When I was a corporate and mortgage bond manager, I would have to look through prospectuses, if the bonds weren’t vanilla in nature. There was a division of labor — credit analysts would opine on the likelihood of whether a company was “money good,” and portfolio managers would try to decide relative value, analyze structure issues, and figure out whether the bond fit client needs.
The structure part didn’t come up often, but when it did, you’d have to read through a prospectus between a quarter of an inch to an inch thick. There were rewards to doing that. Sometimes I learned that protections weren’t what they seemed… I remember looking at an Enron privately placed bond, and after looking at the complex structure, asking what would happen if Enron’s stock price fell so hard that they couldn’t issue preferred or common equity to redeem the notes. I was told that Enron was a very successful corporation, and that wouldn’t happen. We didn’t buy the deal, and we let some of our existing Enron bonds mature. The protections might be valuable in a minor crisis, but not in a major one. In a major crisis, they would be the equivalent of unsecured debt.
After Enron blew up (and we took losses on the smaller amount of bonds still held — that’s another story), all Enron-like deals began to founder in the market. Dominion Utilities had a bond, Dominion Fiber Ventures, that was an Enron-like structure. It was only 3% of their capital structure, though, so unlike Enron, it wouldn’t kill them. We quietly bought as much as we could, after I read the prospectus, saw the protections (must issue preferred stock to redeem bonds if downgraded and stock price is below a certain price for so much time), and saw that Dominion guaranteed the debt. Dominion’s stock price did fall below the threshold, and a downgrade might come, so Dominion negotiated with bondholders to redeem the debt. We had a 10%+ gain plus interest in less than a year.
My point here is that protective measures in bonds must be adequate for the size of the issue involved, and must be capable of handling a big crisis to truly be effective. With Dominion, the protections were adequate, with Enron, they weren’t. Protective systems can work when they only have to take care of 3% of the capital structure — they will be inadequate at 50%.
Let me point you to a few other areas where this can be a problem. General American went under when they had ratings triggers on their floating rate GICs, as did ARM Financial. All it took was a downgrade, and when the money market funds exercised their puts, they couldn’t meet the redemptions, and they were insolvent. For GA, it was 25% of their capital structure. Metlife bought them for less than 75% of their net assets, and paid off the claimants. Mutual Benefit died for similar reasons. (I was a small part of trying to eliminate such triggers in property-catastrophe insurance.)
Or consider the financial guarantors. What if many different types of insured debt got into trouble at once? We may be seeing that now. If it’s not enough to see structured products in trouble, what of municipalities with soft real estate markets, like Vallejo? The rating agency models give some benefit to lack of correlation in the business mix, but in a systemic crisis, there is greater correlation. Insured obligations are AAA (or if you speak Moody’s Aaa) so long as the system is not overwhelmed. In normal times financial guarantors are money-spinners. There are few defaults, and nothing that is concentrated.
Or consider the auction rate securities markets, with all of the failed auctions of late. The dealers bought bonds when it was to their advantage, or, at least, not a big disadvantage. But when a tidal wave came, they protected themselves and not their issuers. Municipalities are working to refinance the high cost debt that they now have. The end result is bad but not horrid, but it will lead to steep yields in the long end of the muni curve for a while. (Also student loans and closed-end muni funds…)
Finally, think of the variable rate demand note (obligation/bond) market (Hi, Liz, another good article!). It is similar to the auction rate securities market, except there are banks that guarantee (for a time, sometimes to maturity, but usually for more like a year or two) to repurchase notes at par, so long as the municipality is still solvent, and the guarantor is still solvent, and not severely downgraded. The escape clauses have not been triggered, so now the banks that guaranteed repurchase at par must buy the bonds. What happens if the bank runs out of liquidity to make the purchases? The bonds will trade decidedly below par in most cases, even at the maximum interest rate payable.
I could go on from here, and talk about other protective structures that fail in disaster scenarios (Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund?), but you get the idea. Truth is, almost ant protective structure will fail, given a large enough crisis. Strong as the GSEs are, even they could fail in a large enough crisis, though the US government would likely stand behind senior obligations.
The important thing for fixed income investors is to evaluate the level of crisis that any protective structure/covenant might protect against, and how likely that crisis might be. During a period when many aspects of the credit markets are under threat, it’s too late to begin the analysis. Best to analyze when things are calm, and then ask the question, “What if?…”
One of the troubles with the way that academic research in the social (and biological) sciences is set up, is that there is a bias toward publishing research that is statistically significant. Here are some of the problems:
If honestly done, there is value in publishing research that says there doesn’t seem to be any relationship between variable being studied and the cofactors. If nothing else, it would tell future researchers that that avenue has been checked already. Try another idea.
