitcoin

I feel stronger about this than when I originally wrote this. ?Bitcoin and the other cryptocurrencies are just a speculative crapshoot, and the attempt to have a currency without the legal structure of a government will fail, unless it is a commodity like gold. ?Also, the blockchain is an overrated resource hog that lacks the flexibility possessed by life insurance company policy management systems.

On Negative Interest Rates

Explains why they exist, and what dangers could come from them.

An Idea Whose Time Should Not Come

Financial complexity should usually be avoided, particularly with financial guaranty schemes.

We Don?t Need To Be Able To Short Private Companies

Like the prior article, there are people with too much time on their hands thinking up nutty and useless ideas. ?There is enough risk in the world already; we don’t have to add to it.

The Bond Market Tells The Fed What To Do, Not Vice-Versa

Sometimes we forget that the collective lending and borrowing decisions of the US bond market are more powerful than the Fed.

Index Investing is not Inherently Socialistic

I think active managers have to grow up and accept that passive investing isn’t evil; it just cuts against the economic interests of active managers like me, at least for now. ?When it gets really big, the paradigm will shift…

On Being A Forced Seller in a Panic

Very few people want to panic, and fewer want to sell at the bottom — but many do just that. ?How can you avoid it?

Why Life Insurers, Defined Benefit Plans, and Endowments Invest Differently

How investing differs for investors that have different types of long-duration liabilities to fund.

Fade High Price-Sensitivity Assets in Crude Oil

A short and lonely post where I told you in advance that crude oil would hang around $50/barrel “for a few years.” ?And, my reasoning was on target as well.

Simple Stuff: On Bid-Ask Spreads

Do you have basic concepts that you want to have explained? ?Shoot me an email, and if I think enough people would be interested, I will do it.

Why is the Stock Market So High?

Posted on 5 August 20176 August 2017 by David Merkel

Photo Credit: Carl Wycoff || It is a long way to the end of retirement. ?People are getting ready for it. ?Are you?

==========================

Assuming that you could throw stones on the financial internet, it would be hard to toss a stone and miss articles talking about how high the stock market is. ?One good article from last week was?Why Do U.S. Stocks Keep Hitting Records? Here Are Five Theories from the Wall Street Journal. ?Here were the five theories:

Stocks Reflect the Resurgent Health of American Corporations
The Global Outlook Is Looking Brighter
The U.S. Economy Is in a ?Goldilocks? Situation
Passive Funds Are Propping Up Prices
There Is No Alternative

Of this list, I think answers 1, 3 and 5 are correct, and 2 and 4 are wrong. ?I have a few other answers that I think are right:

Demographics are leading people to buy assets that will provide long-term cash flows.?Monetary policy has led to asset price inflation, not goods price inflation.
People are overestimating the resiliency of the political and social constructs that make all of this possible.
The “Dumb Money” hasn’t arrived yet, but the sale of volatility by retail contradict that.

I disagree with point 2 from the WSJ article because a stronger global economy not only means that profits will rise, but also the cost of capital. ?Depending on which factor is stronger, a stronger global economy can make stocks go up, down, or be neutral.

On point 4, I’ve written about that in?Overvaluation is NOT Due to Passive Investing. ?What matters more than the active/passive mix is the total shift in portfolio holdings into stocks versus everything else. ?When people hold a lot of their portfolio in stocks, stock prices tend to be high.

The active/passive mix does have effect on the relative prices of securities in the indexes versus outside the indexes.?The clearest place to see the impacts of ETFs and indexing is in bonds, where bonds that are in the indexes trade at lower yields and higher prices than similar non-index bonds.

With stocks, it is probably the same, but harder to prove;?I wrote about this here.??In the short run, the companies in the popular indexes are getting a tailwind. That will turn into a headwind at some point, because the voting machine always eventually becomes a weighing machine.

Why are stocks high?

Profit margins are high because of productivity increases from the application of information technology. ?Also, there is a lot of lower paid labor to employ globally which further depresses wage rates in developed countries.

Points 3 and 5 of the WSJ article are almost saying the same thing. ?Interest rates are low. ?They are low because inflation is low,, and general economic activity is not that robust. ?As such, the cost of capital is low, people are willing to pay high prices for stocks and bonds relative to their cash flows.

Part of this stems from demographics, which was my first additional point. ?For those that are retired or want to retire, there aren’t a lot of ways to transfer money earned in the present so that you can get the equivalent purchasing power or better far into the future. ?There are a few commodities that you can store, like gold, but most can’t be stored. ?Thus you can buy bonds if you don’t think inflation will be bad, or inflation-protected bonds if you can live with low real returns. ?Money market funds will keep your principal stable, but also provide little return. ?You can buy stocks if you are willing to get some inflation protection, and run the risk of a rising cost of capital at some point in the future. ?Same for real estate, but substitute in rising mortgage rates.

A shift can happen when the marginal dollar produced by monetary policy shifts from being saved to being spent. ?For now, monetary policy inflates asset prices, not goods prices (much).

My second point says that people are willing to spend more on stocks when they think that the system will remain stable for a long time. ?That seems to be true today, but as I have pointed out before, it discounts the probability of trade wars, real wars, resurgent socialism, and bad future demographics. ?Nations with shrinking populations tend to have poor asset returns. ?Also, nations with unproductive cultures don’t tend to make economic progress.

My third point is equivocal. ?I don’t see a lot of people yelling “buy stock!” ?There’s a lot of disbelief in the market; this is what Jason Zweig was talking about in his most recent WSJ column. ?That said, when I see lots of activity from people shorting volatility through exchange traded products in order to earn returns, it makes me wonder. ?As I have said before, “Nothing brings out the financial worst in people like the lure of seemingly free money.” ?Eventually those trades sting those that stay at the party too long.

So, where does that leave me? ?The market is high, as my models indicate. ?It may remain high for a while, and may get higher still. ?That said, it would be historically unprecedented to remain in the top decile of valuations for more than three years. ?It would be healthy to have the following:

A garden-variety recession
A garden-variety bear market
More varied sector/industry performance

Will we get any of those? ?I don’t know. ?I can tell you this, though. ?For now, my asset allocation risk is on the low side for me, with stocks at around 70% (that is high for most people, but that is how I have lived my life). ?If we get over the 95th percentile of valuations, I will hedge what I can. ?For now, I reluctantly soldier on.

Redacted Version of the July 2017 FOMC Statement

Posted on 26 July 201730 July 2017 by David Merkel

Photo Credit: Leo Newball, Jr. || I visited that building when I was 24.

===========

Comments

Labor conditions are reasonably good. GDP is meandering.
The yield curve is flattening, with long rates falling.
Stocks, bonds and gold rise a little.
I think the Fed is too optimistic about the economy. I also think that they won?t get far into letting securities mature before they resume?reinvestment of maturing bonds. [miswrote that last time]

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 32

Posted on 25 July 2017 by David Merkel

==============================

In my view, these were my best posts written between November 2014 and January 2015:

Stay Calm

Political changes rarely create the policy/legal changes that people fear or hope for, so relax.

Problems in Simulating Investment Returns

There are seven problem areas in investment return modeling that are rarely dealt with, and certainly never as a group. ?That’s why I would encourage you to be at least least slightly skeptical of any simulation analysis that you might receive. ?This goes 10x for the schmendricks that propound multivariate normal simulations.

Revenue Misses Can Be Good

Every dollar in the door may be the same, but not every sale or promise made is equally good. ?The contribution margin matter a lot. ?Earnings, especially future earnings, always matters more than revenues.

Is This Legit?

It is little known that I analyze simple and complex investment situations for third party clients so that they can know whether they have a good deal or not. ?Do you need help with an investment situation that puzzles you?

It?s Their Money

Don’t argue with your clients when they leave. ?Wish them well, and do your best for them until the end.

Lagging Long Yields

Yield curves only shift in a parallel fashion about 40% of the time. ?The actual way that yield curves tend to move tend to overstate long bond durations [interest rate sensitivity] by two years versus a parallel yield curve shift.

Learning from the Past, Part 1

Learning from the Past, Part 2

Learning from the Past, Part 3

The start of a nine-part series on my worst investment mistakes, beginning with a boiler room scam, undue pessimism from macroeconomic forecasts, and Caldor (spit, spit).

Should Jim Cramer Sell TheStreet or Quit CNBC?

My personal reflections about Jim Cramer, and why I think efforts to make him change his ways will fail.

Have Your Cake, Eat It Too, And End Up With Only Crumbs

Why you should avoid margin loans; they are the best, until they are the worst.

On Financial Risk Statements, Part 1

I never completed this series, but here I explain how most financial risk statements are useless to average people. ?It would help a lot if plain language and straight talk scenarios were employed.

Living in the Land of Worries, Part 1

How do you cope with worry in investing? ?What if there are other things to worry about that you aren’t considering? (I also never wrote part 2 for this one.)