It encourages quiet specification searches, where the researcher tries out a number of different variables or functional forms, until he gets one with significant t-coefficients. Try enough models, one will eventually hit the 95% significance threshold.
What is statistically significant is sometimes not really significant. The result might be statistically significantly different than the null hypothesis, but be so small that it lacks real significance. I.e., learning that a compound increases cancer risk by one billionth should not be significant enough to merit attention.
Researchers are people just like you and me, and all of the foibles of behavioral finance apply to them. They want tenure, promotions, don’t want to be let go, respect from colleagues and students, etc. They have biases in the selection of research and the framing of hypotheses. For example, we can’t assume that stock price movements have infinite variance, because then Black-Scholes, and many other option formulas don’t work. The Normal distribution and its close cousins become a crutch that allows for papers to get published.
Once an idea becomes a researcher’s “baby”, they tend to nurture it until a lot of contrary evidence comes in. (I’ve seen it.)
Famous researchers tend to get more slack than those that are not well-known. I would trot out as my example here returns-based style analysis, which was proposed by William Sharpe. When I ran into it, one of the first things I noticed was that there were no error bounds on the calculations, and that the cofactors were all highly correlated with each other. The paper didn’t get much traction in the academic world, but was an instant hit in the manager selection consultant community. A FAJ paper in 1998 (I think) came up with approximate error bounds, and proved it useless, but it is still used by some consultants today. (I have many stories on that one; it is that only time that I wrote a pseudo-academic paper in my career to keep some overly slick consultants from bamboozling my bosses.)
Data sets are usually smaller than one would like, and the collection of raw data is expensive. Sample sizes can get so small that relying on the results of subsamples for various cofactors can be unreliable. This is a particular problem in the media when they publish the summary results on drug trials, but don’t catch how small the samples were. People get excited over results that may very well get overturned in the next study.
Often companies fund research, and they have an interest in the results. That can bias things two ways: a) A drug company wants their proposed drug approved by the FDA. A researcher finding borderline results could be incented to look a little harder in order to get the result his patron is looking for. b) A finance professor could stumble across a new profitable anomaly to trade on. That paper ends up not getting published, and he goes to work for a major hedge fund.
The same can be true of government-funded research. Subtle pressure can be brought on researchers to adjust their views. Politically motivated economists can ignore a lot of relevant data while serving their masters, and this is true on the right and the left.
The reason that I write this is not to denigrate academic research; I use it in my investing, but I try to be careful about what I accept.
Now, recently, I took a little heat for making a comment that I thought that the unadjusted CPI or median CPI was a better predictor of the unadjusted CPI than the “core” CPI. So, I went over to the database at FRED (St. Louis Fed), and downloaded the three series. I regressed six month lagged unadjusted, median, and core CPI data on unadjusted CPI data for the next six months. I made sure that the data periods were non-overlapping, and long enough that data corrections would induce little bias. I constrained the weights on my three independent variables to sum to one, since that I am trying to figure out which one gets the most weight. My data set had 80 non-overlapping six-month observations stretching back to 1967. Well, here are the results:
Intercept: -0.0002 (good, it should be close to zero)
Unadjusted CPI: 0.1720 (prob-value 12.3%)
“Core” CPI: -0.1665 (prob-value 11.2%)
Median CPI: 0.9945 (no prob-value because of the constraint imposed)
Prob-value on the F-test: 24.3% (ouch)
Adjusted R-squared: 1.10%. (double ouch)
What does this tell me? Not much. The regression as a whole is not significant at a 95% level. Does the median CPI (from the Cleveland Fed) better predict the unadjusted CPI than the “core” or unadjusted CPI? Maybe, but with these results, who can tell? It is fair to say that core CPI does not possess any special ability to forecast unadjusted CPI over a six-month horizon.
From basic statistics, we already know that the median is a more robust estimator of central tendency than the mean, when the underlying distribution is not known. We also know that tossing out data (“core”) arbitrarily because they are more volatile (and higher) than the other components will not necessarily estimate central tendency better. Instead, it may bias the estimate.
So, be wary of the received opinion of economists that are in the public view. Our ability to use past inflation measures to predict future inflation measures is poor at best, and “core” measures don’t help in the explanation.
1) The blog was out of commission most of Saturday and Sunday, for anyone who was wondering what happened. From my hosting provider:
We experienced a service interruption affecting the Netfirms corporate websites and some of our customer hosted websites and e-mail services.
During scheduled power maintenance at our Data Centre on Saturday Feb. 23 at approximately 10:30 AM ET, the building’s backup generator system unexpectedly failed, impacting network connectivity. This affected several Internet and Hosting Providers, including Netfirms.
Ouch. Reliability is down to two nines at best for 2008. What a freak mishap.
2) Thanks to Bill Rempel for his comments on my PEG ratio piece. I did not have access to backtesting software, but now I do. I didn’t realize how much was available for free out on the web. He comes up with an interesting result, worthy of further investigation. My main result was that PEG ratio hurdles are consistent with a DDM framework within certain moderate values of P/E and discount rates. Thanks also to Josh Stern for his comments.
3) I posted a set of questions on Technical Analysis over at RealMoney, and invited the technicians to comment.
Professionals are Overrated on Fundamental Analysis
2/21/2008 5:19 PM EST
I’m not here to spit at technicians. I have used my own version of technical analysis in bond trading; it can work if done right. But the same thing is true of fundamental investors, including professionals. There are very few professional investors that are capable of delivering above average returns over a long period of time. Part of it is that there are a lot of clever people in the game, and that raises the bar.
But I have known many good amateur investors that do nothing but fundamental analysis, and beat the pros. Why? 1) They can take positions in companies that are too small for the big guys to consider. 2) They can buy and hold. There is no pressure to kick out a position that is temporarily underperforming. With so many quantitative investors managing money to short time horizons, it is a real advantage to be able to invest to longer horizons amid the short-term volatility. 3) They can buy shares in companies that have been trashed, without the “looks that colleagues give you” when you propose a name that is down over 50% in the past year, even though the fundamentals haven’t deteriorated that much. 4) Individual investors avoid the “groupthink” of many professionals. 5) Individual investors can incorporate momentum into their investing without “getting funny looks from colleagues.” (A bow in the direction of technical analysis.)
When I first came to RM 4.4 years ago, I asked a question of the technicians, and, I received no response. I do have two questions for the technicians on the site, not meant to provoke a fundy/technician argument, but just to get opinions on how they view technical analysis. If one of the technicians wants to take me up on this, I’ll post the questions — hey, maybe RM would want to do a 360 on them if we get enough participation. Let me know.
I received some e-mails from readers asking me to post the questions that I mentioned in the CC after the close of business yesterday. Again, I’m not trying to start an argument between fundies and techies. I just want to hear the opinions of the technicians. Anyway, here goes: 1) Is there one overarching theory of technical analysis that all of the popular methods are applications of, or are there many differing forms of technical analysis that compete against each other for validity (and hopefully, profits)? If there is one overarching method, who has expressed it best? (What book do I buy to learn the theory?)
2) In quantitative investing circles, it is well known (and Eddy has written about it recently for us) that momentum works in the short run, and is often one of the most powerful return anomalies in the market. Is being a good technician just another way of trying to decide when to jump onto assets with positive price momentum for short periods of time? Can I equate technical analysis with buying momentum?
To any of you that answer, I thank you. If we get enough answers, maybe the editors will want to do a 360.
Position: none
I kinda thought this might happen, but I received zero public responses. I did receive one thoughtful private response, but I was asked to keep it private. Suffice it to say that some in TA think there is a difference between TA and chart-reading.
As for me, though I have sometimes been critical of TA, and sometimes less than cautious in my words, my guesses at the two questions are: 1) There is no common underlying theory to all TA, there are a variety of competing theories. 2) Most chart-readers are momentum players, as are most growth investors. Some TA practitioners do try to profit from turning points, but they seem to be a minority.
I’m not saying TA doesn’t work, because I have my own variations on it that I have applied mainly to bond investing. But I’m not sure how one would test if TA in general does or doesn’t work, because there may not be a commonly accepted definition of what TA would say on any specific situation.
Um, after reading this article at the Financial Times, I thought it would be a good idea for me to point readers to my article that explained the 2005 Correlation Crisis. Odds are getting higher that we get a repeat. What would trigger the crisis? A rapid decline in creditworthiness for a minority of companies whose debts are referenced in the relevant credit indexes, while the rest of the companies have little decline in creditworthiness. One or two surprise defaults would really be gruesome.
Just something to watch out for, as if we don’t have enough going wrong in our debt markets now. I bumped into some my old RM articles and CC comments from 2005, and the problems that I described then are happening now.
Position: none, and there are times when I would prefer not being right. This is one of them. Few win in a bust.