Relying on the Kindness of Strangers

If you relied on the Swiss Central Bank to keep its peg to the Euro, you deserved to lose the money. ?Study history, and listen to the naysayers.

The Best of the Aleph Blog, Part 36

Posted on 25 July 2017 by David Merkel

In my view, these were my best posts written between November 2015 and January 2016:

Don?t be a Miser in Retirement (Or Ever)

?There is a fine line between over-saving and under-living.?

Another way to phrase it: God isn?t a miser; you shouldn?t be either.

On Lump Sum Distributions

Managing a lump sum distribution for income is one of the hardest things to do in investing.

Easy In, Hard Out (III)

Continuing the series on the troubles the Fed will have shrinking its balance sheet.

Understand Your Liabilities

Your investment decisions should be driven by when you will need to convert the assets to cash for spending purposes.

The Limits of Risky Asset Diversification

Because of the behavior of investors, and increasing interconnectedness between markets, the degree that risky assets diversify each other has been decreasing over time. ?There is really only one diversifier for risky assets — high quality bonds, whether short or long.

How Much is that Asset in the Window? (III)

Continues the fictitious conversation between me and a friend on the topic of how there are no objective prices in the market, much as we might like them.

Seven Thoughts on the Markets

Learning Investments
OPEC
High Yield
F&G Life
Missing Opportunities
FOMC, and
What could the next crisis be?

Direction Matters More Than Position with Monetary Policy

Accommodation ended a lot sooner than the FOMC said it did

Sell a Fraction of Your Home?

In general, highly idiosyncratic and indivisible assets like a home should not be sold in pieces. ?That said, this idea is better than most.

Annotated ?In Hoc Anno Domini??

Response to ?In Hoc Anno Domini?

My critique of Vermont Royster’s vapid Christmas message which gets published in the Wall Street Journal each year.

On Currencies that are Not a Store of Value

What do you do if you live in a place where high inflation is the norm?

On Currencies That Are A Store Of Value, But Maybe Not For Long

What do you do with the currencies of countries that are currently stable, but aren’t running the most stable economic policies?

Cheapness versus Economic Cyclicality

What do you do when the only cheap, safe companies embed a lot of economic cyclicality? ?I.e., they rely on economic growth in order to do really well…

July 2017	September 2017	Comments
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising moderately so far this year.	Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in July indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising moderately so far this year.	No change.? Feels like GDP is slowing, though.
Job gains have been solid, on average, since the beginning of the year, and the unemployment rate has declined.	Job gains have remained solid in recent months, and the unemployment rate has stayed low.	Shades labor conditions down, as improvement has seemingly stopped.
Household spending and business fixed investment have continued to expand.	Household spending has been expanding at a moderate rate, and growth in business fixed investment has picked up in recent quarters.	Shades business fixed investment up.? Does that matter as much in an intangible economy?
On a 12-month basis, overall inflation and the measure excluding food and energy prices have declined and are running below 2 percent.	On a 12-month basis, overall inflation and the measure excluding food and energy prices have declined this year and are running below 2 percent.	Small change of timing.? It?s not much below 2%…
Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.	Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.	No change
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.	Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.	The Dual Mandate is the perfect shield to hide behind.? The Fed can be wrong, but it can never be blamed.
The Committee continues to expect that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further. Inflation on a 12-month basis is expected to remain somewhat below 2 percent in the near term but to stabilize around the Committee’s 2 percent objective over the medium term.	Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria have devastated many communities, inflicting severe hardship. Storm-related disruptions and rebuilding will affect economic activity in the near term, but past experience suggests that the storms are unlikely to materially alter the course of the national economy over the medium term. Consequently, the Committee continues to expect that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further. Higher prices for gasoline and some other items in the aftermath of the hurricanes will likely boost inflation temporarily; apart from that effect, inflation on a 12-month basis is expected to remain somewhat below 2 percent in the near term but to stabilize around the Committee’s 2 percent objective over the medium term.	Mentions the transitory effects of hurricanes.? Aside from that, they think they are on track.
Near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced, but the Committee is monitoring inflation developments closely.	Near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced, but the Committee is monitoring inflation developments closely.	No change.? Note the unbalanced language, though ? they are only monitoring inflation closely.
In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1 to 1-1/4 percent.	In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1 to 1-1/4 percent.	No change.
The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.	The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.	No change, but monetary policy is no longer accommodative.? The short end of the forward curve continues to rise, and the curve flattens.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.	In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.	No change
This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.	This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.	No change.? If you don?t know what will drive decision-making, i.e., it could be anything, just say that.
The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal.	The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal.	No change. Symmetric: we can?t let inflation get too low, because we don?t regulate banks properly.
The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run.	The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run.	No change
However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.	However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.	No change
For the time being, the Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.		Deleted; QE is over (for now).
The Committee expects to begin implementing its balance sheet normalization program relatively soon, provided that the economy evolves broadly as anticipated; this program is described in the June 2017 Addendum to the Committee’s Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.	In October, the Committee will initiate the balance sheet normalization program described in the June 2017 Addendum to the Committee’s Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.	Promises the very slow end of QE, as they may start to let securities mature.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Charles L. Evans; Stanley Fischer; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; and Jerome H. Powell.	Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Charles L. Evans; Stanley Fischer; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; and Jerome H. Powell.	No dissents; it?s relatively easy to agree with doing nothing.