There are situations that are micro-stable and macro-unstable, and await some force to come along and give it a push, knocking it out of its zone of micro-stability, and into a new regime of instability. When you write about situations like that before the fact, it is quite possible that you can end up wrong for a long time. I wrote for several years as RM about overleveraging credit, mis-hedging, yield-seeking, over-investment in residential real estate (May 2005), subprime lending (November 2006), quantitative strategies gone awry, etc. The important thing is not to put a time on the prediction because it gives a false message to readers. One can see the bubble forming, but figuring out when cash flow will be insufficient to keep the bubble financed is desperately hard.
5) This brings up another point. It’s not enough to know that an investment will eventually yield a certain outcome, for example, that a distressed tranche of an ABS deal will eventually pay off at par. One also has to understand whether an investor can handle the financing risks before receiving the eventual payoff. Will your prime broker continue to finance you on favorable terms? Will your regulator force you to put up more capital against the position? Will your investors hang around for the eventual payoff, or will they desert you, and turn you into a forced seller? Can your performance survive an asset that might be a dud for some time?
This is why the price path to the eventual payoff matters. It shakes out the weak holders, and moves assets that should be financed by equity onto strong balance sheets. It’s also a reason to be careful with your own balance sheet during boom times, and in the beginning and middle of financial crises — don’t overextend your positions, because you can’t tell how long or deep the crisis might be.
6) I agree with Caroline Baum; I don’t think that the FOMC is pushing on a string. The monetary aggregates are moving up, and nominal GDP will as well… it just takes time. The yield curve has enough slope to benefit banks that don’t face a lot of credit problems… and the yield curve will steepen further from here, particularly if the expected nadir of Fed funds drops below 2%. Now, will real GDP begin to pick up steam? Not sure, the real question is how much inflation the Fed is willing to accept in the short run as they try to reflate.
7) Now, inflation seems to be rising globally. At this point in the cycle, the FOMC is ahead of almost all major central banks in loosening policy. I think that is baked into the US dollar at present, so unless the FOMC gets even more ahead, the US Dollar should tread water here. Eventually inflation elsewhere will get imported into the US. It’s just a matter of time. That’s why I like TIPS here; eventually the level of inflation passing through the CPI will be reflected in implied inflation rates.
8 ) Okay, MBIA will split in 5 years? That is probably enough time to strike deals with most everyone that they wrote coverage for structured products, assuming the losses are not so severe that the entire holding company is imperiled. If it’s five years away, splitting is a possibility, but then are the rating agencies willing to wait that long? S&P showed that they are willing to wait today. Moody’s will probably go along, but for how long?
9) I found it interesting that AQR Capital has not been doing well in 2008. When quant funds did badly in the latter half of 2007, I suffered along with them. At present, I am certainly not suffering, but it seems that the quants are. I wonder what is different now? I suspect that there is too much money chasing the anomalies that the quant funds target, and we reached the end of the positive self-reinforcing cycle around mid-year 2007; since then, we have been in a negative self-reinforcing cycle, with clients pulling money, and the ability to carry positions shrinking.
10) Now some graphs tell a story. Sometimes the story is distorted. This graph of the spread on Fannie Mae MBS is an example. Not all of the spread is due to the creditworthiness of Fannie Mae. Those spreads have widened 30 basis points or so over the past six months for Fannie’s on-the-run 5-year corporate bond, versus 50 basis points on the graph that I referenced. So what’s the difference? Increased market volatility makes residential MBS buyers more skittish, and they demand a higher yield for bearing the negative optionality inherent in RMBS. Fannie and Freddie are facing harder times from the guarantees that they have written, and the credit difficulties at the mortgage insurers, but it would be difficult to imagine the US Government allowing Fannie or Freddie to default on senior obligations.
That’s another reason why I like agency-backed RMBS here. You’re getting paid a decent spread to bear the risks involved.
11) I would be cautious about using prics from CMBX, ABX, etc., to make judgments about the cash bonds that they reference. It is relatively difficult to borrow and short small ABS and CMBS tranches. It is comparatively easy to buy protection on the indexes, the only question is what level does it take to induce another market participant to sell protection to you. When there is a lot of pressure to short, prices overshoot on the downside, and stay well below where the cash bonds would trade.
12) One last point, this one coming via one of our dedicated readers passing on this blurb from David Rosenberg at Merrill Lynch:
A client sent this to us last week
It was a New York Times article by Louis Uchitelle in December 1990 on the housing and credit crunch. In the article, there is a quote that goes like this ? ?This is different from the experience of the Great Depression, but something related to the 1930?s is beginning to happen?. Guess who it was that said that (answer is at the bottom of the Tidbits).
Answer to question above
?Ben Bernanke, a PrincetonUniversity Economist? (and future Fed chairman, but who knew that then?).
My take: it is a very unusual time to have a man as Fed Chairman who is a wonk about the Great Depression. That makes him far more likely to ease. The real question is what the FOMC will do if economic weakness persists, and inflation continues to creep up. I know that they want to save the day, and then remove all policy accomodation, but that’s a pretty difficult trick to achieve. In this scenario, I don’t think the gambit will work; we will likely end up with a higher rate of price inflation.
As I have said before, most companies in financial trouble would just love to split themselves in two.? Create company A with the good business, and company B with the bad business, and the holding company owns them both.? Send company B into insolvency, and the holding company hasn’t lost much… most of the value was in company A.? Who lost, though?? The creditors of the company before the split, who now rely on company B.? In the real world, it gets called fraudulent conveyance.
Ackman’s proposal avoids that.? It makes the CDO guarantor the owner of the municipal guarantor, and the holding company only directly owns the CDO guarantor.? From my example above, it would mean that the holding company would own company B, which in turn owns company A.? If B goes bust, creditors of B still have the advantage of being to draw on the value of company A in insolvency.? In this split-up, in the short run, no one’s rights are compromised.
But for Ackman, it is still talking his book, because he is trying to protect against a split-up where the holding company owns both A and B independently, because the holding company (which he is short) is worth more if the regulators allow such a split-up, and the court cases fail that challenge such a split-up.
This is one of those cases where the proposer of the idea gets ignored because of his self-interest.
It has been one year since I started The Aleph Blog. During that time, we have seen a lot of changes:
The panic in China in late February 2007.
The troubles in subprime, home equity, and residential real estate generally. (Commercial real estate is a work in progress.)
Increased realized volatility in the markets.
Increased price inflation.
The accelerated decline in the US Dollar.
Blowout of private equity lending.
Trouble as the rating agencies and the financial guarantors.
Trouble in the money markets from SIVs and ABCP.
Troubles in the municipal bond markets, mainly from overspeculation, but also from troubles at the guarantors.
The FOMC shifts from being an inflation fighter to a weak economy and lending fighter.
I left my previous employer (good guys generally), and have become employed elsewhere (a much better match for my abilities and desires).
My broad market portfolio has adjusted to changing market conditions, and continues to outperform the S&P 500, as it has for the last 7.5 years.
Pretty amazing, I think. My blog is an expression of my character in the economics/finance/investment world. I have a lot of interests, so my blog is diversified in what I write about. There is almost always someone more experienced than me writing about a given issue. I think of myself as a good number 2 (3? 5? 10?) on many issues. Because of that, my job is to look for the interactions — the second-order effects in other markets that may give us a clue as to future happenings.
If you want to see a sampling of what I felt my best articles have been, you can look here. If you have other nominations for this category, I am all ears.
Why did I start the blog? Rejection from those that I wrote for and worked with. I was frustrated, and needed an outlet for self-expression. Learning from what I wrote at RealMoney, from the first day, I followed the same ethics code, to protect those that I worked for.
What of the future? I plan on some meaty articles on inflation, the PEG ratio, some book reviews, and perhaps a series on long-term investing for children. (In addition to what I mentioned in Post 500.)
Now, I did not expect the level of acceptance that I received in my first year, and so I thank my readers. I have been quoted in a wide number of places that I would not have expected when I started this. I only ask that if you like what I write, please refer my blog to your friends, as it seems best to you.
To all of my readers, here’s to a profitable year number two. Thanks for being with me over the past year. For those that have commented here, a special thank you. To my family and church, thank you. Finally, thanks be to Jesus Christ. Woo-hoo! What a great year! 😀
Perhaps I should start with a small apology because my post yesterday did not even consider the forthcoming release of the FOMC minutes.? Not that I would have had anything great to say, but being asleep is being asleep. 😉
1) I’ve been banging the increasing inflation drum for a few years, and now I think inflation is getting some traction.? There was the CPI report today, of course, but I don’t put too much stock in monthly numbers — there is too much noise.? (I don’t think anyone wonders why I don’t spend a lot of time on quarterly, monthly or weekly data releases, but if anyone does wonder, it is because the signal to noise ratio is low.? The shorter the period, the lower it gets.)? I follow a melange of public and private bits of data, but try to look at it over longer periods of time — at least a year if possible.? A rise in inflation will make the FOMC’s life difficult.? I have been arguing for asset deflation and price inflation for some time now, and that is not a mix that I would enjoy trying to manage, if I were on the FOMC.