June 2017	July 2017	Comments
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in May indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising moderately so far this year.	Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June indicates that the labor market has continued to strengthen and that economic activity has been rising moderately so far this year.	No change.? Feels like GDP is slowing, though.
Job gains have moderated but have been solid, on average, since the beginning of the year, and the unemployment rate has declined.	Job gains have been solid, on average, since the beginning of the year, and the unemployment rate has declined.	Shades labor conditions up
Household spending has picked up in recent months, and business fixed investment has continued to expand.	Household spending and business fixed investment have continued to expand.	No real change
On a 12-month basis, inflation has declined recently and, like the measure excluding food and energy prices, is running somewhat below 2 percent.	On a 12-month basis, overall inflation and the measure excluding food and energy prices have declined and are running below 2 percent.	Changes, but to little effect.
Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.	Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed, on balance.	No change
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.	Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability.	No change; somebody tell them that things that can?t change don?t belong here.
The Committee continues to expect that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further. Inflation on a 12-month basis is expected to remain somewhat below 2 percent in the near term but to stabilize around the Committee’s 2 percent objective over the medium term.	The Committee continues to expect that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, economic activity will expand at a moderate pace, and labor market conditions will strengthen somewhat further. Inflation on a 12-month basis is expected to remain somewhat below 2 percent in the near term but to stabilize around the Committee’s 2 percent objective over the medium term.	No change; monetary policy solves all.
Near term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced, but the Committee is monitoring inflation developments closely.	Near-term risks to the economic outlook appear roughly balanced, but the Committee is monitoring inflation developments closely.	No change.
In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate to 1 to 1-1/4 percent.	In view of realized and expected labor market conditions and inflation, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1 to 1-1/4 percent.	No change.
The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.	The stance of monetary policy remains accommodative, thereby supporting some further strengthening in labor market conditions and a sustained return to 2 percent inflation.	No change, but monetary policy is no longer accommodative.? The short end of the forward curve continues to rise, and the curve flattens.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.	In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.	No change
This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.	This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.	No change.? If you don?t know what will drive decision-making, i.e., it could be anything, just say that.
The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal.	The Committee will carefully monitor actual and expected inflation developments relative to its symmetric inflation goal.	No change. Symmetric: we can?t let inflation get too low, because we don?t regulate banks properly.
The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run.	The Committee expects that economic conditions will evolve in a manner that will warrant gradual increases in the federal funds rate; the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run.	No change
However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.	However, the actual path of the federal funds rate will depend on the economic outlook as informed by incoming data.	No change
The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.	For the time being, the Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction.	No change
The Committee currently expects to begin implementing a balance sheet normalization program this year, provided that the economy evolves broadly as anticipated.	The Committee expects to begin implementing its balance sheet normalization program relatively soon, provided that the economy evolves broadly as anticipated;	Accelerates the timing of change.
This program, which would gradually reduce the Federal Reserve’s securities holdings by decreasing reinvestment of principal payments from those securities, is described in the accompanying addendum to the Committee’s Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.	this program is described in the June 2017 Addendum to the Committee’s Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.	Promises the slow end of QE, as they may start to let securities mature.
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Charles L. Evans; Stanley Fischer; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; and Jerome H. Powell.	Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Janet L. Yellen, Chair; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Lael Brainard; Charles L. Evans; Stanley Fischer; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; and Jerome H. Powell.	No dissents; it?s relatively easy to agree with doing nothing.
Voting against the action was Neel Kashkari, who preferred at this meeting to maintain the existing target range for the federal funds rate.		No dissents.