2) But there’s another reason why I have been arguing for price inflation.? It was about four years ago that I suggested on RealMoney that the cycle would end when China begins to experience a bout of price inflation.? Well, we are there now.? It was simple for China (and other nations) to ship us goods or provide services when the US Dollar was stronger, and inflation was low.? It is much harder with a weaker dollar, and rising price inflation.? The people of China need American goods, not more paper promises stuffed inside their central bank.
3) A few central banks aside from the Fed have loosened recently, but not many, and not much.? The US is walking alone here, and other nations are trying to cope.? Many other countries are willing to let their economies slow a bit, and perhaps let their currencies rise versus the US dollar in order to reduce inflation.? A few are still tightening.? The inflationary impacts of our monetary policy continue to radiate out, and will continue to, until the Fed starts its next tightening cycle.
4) The way I understand the FOMC’s behavior at present, is that they will drop rates hard for a time, and then remove policy accommodation dramatically once normal economic activity resumes.? My concern is that it may be more difficult removing policy accommodation than many suppose.? The TAF is holding down the TED spread at present, though the TED spread is still high.? What happens when it goes away?? Extending liquidity is always easier than removing it.? And, as it said in the 1/21/2008 portion of the FOMC minutes:
Some members also noted that were policy to become very stimulative it would be important for the Committee to be decisive in reversing the course of interest rates once the economy had strengthened and downside risks had abated.
The FOMC is not intending on letting low short rates remain for a long time.? That would make me queasy if I had a lot of money riding in the belly of the yield curve, say 4-7 years out.
5)? How would I characterize the FOMC minutes, then?? Weak economy, but not a shrinking economy.? Difficulties in the lending markets; credit spreads are high.? Inflation higher than we would like, but economic weakness, especially that affecting the financial system comes first.
6) From yesterday, my friend Dr. Jeff asked:
What was the Fed reply about M3?? I have continuing curiosity about this topic, as you know.? My economist friends tell me that it is not a useful measure.? It includes elements that are exchanges not increasing monetary supply and is also not subject to policy action.? MZM is interesting, but distorted by investors selling stocks and going to cash.? The latest macro textbooks stick to M2.
Meanwhile, many wingnuts (not you of course) see the dropping of the M3 reporting as some conspiratorial move.? They credit large government bureaucracies with much more conspiratorial power than could possibly be mustered!
By reading actual transcripts, you have vaulted into the top 1% of Fed analysts – if you were not there already 🙂
The nice fellow at the Fed who e-mailed me back confirmed that I should be looking at the H.8 report for an M3 proxy.
If you’re not into monetary policy, you can skip this. Within the month, the Federal Reserve will stop publishing M3. Now, I think M3 is quite useful as a gauge of how much banks are levering themselves up in terms of credit creation, versus the Fed expanding its monetary base. I have good news for those anticipating withdrawal symptoms when M3 goes away: The Federal Reserve’s H.8 report contains a series (line 16 on page 2 – NSA) for total assets of all of the banks in the US. The correlation between that and M3 is higher than 95%, and the relative percentage moves are very similar. And, from a theoretical standpoint, it measures the same thing, except that it is an asset measure, and that M3 incorporated repos and eurodollars, which I think are off the balance sheet for accounting purposes, but should be considered for economic purposes.
But it’s a good substitute… unless Rep. Ron Paul’s bill to require the calculation of M3 passes, this series will do.
Position: noneI since modified that to be total liabilities, and not total assets.? My use of M3 is a little different than most economists.? There is a continuum between money and credit, and M3 is more credit-like, while measures that don’t count in time deposits are money-like.? My view of M3 was versus other monetary measures, helping me to see how much the banking system was willing to borrow from depositors in order to extend credit.? As an aside, non-M2 M3 growth is highly correlated with stock price movement (according to ISI Group).
7) I give credit to the members of the FOMC who said (regarding the intermeeting 75 bp rate cut):
However, some concern was expressed that an immediate policy action could be misinterpreted as directed at recent declines in stock prices, rather than the broader economic outlook, and one member believed it preferable to delay policy action until the scheduled FOMC meeting on January 29-30.
This is just an opinion, but on policy grounds, I would have found it preferable for the FOMC to have cut 125 basis points on the 30th, rather than the two moves.? I don’t believe that the FOMC should react to short-term market conditions, and in general, they should avoid the appearance of it.? Monetary policy works with a long and variable lag.? One week would not have mattered; the FOMC needs to consider the way their actions appear, as well as what those actions are.
I like variety at my blog.? I like to think about a lot of issues, and the interconnections within the markets.? Sometimes that makes me feel like a lightweight compared to others on critical issues.? But what I am is a stock and bond investor who analyzes the economy to make better investment decisions, primarily at the sector level, and secondarily at the asset class level.
At present, analyzing the FOMC is a little confusing.? Why?
We have Fed Governors speaking their minds, because Bernanke doesn’t maintain the control that Greenspan did.? Thus we hear a variety of views.
The economy is neither strong nor weak, but is muddling along.
The Dollar is weak, but doesn’t seem to be getting weaker; it seems that a pretty accommodative forecast of FOMC policy has been baked in.
MZM and my M3 proxy are running ahead at double-digit rates, while M2 trots at around 6%, and the monetary base lags at a 2% rate.? We are now more than nine months since our last permanent injection of liquidity.? I asked the Federal Reserve in an e-mail to tell me what the longest time was previously between permanent open market operations one month ago, but they did not respond to me.? (They did respond to me when I suggested my M3 proxy, total bank liabilities.)
The Treasury yield curve still has a 2% Fed funds rate in 2008, but the recent curve widening should begin to inject some doubt into the degree of easing that the Fed can do.? Once yield curves get near maximum steep levels, something bad happens, and the loosening stops.? At a 2% Fed funds rate, we will be near maximum steep.
The TAF auctions have reduced the TED spread to almost reasonable levels, but it almost seems that the Fed can’t discontinue the auctions, because the banks have found a cheap source of financing for collateral that can’t be accepted under Fed funds.
At present, I see a 50 basis point cut coming at the 3/18 meeting.? That’s what fits the yield curve, Fed funds futures, and the total chatter.? For the loosening trend to change, we will need something severe to happen, such as a inflation scare or a dollar panic.
Now the equity markets are not near their peak, but the debt markets are showing more fear, and that is what is motivating the Fed.? Capital levels at banks?? Credit spreads on bonds?? Ability to get financing?? The Fed cares about these things.
In some ways, Bernanke cares the most.? Of all the people to have in the Fed Chairman seat at this time, we get a man who is a scholar on the Great Depression, and determined to not let it happen again, supposing that it was insufficient liquidity from the Federal Reserve that led to the Depression.? That might not have been the true cause, but it does indicate a Fed biased toward easing, until price inflation smacks them hard.
One last note.? Though I haven’t read through the 2001 transcripts of the FOMC, I have scanned the 1999 and 2000 transcripts.? The FOMC is flexible in the way that they view policy, and willing to consider things that aren’t perfectly orthodox, such as the stock market, even if it is hidden in the rubric of the wealth effect.
Thanks to Naked Capitalism for pointing out this post by Paul Krugman. Here was my response:
Mr. Krugman, do your homework.Extend the graph out to five years, and you will see that yields on Baa bonds fluctuated between 7.1% and 5.7% over that time period.The correlation between Fed funds and Moody’s Baa series was pretty small during that time period, whether the fed funds rate was rising or falling.I just calculated the R-squared on the regression — 0.1%, for a 3.2% correlation.
Maybe it’s just a bad time period, so I ran it back to 1971, which was as far as my Bloomberg terminal would let me go.(Maybe I’ll go to FRED and download longer series, and use Excel, but I don’t think the result will be much different — the R-squared was 6.5%, for a correlation coefficient of 25.5%.Not a close relationship in my book for two time series relationships that are both interest rates.
Practical economists like me are aware that credit-sensitive investments often have little practical relationship to Fed funds.We work in the trenches of the bond market, not the isolation of academic economics, where you don’t contaminate your theories with data.
The Fed may or may not be pushing on a string, but you have certainly not proven your case.
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Here’s the graph for the Fed funds rate and Moody’s Baa yield series since 1971. (When I ran my calculations, I used monthly, but could only get the graph back to 1971 if I went to quarterly.
(graph: Bloomberg)
As I said, not much of a correlation, but why so low?? This is related to a topic on which Bill Rempel has asked me for an article.? (To do that article, I have to drag a lot of yield data off of Bloomberg for analysis; I will be getting my full subscription soon, and once that happens, I can start.)
As an investment actuary, I’ve had to develop models of the full? maturity/credit yield curve — maturities from 3 months to 30 years (usually about 10 points) and credit from Treasuries, Agencies and Swaps to Corporates, AAA to Single-B.? A Treasury yield curve at any point in time can be fairly expressed by a four factor model, and the R-squared is usually around 99%.? (I learned this in 1991, and there is a funny story around how I learned this, involving a younger David and a Bear Stearns managing director.)
The short end of the Treasury yield curve is usually far more volatile than the long end in yield terms (but not in price terms!).? All short high-quality rates are tightly correlated, and that includes Fed funds, Agency discount notes, T-bills, LIBOR (well, usually), A-1/P-1 commercial paper, etc.? As one goes further down the yield curve in maturity, the correlations weaken, but still remain pretty tight among bonds rated single-A or better.? (As a further note, Fed funds and 30-year Treasury yields also don’t correlate well.)
Credit is its own factor, which varies with expectations of the economy’s future prospects.? A single-B, or CCC borrower can only repay with ease if the economy does well.? If prospects are looking worse, no matter what the Fed does to short high-quality rates, junk grade securities will tend to rise in yield.? Marginal investment grade securities (BBB/Baa) will tread water, and short high-quality bond yields will correlate well with Fed funds.
When I say “credit is its own factor,” what I am saying is that outside of Treasury securities, every credit instrument participates to varying degrees in exposure to the future prospects of the economy.? (Credit in its purest form behaves like equity returns.)? For conservatively capitalized enterprises with high quality balance sheets, their credit spreads don’t change much as prospects change for the economy.? For entities with low quality balance sheets, their spreads change a lot as prospects change for the economy.
So, for two reasons, Mr. Krugman should not have expected the Fed funds target rate and the Moody’s Baa yield to correlate well:
Fed funds is a short rate, and Moody’s Baa is relatively long (bonds go over the full maturity spectrum).
Fed funds correlates well with the highest quality yields, and Baa is only marginally investment grade.? Recessions should hurt Baa spreads, leaving yields relatively constant.
The move may help regulators protect investors who have municipal bonds insured by the firm. But it could also force banks who are large holders of the other securities to take significant losses. Some banks that have been talking with FGIC in recent weeks to bolster the firm were taken aback by the announcement and could yet try to block it, say Wall Street executives.
and —
The banks learned of the split-up plan Friday by seeing it reported on CNBC, this person said, calling it a “bizarre situation.”
All of the banks have hired legal counsel and are prepared to go to court. The person familiar with the situation said FGIC’s move could result in “instant litigation.” FGIC didn’t respond to queries about the banks’ reaction to Friday’s announcement.
?now, it could lead to:
One plan the parties are discussing involves commuting, or effectively tearing up, the insurance contracts the banks entered into with FGIC, according to another person familiar with the matter. In exchange, FGIC would pay the banks some amount to offset the drop in value of those securities, or give them equity stakes in the new municipal-bond insurance company.
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However, if a breakup is endorsed by the New York Department of insurance, that could limit the legal liability.
One other wild card: If FGIC splits into two, it could throw into turmoil potentially billions of dollars of bets that banks, hedge funds and other investors have made on whether FGIC would default on its own debt. If FGIC is split, it isn’t clear how those “credit default swaps” would be valued, since one half of the new company would have a higher risk of default than the other.
?To the extent that the NY Department of Insurance limits the legal liability of PMI, they raise their own liability.? If I were one of the banks, I would sue the State of New York, and quickly, because NY is moving more quickly than they ought to.? There is no NY crisis here, and the politicians and bureaucrats of New York should behave as gentlemen, and not thugs.
Now, one thing I would agree with the NY Department of Insurance on is this: no dividends to the holding companies.? Until things stabilize, retain assets at the operating companies in order to make sure that claims can be paid.? If MBIA and PMI go broke, that is no great loss, except to those that hold equities, or holding company debt.? But if the operating subsidiaries go broke, that is significant to those who will make claims against the companies.
This will be a brief note because it is late, but the state insurance commissioners lack authority to favor one class of claimants over another to the degree of setting up a “good bank/bad bank” remedy, where municipalities get preferential treatment ovr other potential claimants.? The regulators allowed the nonstandard business to be written for years, with no objection.? The insureds that would be forced into the “bad bank” would likely not have agreed to the contract had they known that the claims-paying ability of the guarantor would be impaired.
There is nothing in contract law that should favor municipalities over other claimants.? Now, if they want to modify the law prospectively, that’s another thing.? Create a separate class of muni insurers, distinct from financial guarantors that can guarantee anything for a fee.? Different reserving and capital rules for each class.
Now this doesn’t mean that New York won’t try to split the guarantors in two; I think they will lose on Ambac because it is Wisconsin-domiciled.? With MBIA, they will lose after a longer fight, because they don’t have the authority to affect the creditworthiness of contracts retroactively.
